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I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys may seek to practice law in a state on either a per-
manent or a temporary basis. An attorney's permanent admission
to the bar may take two forms-first time or initial admission
upon receiving a law degree and admission after having practiced
in another state. In both of these cases, the applicant must comply
with certain requirements before being admitted to the state's
bar.1 Among the requirements that may be mandated by a state
are demonstration of good moral character, successful completion
of a bar examination, some form of residency, payment of fees, and
graduation from an accredited law school. Temporary admission or
admission pro hac vice is permission to try a single lawsuit in a
foreign jurisdiction.' An attorney seeking temporary admission
must also comply with certain requirements before being granted
permission to appear.3
Attorneys have a substantial interest in successfully complet-
1. A state can require bar applicants to possess certain qualifications in order to be
eligible for admission as long as those qualifications are rationally related to fitness to prac-
tice law. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
2. See note 821 infra and accompanying text.
3. See note 828 infra and accompanying text.
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ing the requirements for admission to the bar, particularly in the
case of permanent admission. Obviously, obtaining a license to
practice law is the sine qua non to an attorney's continuing career.
Similarly, a state has a substantial interest in ensuring that its at-
torneys are both academically and morally competent to practice
law. The state has a duty to protect prospective clients as well as a
significant interest in safeguarding the efficient administration of
justice."
Considering the significant interests involved in bar admission
decisions, it is not surprising that when a state denies admission to
an applicant, litigation is likely to follow. Despite the inherently
local nature of bar admission regulation, 5 states cannot deny ad-
mission to an applicant or lay down rules contrary to federal con-
stitutional principles. 6 Often the foundation of claims by rejected
bar applicants is that the state violated rights granted under the
federal constitution. These claims focus on a number of constitu-
tional provisions, ranging from the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses to the commerce and privileges and immunities
clauses.
Recently, there has been a surge of publicity and comment di-
rected toward the problems of attorneys who are denied either per-
manent or temporary admission to the bar.7 Several factors have
contributed to the recent interest in this problem. First, the num-
ber of people taking the bar examination has increased steadily
over the past five years.8 Second, the law practice of many attor-
neys has taken on an increasingly interstate character resulting in
4. See notes 50-52 infra and accompanying text.
5. Because attorneys are officers of the court, the power to admit, control, and disbar
them inherently resides with the state's judiciary. Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Examiners,
438 F.2d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 1971).
6. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. at 239.
7. See, e.g., Rout, Flunking the Bar Exam Frustrates Thousands of Law-School
Grads, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1981, at 1, col. 1; National L.J., Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 4; Note, A
Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements Under the Interstate Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 HAv. L. Rsv. 1461 (1979); 79 COLum. L. Rxv.
572 (1979).
8.
Year Total Taking Total Passing Percent Passing
1975 46,414 34,144 74.0%
1976 49,099 34,951 70.0%
1977 51,970 36,514 70.0%
1978 53,980 36,434 67.4%
1979 57,676 39,631 68.8%
Source: BAR ExAImm (1975-1979) (taken from the annual statistics compiled by the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiners).
658 [Vol. 34:655
BAR ADMISSIONS
a need to appear and practice in more than one state.' Finally,
more licensed attorneys are moving on a permanent basis from one
state to another during their careers, and such mobility requires
them to seek permanent admission in a second or third state.10
Thus, because more attorneys are seeking various types of admis-
sion, states deny admission to a greater number of people.
This Special Project examines and analyzes selected constitu-
tional challenges to requirements for permanent and temporary
admission to the bar. In the area of permanent admission, the Spe-
cial Project looks at constitutional challenges to three qualifica-
tions typically required of bar applicants by states: demonstration
of good moral character, successful completion of a bar examina-
tion, and residency. In the area of admission pro hac vice, the Pro-
ject examines constitutional challenges to the basis on which
judges have denied temporary admission to an applicant.
One issue with which the Project does not deal in depth is
federal jurisdiction in bar admission cases. A brief overview of this
question, however, is necessary to a complete understanding of bar
admission cases. Although state courts are competent to decide
federal questions raised by unsuccessful bar applicants, n such in-
dividuals often seek federal court appellate' or original s involve-
ment. The responsibility for regulation of the bar, including bar
admissions, resides inherently with the state judiciary, usually the
state supreme court.14 In the exercise of this power, the state su-
preme court performs two types of functions: rulemaking 5 and ad-
judication. 6 The rulemaking function refers to promulgation of
general regulations that apply to all applicants, such as residency
requirements. The adjudicative function refers to a court's decision
9. See Part 11, Section C, subsection 2.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980) (invalidating bar
residency requirement as violative of federal constitution).
12. See, e.g., In re Stoler, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232 (1957).
13. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Bar Examiners, 623 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1980); Woodard
v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979); Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977); Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examin-
ers, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
14. See note 5 supra. The courts can properly delegate this authority to a body such
as a board of bar examiners. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923). See note 42 infra and
accompanying text.
15. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
16. See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
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in an individual case-that is, whether a particular applicant
should be admitted to the bar. These functions form the basis for
determining what type of federal court intervention is appropriate
in a given circumstance.
The Constitution limits the exercise of federal jurisdiction to
cases and controversies within the meaning of Article rI.17 In a
case involving appellate jurisdiction, In re Summers," the Su-
preme Court held that "[a] claim of a present right to admission to
the bar of a state and a denial of that right is a controversy"
within the meaning of Article 111.19 Thus, the Court held that it
could constitutionally review federal issues raised by the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision to deny admission to the petitioner.20
When a state supreme court has rendered a decision in a given
case, the only federal court involvement that is appropriate is ap-
pellate review of the federal issues by the United States Supreme
Court.2 1 Such review is discretionary except in limited circum-
stances. 22 Thus, when a state court renders a decision concerning a
particular applicant's fitness for admission to the bar, the exclusive
avenue of federal review is by the Supreme Court if federal issues
17. U.S. CONST. Art. IX, § 2, cL 1. This provision provides as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority-,-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controver-
sies to which the United States shall be a Party--to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of dif-
ferent States;-between Citizens of the Same State claiming Lands under grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.
18. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
19. Id. at 568.
20. Id. at 568-69.
21. See, e.g., Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1356 (E.D.N.C.
1970) ("a final judgment properly rendered by a state court in any proceeding is reviewable
only by state appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court").
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). Section 1257 provides in part:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States
is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
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are raised.2
A different situation is presented by a constitutional challenge
to the general rules that govern admission to the bar and to the
administration of those rules. Federal district courts are competent
to hear such challenges in an original action, generally filed pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.' 4 In Doe v. Pringle"5 the Tenth Circuit
stated that
while federal courts do exercise jurisdiction over many constitutional claims
which attack the state's power to license attorneys involving challenges to
either the rule-making authority or administration of the rules... such is
not true where review of a state court's adjudication of a particular applica-
tion is sought .... [Tihe latter claim may be heard, if at all, exclusively by
the Supreme Court of the United States."'
Thus, federal court jurisdiction is appropriate in state bar admis-
sion cases in limited circumstances. It should be noted that while
federal courts are competent to exercise jurisdiction as described,
they are not required to do so27 Thus, principles of federalism and
comity have resulted in great reluctance on the part of federal
courts to become involved in bar admission cases.'
II. PERMANENT ADMISSION To THE BAR
The power to determine who shall be permanently admitted to
the practice of law resides with the state." Only if a bar applicant
shows that the state has violated his constitutional rights can a
23.. Brown v. Board of Bar Examiners, 623 F.2d 605, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1980); Woodard
v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 598 F.2d 1345, 1346 (4th Cir. 1979); Doe v. Pringle, 550
F.2d 596, 597 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977); MacKay v. Nesbett, 412
F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Jurisdiction to entertain such suits is given to federal district courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1976).
25. 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
26. Id. at 597 (emphasis in original).
27. A federal court may decline jurisdiction of a case that it is competent to hear on
grounds of comity or abstention in deference to the involvement of a state in the matter.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
28. See, e.g., Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596, 600-03 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 916 (1977); MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1969).
29. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Exam-
iners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Martin-Trigona v. Underwood,
529 F.2d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1975).
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federal court interfere with this determination. On the state level,
the control of bar admissions rests inherently with the judiciary,
although the state legislature may formulate general standards or
guidelines. 1 Typically, the state supreme court acts as the general
overseer of the bar and delegates the responsibility of daily admin-
istration to a board or committee of bar examiners.3 The final
power in this area, however, rests with the court, and it is the court
that ultimately admits or rejects an individual applicant.3
In the process of admitting applicants to the bar, states exer-
cise two types of functions. A framework of rules and regulations
that apply to all applicants is set up by the state supreme court,
the board of bar examiners, or the state legislature, and this con-
stitutes a rulemaking function." A quite different function is exer-
cised by the courts that admit or reject a particular applicant on
the basis of his individual circumstances by application of permis-
sible standards. In such a situation, the court is exercising an adju-
dicative function.35 This subtle but significant difference assumes
major importance when courts must decide issues of federal juris-
diction 6 and due process.
Consistent with due process, states can require bar applicants
to possess "high standards of qualification, such as good moral
character or proficiency in its law. '' 8 Common "qualifications" re-
quired by states include good moral character, 9 successful comple-
30. Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977). For
a discussion of federal court jurisdiction in bar admission cases, see notes 11-28 supra and
accompanying text.
31. Feldman v. Board of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 669, 702 (8th Cir. 1971); In re La-
vine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935); Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939 (1969).
32. Mavity, State Rules Governing Admission to the Bar: Comparisons and Com-
ments, in BAR ADWSSION RuL AND STUDENT PRAcncE RuLn 8-9 (F. Klein ed. 1978). The
bar examiners are assisted in some states by a committee on character and fitness. The bar
examiners and the members of the committee on character and fitness are usually appointed
by the state's highest court, but in some states statutes require their appointment by the
governing body of the state bar. Id. at 9. For a discussion of the operation of the Committee
on Character and Fitness of the New York Bar, see Schwartz, What Is a Character and
Fitness Committee?, 49 N.Y. STATE B.J. 302, 302-06, 398-401, 440-42, 494-99 (1977).
33. See note 480 infra and accompanying text.
34. See Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916
(1977); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
35. See Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916
(1977); MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1969).
36. See notes 11-28 supra.
37. See notes 81-82 infra.
38. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
39. All states currently require an applicant to demonstrate good moral character.
[Vol. 34:655662
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tion of a bar examination4 0 and some form of residency.41 In most
states, after an investigation of the applicant and the administra-
tion of the bar examination, the bar examiners recommend to the
state supreme court whether the applicant should be admitted.4'
Courts have varied in determining the conclusiveness of the bar
examiners' decisions,43 but in general the courts give considerable
weight to these recommendations." The applicant who is not rec-
ommended for admission may challenge the findings of the board,
usually in an original action in the state's highest court.4" Through-
out the application process, the burden of proof is on the
applicant.' 6
Unsuccessful bar applicants have mustered a wide variety of
constitutional challenges to state requirements for permanent ad-
mission to the bar, utilizing the due process and equal protection
clauses as well as the commerce clause and the privileges and im-
munities clause. This part of the Special Project examines the con-
stitutional implications of three common requirements: good moral
character, proficiency in law as demonstrated by successful com-
pletion of a bar examination, and residency."
Mavity, supra note 4, at 8. For a complete discussion 6f the good moral character require-
ment, see Part II, Section A, infra.
40. Almost all states require an applicant to complete successfully a bar examination,
the only exception being those states with "diploma privilege." See note 380 infra. For a
discussion of the bar examination, see Part H, Section B infra.
41. A majority of the states have some form of residency requirements. See note 495
infra. For a discussion of residency requirements, see Part I, Section C infra.
42. The Supreme Court has held that the determination of which individuals have the
requisite qualifications to be admitted into a profession may properly be committed to a
body such as a board of bar examiners. See Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923).
43. See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 301, 314-17 (1959).
44. See, e.g., In re Feingold, 296 A.2d 492 (Maine 1972) (certification by board that a
person was of good moral character is entitled to "great weight"). Despite this deference,
courts generally are free to disregard the recommendations of the bar examiners. "The
Board is an administrative aid to the court. It does not itself admit applicants to the bar
... but merely makes recommendations to the court, which recommendations the court
may or may not elect to follow." Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699, 702
(8th Cir. 1971).
45. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 254 (1957).
46. Placing the burden of proof on the applicant is not a violation of due process.
Martil-Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Rogers, 297 N.C. 48, 253
S.E.2d 912 (1979).
47. Some states require their bar applicants to graduate from an accredited law schooL
This requirement has generated considerable controversy resulting in a number of lawsuits.
Uniformly, courts have upheld this requirement as a reasonable qualification for admission
to the bar. See, e.g., Santos v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 618 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding the
Alaska requirement of graduation from an accredited law school); Brown v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 623 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1980) (approving in dictum the Nevada requirement of
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:655
A. Good Moral Character
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners"8 the Supreme Court
held that, consistent with due process, states may require bar ap-
plicants to demonstrate good moral character to qualify for admis-
sion to the bar. Historically, the requirement of good moral charac-
ter stemmed from the peculiar nature of the practice of law in
American society. As Justice Frankfurter stated,
[A]ll the interests of man that are comprised under the constitutional guar-
antees given to "life, liberty and property" are in the professional keeping of
lawyers . . .. From a profession charged with such responsibilities there
must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of
granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that




In less noble terms, states have two legitimate goals in ensuring
that their lawyers possess good moral character: the protection of
prospective clients and the assurance of the orderly and efficient
administration of justice.50 Because of the law's technical nature,
the unscrupulous lawyer, in his role as a counselor, could easily
mislead a trusting client.51 Similarly, the litigating attorney has ac-
cess to a variety of devices that could be used to obstruct the judi-
cial process.2
Currently, all states require bar applicants to make a showing
graduation from an accredited law school); Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.
1966) (upholding the Arizona requirement of graduation from an accredited law school).
48. 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
49. Id. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50. Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Comm., 116 Conn. 409, 415, 165 A. 211, 213
(1933) ("The ultimate purpose of all regulations of the admission of attorneys is to assure
the courts the assistance of advocates of ability, learning, and sound character and to pro-
tect the public from incompetent and dishonest practitioners."). See generally Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 301, 304-09 (1959); Note, Admission to the Bar Following Conviction for Refusal
of Induction, 78 YALa L.J. 1352, 1355-62 (1969).
Because these goals fall within the proper exercise of the state's police power, they are
legitimate state purposes. A third state purpose is sometimes suggested: the protection of
the reputation of the bar. E.g., State ex rel Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Wiebusch, 153 Neb.
583, 594-95, 45 N.W.2d 583, 586-87 (1951). This requirement has been rejected, however, by
at least one commentator as superfluous and unconstitutionally vague. 65 YALE L.J. 873, 879
(1956).
51. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 358 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 1978); 65 YALE L.J. 873,
879 (1956).
52. Such devices include subornation of perjury, Paonessa v. State Bar, 43 Cal. 2d 222,
272 P.2d 510 (1954); intentionally deceiving opposing counsel, Coviello v. State Bar, 275
P.2d 482 (Cal. 1954); and bribery of jurors, In re Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 47 N.E.2d 12
(1943).
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of good moral character.5 Generally, the investigation to deter-
mine if an applicant has satisfactorily demonstrated this require-
ment is conducted by the board of bar examiners or by a commit-
tee on character and fitness." This investigative body is rarely
provided with specific criteria of fitness"5 and is therefore free to
consider a wide range of facts and circumstances. Typically, the
applicant must fill out an extensive questionnaire for the commit-
tee, in which he is asked, among other things, whether he has ever
been arrested, charged with, or questioned regarding the commis-
sion of a crime, and if so, the circumstances involved.5 The appli-
cant also is generally required to submit several letters of recom-
mendation to the board or committee.57 In some states, the
investigative body relies almost entirely on information supplied
by the applicant, but in other states, a thorough investigation is
made by a local subcommittee in the applicant's county of
residence.' 8
Because of the absence of specific guidelines and the large
amount of discretion accorded to the investigative body, courts
that review decisions of the bar examiners must be particularly
careful in determining what character requirements may be consti-
tutionally required of bar applicants. This section of the Special
Project examines due process problems associated with the re-
quirement of good moral character. First, the section sets forth the
due process analysis that the Supreme Court has announced for
reviewing two aspects of this requirement: rules of general applica-
tion and determinations on an individual basis. The section next
examines due process cases in which a decision has been made that
53. See note 39 supra.
54. Mavity, supra note 32, at 8-9.
55. Note, Admission to the Bar Following Conviction for Refusal of Induction, 78
YALE L.J. 1352, 1354 (1969).
56. See the suggested questionnaire of the National Conference of Bar Examiners,
THE BAR ExAmmIlas' HANDBOOK 70-74 (1968).
57. See, e.g., id. at 74. Because the burden of proof rests on the applicant, see note 46
supra, in close cases, many letters of recommendation may be submitted by the applicant.
For example, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), the applicant
introduced letters from all but one member of his law school class and all available law
school professors.
58. Mavity, supra note 32, at 48. Compare RuLEs GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, R. 1:25 (West 1981) ("It shall be the duty of the committee... on
character to determine the fitness to practice law of each candidate... on the basis of and
by reviewing the personal record and reputation of each candidate .... .") with RULES FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF INDIANA, R. 12 (requiring, at a minimum, a committee on charac-




a person's pattern of conduct justified a finding of bad character.
Finally, this section explores due process/first amendment chal-
lenges to rules that require bar applicants to furnish information
concerning their political beliefs and associations.
1. Due Process-The Analytical Framework
The fourteenth amendment mandates that no state shall deny
to persons within its jurisdiction due process of law.5 9 Under cur-
rent due process analysis, courts initially look to the nature of the
interest involved to determine whether it is "within the contempla-
tion of the 'liberty or property' language of the fourteenth amend-
ment."' 0 Thus, a bar applicant receives due process protection only
if he can prove a deprivation of a liberty or property interest en-
compassed by the fourteenth amendment.8 1 In Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners2 the Supreme Court recognized that bar appli-
cants possess a protected interest in permanent admission to the
bar, but the Court failed to state whether that interest was a prop-
erty or a liberty interest. In order to understand the bar admission
cases, it is necessary to explore further the nature of the interest
involved.
Although the scope of protected property interests has been
expanded far beyond personalty and real property to include such
items as welfare benefits" and tenured public employment," the
Supreme Court has not defined property so broadly as to include
an applicant's interest in being admitted to the bar. The Court
consistently has stated that the Constitution does not create prop-
erty interests; rather, such interests must be created and defined
by an independent source such as state law. 5 Relying on the inde-
pendent source, the claimant must demonstrate a "legitimate claim
of entitlement."66 Such an entitlement requires that an individual
59. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
60. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
61. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). For a general discussion of
liberty and property interest, see Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CoRNsm L.
Rnv. 405 (1977).
62. 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). See also Willner v. Committee on Character & Fit-
ness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262 (1957).
63. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
64. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
65. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 9 (1978); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972).
66. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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have "more than an abstract need or desire . .. [or] a unilateral
expectation" 7 of receiving a benefit. Thus, in Board of Regents v.
Roth,68 when a teacher who was not rehired upon the expiration of
a one year contract was unable to demonstrate more than an ex-
pectation of being rehired, the Court concluded that no property
right existed. Similarly, an applicant for admission to the bar has
no entitlement to practice law-he has only an expectation of be-
ing allowed to practice."' Therefore, bar applicants have no consti-
tutionally recognizable property interest. 0
A bar applicant, however, does have a liberty interest in being
admitted to the bar. In contrast to its lack of involvement in the
defining of property interests, the Supreme Court has recognized
constitutionally based liberty interests. The Court has defined lib-
erty so that the concept now encompasses much more than "mere
freedom from bodily restraint"71 and includes
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occu-
pations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own con-
science, and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized... as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
72
Despite this seemingly broad definition of liberty, the Court in
Roth refused to find a liberty interest in the teacher's continued
employment. Citing Schware, the Court acknowledged that "a
State, in regulating eligibility for a type of professional employ-
ment, cannot foreclose a range of opportunities 'in a manner...
that contravene[s] . . . Due Process.' "7 The Court, however, dis-
tinguished the situation of the teacher in Roth from that of the bar
applicant in Schware, noting that the teacher's "record of nonre-
tention... would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of op-
portunities amounting to a deprivation of 'liberty' ,f4 like that pre-
67. Id.
68. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
69. "To disbar an attorney is to deprive him of what, within the meaning of our con-
stitutions of government, may fairly be regarded as property. But one who asks the privilege
of admission to the bar is simply seeking to obtain a right of property which he has not got."
In re O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 55, 63 A. 777, 780 (1906) (citations omitted).
70. But see Reese v. Board of Comm'rs of AL. State Bar, 379 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1980),
in which the Alabama Supreme Court held that "[tihe right to practice law is a valuable
property right, which can be denied only by due process of law." Id. at 569 (emphasis
added).
71. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
72. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
73. 408 U.S. at 574.
74. Id. at 574 n.13.
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sent when a bar applicant is denied admission. Because a teacher
who is dismissed still has the opportunity to seek employment with
other public institutions in the state, the Court reasoned that the
teacher had not been deprived of a liberty interest. "It stretches
the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty'
when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as
before to seek another. '7 5 On the other hand, the unsuccessful bar
applicant does not have the opportunity to seek alternative legal
employment. Once excluded from the bar, a bar applicant is de-
nied all opportunity to practice law within the state; furthermore,
if the adverse determination is based upon a finding of bad charac-
ter, other states may also deny him admission.7 6 This "gross" fore-
closure of opportunity elevates the applicant's interest to the sta-
tus of a liberty and therefore triggers due process protection."
Once a protected fourteenth amendment interest is found, the
Court reviews the state's action to determine whether an unconsti-
tutional deprivation has occurred. When a rule or regulation of
general application is involved, principles of substantive due pro-
cess apply. If a fundamental interest 8 is involved, then the com-
pelling interest test applies: the individual's interest cannot be in-
fringed unless the state's interest is compelling and the method
used is the least restrictive alternative. If the interest is not fun-
damental, then the rational basis test applies and the state's action
will be justified if it bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate
75. Id. at 575.
76. Inquiries into the Political Beliefs and Activities of Applicants for Admission to
the Bar, 1 COLUM. SURVEY OF HumAN RIGHTs 33, 53 (1967-1968).
77. The special considerations involved in a bar admission case were also recognized
by the Supreme Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957):
While this is not a criminal case, its consequences for [the applicant] take it out of
the ordinary run of civil cases. The Committee's action [in denying the applicant mem-
bership in the bar] prevents him from earning a living by practicing law. This depriva-
tion has grave consequences for a man who has spent years of study and a great deal of
money in preparing to be a lawyer.
Id. at 257-58.
78. Fundamental interests include freedom of association, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); freedom of speech, e.g., Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); free
exercise of religion, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); Contwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); personal privacy, e.g., Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); freedom of
travel, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See generally Note, The Less Restrictive
Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Crite-
ria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974).
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state purpose.8 0
When the Court reviews an adjudicative proceeding or a deter-
mination on an individual basis, a different mode of analysis is em-
ployed. First, the state must satisfy procedural due process re-
quirements-that is, some form of notice and an opportunity to be
heard must be afforded to the individual."" Second, the decision
rendered must rest on sufficient grounds-that is, based upon the
evidence before the decisionmaker; the result must not be
arbitrary.
82
(a) Patterns of Conduct Resulting in a Finding of Bad Moral
Character: Due Process Review of Individual Determinations
(1) Introduction
The Supreme Court has given extensive consideration to state
applications of the good moral character requirement in two cases,
80. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
81. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1266
(1965).
In the bar admissions context, the procedural requirements are settled. In Willner v.
Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), the applicant had passed the New
York bar examination in 1936 but was denied admittance by the committee on character
and fitness. In order to apply again, a New York applicant was required to obtain written
consent of the Appellate Division. Such consent was repeatedly denied to Willner. At no
time was the applicant given a hearing, allowed to confront witnesses against him, or in-
formed of the specific reasons for the denial of his application. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the requirements of procedural due process were not met. The Court found the
applicant was "clearly entitled to notice of and a hearing on the grounds for his rejection."
Id. at 105. See also Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1971); In re Monaghan, 126
Vt. 53, 56, 222 A.2d 665, 669 (1966).
The four member plurality in Willner insisted on the need to allow the applicant to
confront adverse witnesses, but the three concurring justices did not interpret the plurality
decision to mean that cross-examination is automatically required in all cases. Id. at 107-08
(Goldberg, J., concurring). More recent cases, however, have found procedural due process
violations when the applicants were denied the opportunity to confront and examine wit-
nesses. Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964); Application of Dinan, 157
Conn. 67, 244 A.2d 608 (1968); Ex parte Kellar, 81 Nev. 240, 401 P.2d 616 (1965); Appeal of
Incardi, 436 Pa. 364, 260 A.2d 782 (1970).
An applicant has the right to present evidence on his own behalf, including favorable
witnesses and letters of recommendation. Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205
(1964); Ex parte Kellar, 81 Nev. 240, 401 P.2d 616 (1965). Unsuccessful applicants may
challenge the decision of the bar examiners, usually by petitioning the state's highest court.
Appeal from the state supreme court is only by writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court. Doe v. Pringle, 550 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916
(1977).
82. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Exam-
iners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957). See notes 83-124 infra.
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Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners"3 and Konigsberg v. State
Bar,84 finding on both occasions that the exclusion of the appli-
cants constituted a violation of the due process clause. Despite
strong evidence of good character submitted by both Schware 5
and Konigsberg,e6 the bar examiners of their respective states re-
fused to certify their good character 7 and the state supreme courts
upheld the bar examiners' determination."8
In Schware the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on three
grounds in finding that Schware was not of good moral character.
First, for a four year period ending over twenty years prior to his
seeking admission to the bar, Schware had used aliases to avoid
anti-Semitism in seeking employment and organizing non-Jewish
workers."9 Second, Schware was one of a large number of strikers
arrested but not tried on charges of "suspicion of criminal syndi-
calism."'' 0 He was also arrested, indicted, but not tried for violating
the Neutrality Act of 1917 by allegedly recruiting persons to fight
for the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War.91 Finally, Schware was a
member of the Communist Party during the depression.2 Follow-
ing New Mexico's refusal to admit him to the bar, Schware peti-
tioned the Supreme Court for review, alleging that he had been
denied the opportunity to practice law in violation of due pro-
cess.93 The Court began its analysis by stating that "[a] state can-
not exclude a person from the practice of law ... in a manner or
83. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
84. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
85. At the hearing before the New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners, Schware's wife,
his rabbi, a local attorney, the secretary to the dean of the law school, and Schware himself
testified as to his good character. Schware introduced letters from every member of his law
school class except one and from all of his law school professors who were then available.
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 235 (1957).
86. Konigsberg submitted written statements from 42 individuals who had known him
over the past 20 years and who attested to his excellent character. Konigsberg v. State Bar,
353 U.S. 252, 264 (1957).
87. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 234-35 (1957); Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 259 (1957).
88. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304, 291 P.2d 607 (1955). The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, without opinion, denied Konigsberg's petition for review. Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 254 (1957).
89. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 240 (1957).
90. Id. at 241. Schware testified that approximately 2000 persons were arrested in con-
nection with the strike. Id. at 241 n.7. Schware was arrested at least two times on suspicion
of criminal syndicalism. Id. at 241.
91. Id. at 242.
92. Id. at 243.
93. Id. at 238.
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for reasons that contravene ... Due Process . ... "" The Court
then continued,
A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral char-
acter or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but
any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's
fitness or capacity to practice law .... Even in applying permissible stan-
dards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis
for their finding that he fails to meet these standards. .... 95
The Court then framed the issue in the case as "whether the Su-
preme Court of New Mexico on the record before us could reason-
ably find that he [Schware] had not shown good moral charac-
ter."' Thus, the Court clearly distinguished between the type of
due process review applied to a general requirement, such as good
moral character, that is applicable to all candidates and the type of
due process review applied to a finding that a single applicant does
not meet this general standard. The Court concluded that "[t]here
is no evidence in the record which rationally justifies a finding that
Schware was morally unfit to practice law."' 7
In reaching this conclusion, the Court carefully combed the
evidence in the record. The Court quickly dismissed the claim con-
cerning the use of aliases, finding that no intent to cheat or de-
fraud was involved.98 Two important rules were established in the
Court's consideration of Schware's arrest record. First, "[t]he mere
fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative
value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct.""9 Be-
cause formal charges were never brought against Schware in con-
nection with the strike and because such a large number of strikers
were arrested, the Court attached virtually no significance to his
arrests on charges of criminal syndicalism.100 The Court also delin-
eated a second important rule: "In determining whether a person's
character is good the nature of the offense which he has committed
94. Id.
95. Id. at 239 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 246-47 (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 240-41.
99. Id. at 241 (footnote omitted). "An arrest shows nothing more than that someone
probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense. When formal charges are not filed
against the arrested person and he is released without trial, whatever probative force the
arrest may have had is normally dissipated." Id.
100. The significance of the arrests was further diminished in the eyes of the Court
because of the large number of strikers arrested, see note 71 supra, and because of the
broadness and vagueness of the California syndicalism statutes in effect at the time of
Schware's arrest. 353 U.S. at 241-42 (1957).
1981]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
must be taken into account." 101 Looking at Schware's alleged viola-
tion of the Neutrality Act, the Court noted the idealism of young
men who, in the prelude to World War II, volunteered to fight for
causes they believed right, and determined that even if it were
shown that Schware had violated the Act, no moral turpitude was
involved.10 2 Finally, concerning Schware's past Communist affilia-
tion, the Court emphasized the legality of the Communist Party at
the time and concluded that the mere fact of past membership
"does not justify an inference that he presently has bad moral
character."' 03 The Court carefully examined evidence in the record
of the applicant's present moral character. After considering the
oral and written testimony of those who knew Schware,'" the
Court evaluated him as "a man of religious conviction" with a
demonstrated "solicitude for others.' 0 5 Schware was said to be an
industrious' and candid'07 person and "a man of high ideals with
a deep sense of social justice."'' 08 Finding no substantial doubts as
to Schware's present moral character, the Court concluded that no
rational justification existed to exclude Schware from the bar.'0 '
In Konigsberg the applicant was refused admission to the bar
because he failed to prove that he was of good moral character and
that he did not advocate the overthrow of the government by un-
constitutional means." 0 The bar examiners based their conclusion
about Konigsberg's character on the testimony of an ex-Commu-
nist who claimed to have witnessed him at meetings of the Com-
munist Party in 1941, and on his editorials that criticized certain
public officials."' The second conclusion was based upon Konigs-
101. Id. at 243 (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 242-43.
103. Id. at 244. The Court attempted to justify Schware's membership in the party by
pointing out that at the time when Schware joined the Communist Party, the United States
was in the depression and that many people were, along with Schware, led to believe that
the radical economic changes suggested by the Communists were necessary. Id.
104. See note 85 supra.
105. 353 U.S. at 240. In evaluating character, the Court demonstrated a willingness to
take a wide variety of evidence into account. Evidence of Schware's solicitude for others was
demonstrated by his practice of reading the Bible to an illiterate soldier while in the Army
and law to a blind student while in law school. Id.
106. Schware's industry was demonstrated by his operation of a business to support
his family while he studied law. Id.
107. Schware's full disclosure of his personal history to the dean of his law school
demonstrated candor. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 246.47.
110. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 253 (1957).
111. Id. at 266.
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berg's refusal to answer questions about his political beliefs and
associations.112 The applicant petitioned the Supreme Court for re-
view, claiming a violation of due process because the evidence in
the record did not rationally support a finding of doubt about his
character or loyalty.113 The Court agreed with this contention, con-
cluding that "the evidence does not rationally support the only two
grounds upon which the Committee relied in rejecting his [Konigs-
berg's] application for admission to the California Bar.11 4 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court found the testimony of the ex-
Communist to be unconvincing, and further stated that even if it
were assumed that Konigsberg had been a Communist, his mere
membership would not support a finding of lack of good moral
character because the Communist Party had been a legal, recog-
nized political party at the time."" The Court held that no infer-
ence of bad moral character could be drawn from the series of edi-
torials in which Konigsberg severely criticized public officials and
public policy, stating instead that such free expression is essential
to a democratic society.1 With respect to Konigsberg's refusal to
answer questions about his relationship to the Communist Party,
the Court held that bad character would not be inferred if such
refusal was based upon a good faith belief that the Constitution
prohibited such inquiries.117 The Court engaged in an extensive
discussion of the evidence of Konigsberg's "honest and upright"
life,118 quoting from four of the forty-two written recommendations
and detailing his employment in "responsible professional
112. Id. at 271.
113. Id. at 262.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 266-68.
116. Konigsberg's editorials criticized, inter alia, American involvement in the Korean
War, "the actions and policies of the leaders of the major political parties, the influence of
'big business' in American life, racial discrimination, and [the Supreme] Court's decisions in
Dennis [v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)] and other cases." Id. at 268.
117. Id. at 270. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether Konigsberg's consti-
tutional objections to the inquiries were well founded. Id. After the case was remanded and
Konigsberg again refused to answer questions about his membership in the Communist
Party, however, the bar examiners and the state court again refused to certify his good
character and, on appeal, the United States Supreme Court was forced to address the ques-
tion directly. The Court held that Konigsberg was not constitutionally justified in refusing
to answer the questions and that the refusal to admit him to the bar was not unconstitu-
tionally arbitrary. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). For a discussion of more
recent cases on the subject of refusal to answer bar application questions, see text accompa-
nying notes 245-63 infra.




Acknowledging the usefulness of the good moral character re-
quirement in regulating bar admissions, the Court cautioned that
the term is "unusually ambiguous. '120 "Such a vague qualification,
which is easily adapted to fit personal views and predilections, can
be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial
of the right to practice law."'121 The Court observed that California
case law defined good moral character in terms of an absence of
moral turpitude,122 but for the purposes of the instant case the
Court adopted a broader standard: a person could justifiably be
excluded from the bar if "a reasonable man could fairly find that
there were substantial doubts about [the applicant's] 'honesty,
fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the
state and nation.' 123 Finding no "authentic reliable evidence of
unlawful or immoral actions reflecting adversely upon him,"' 4 the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further
consideration.
Schware and Konigsberg clearly indicate that the Supreme
Court considers exclusion from the bar on character grounds a very
serious determination that should not be made without sufficient
justification. It appears that "sufficient" grounds means more than
a showing that the record is devoid of any evidence to support the
decisionmaker's conclusion. 25 For example, in Schware the Court
held the applicant's indictment for violation of the Neutrality Act
of 1917 and his other arrests were not sufficient evidence to sup-
port a rational conclusion of bad moral character. Yet, it seems
that such evidence could produce different conclusions as to char-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 262-63. "[A]ny definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences,
and prejudices of the definer." Id. at 263.
121. Id. But see Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247-49 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter argued that although good moral character
is a rather imprecise standard, it is not so indefinite as to be an impermissible requirement.
See also Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1971) ("Long
usage [of the good moral character requirement]... has given well-defined contours to this
requirement."). At least one commentator, however, has questioned whether the good moral
character standard meets the standard of certainty required by the due process clause. 48 U.
CIN. L. REv. 876 (1979).
122. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. at 263.
123. Id. at 264.
124. Id. at 273.
125. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 199 (1960) ("The ultimate
question presented to us is whether the charges against petitioner were so totally devoid of
evidentiary support as to render his conviction unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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acter among reasonable people, and that the state court's opinion
was not totally arbitrary. Thus, due process would seem to require
a strong showing of bad character to support exclusion from the
bar. The Court's concern is further demonstrated by the care it
used in analyzing both the alleged offenses and the evidence of
good character. In both cases the Court evaluated each indication
of bad character individually and thoroughly. The Court examined
a wide range of factors offered as indications of good moral charac-
ter, seemingly finding no detail too trivial for its consideration. 1
Schware and Konigsberg suggest a two-step process in deter-
mining whether a finding of bad character is rationally supported
by the evidence in the record., First, a court must consider the na-
ture of the acts offered as evidence of bad character. If the acts are
insufficient to infer bad character, the analysis ends and the appli-
cant is admitted. Second, if the acts are serious enough to indicate
a lack of good moral character, the court, bearing in mind that the
burden of persuasion remains on the applicant, must evaluate the
applicant's evidence of his present good moral character in light of
the evidence of bad character. The court may uphold the exclusion
only if it determines that the evidence of the applicant's character,
on balance, indicates that the bar examiners were justified in their
decision and that therefore due process was not denied.
State courts do not usually discuss bar admission decisions in
a constitutional context; often, the issue is stated as a factual ques-
tion: Does the applicant possess good character? Implicit in all bar
admission cases, however, must be a concern for whether the exclu-
sion can withstand due process scrutiny. The two-step analysis
suggested in this Special Project therefore provides a helpful
framework for studying how state supreme courts determine
whether bar applicants have been accorded due process protection
in the assessment of their fitness to practice law.
(2) Criminal Conduct
Evidence of criminal conduct is a common reason to question
126. Justice Rehnquist, then a practicing attorney in Phoenix, severely criticized the
Schware and Konigsberg cases, saying that "what the Supreme Court of the United States
has done in each of these cases is to give the applicants a de novo trial on the basis of the
printed record. It has chosen to believe every self-serving statement made by each applicant
and on the basis of such 'facts' to hold that the findings below were not 'rationally justi-
fied."' Rehnquist, The Bar Admission Cases: A Strange Judicial Aberration, 44 A.B.A. J.
229, 232 (1958).
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the good moral character of an applicant.12 7 Courts generally agree
that the existence of a criminal record does not require an auto-
matic rejection of an applicant; rather, this is a factor to be consid-
ered in evaluating his present moral character. 128 Thus, it has been
held that proof of some independent act beyond the mere fact of a
criminal conviction is necessary in order to demonstrate moral un-
fitness-the nature of the act and the circumstances surrounding
its commission must be considered. 29 What the act reveals about
the moral fitness of the applicant is more important than a techni-
cal determination of whether the act is, in fact, illegal.80
The seriousness of the crime is a primary consideration. Thus,
courts have held that a shoplifting conviction within five years of
the application was insufficient evidence of bad character to ex-
clude the applicant.81 Similarly, it has been held that, although a
petty larceny conviction is relevant to an assessment of his charac-
ter, it will not automatically disqualify a bar applicant.8 2 The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court has adopted the position that only acts so
heinous as to constitute moral turpitude are permissible grounds
127. A discussion of all types of behavior that has been sufficient to justify the exclu-
sion of bar applicants is beyond the scope of this Special Project. Rather, this Special Pro-
ject will discuss the courts' method of analysis as that analysis has been used with respect to
criminal conduct, homosexuality, cohabitation, and bankruptcy. The analytical framework
suggested herein is equally applicable to other acts offered by bar examiners as evidence of
bad conduct.
For a more thorough discussion of types of conduct that have been used as evidence of
bad moral character, see Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 192 (1978) (criminal conduct); 64 A.L.R.2d 301
(1959) (crimes and other specific acts of misconduct).
128. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 192 § 3[a] (1978). The practical effect of the
existence of a criminal conviction is to increase the burden of proof on the applicant to show
his good moral character. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447,421 P.2d
76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966); In re Davis, 38 Ohio St. 2d 273, 313 N.E.2d 363 (1974).
129. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 228 (1966).
130. See In re Alpert, 269 Or. 508, 525 P.2d 1042 (1974) (applicant had engaged in
dubious, though possibly legal, stock dealings). Applicants have also been excluded upon the
basis of a finding that a record of arrests indicates bad character even though all charges
were dropped. E.g., Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 P. 697 (1930) (receiving stolen
property, forgery, misappropriation of guardianship funds, violation of Mann Act); In re
Stover, 65 Cal. App. 622, 224 P. 771 (1924) (cheating in dice game and attempting to short
change a restaurant cashier); In re Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1944) (con-
spiracy). But see Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) ("mere fact
that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has
engaged in any misconduct").
131. In re Howard C., 286 Md. 244, 407 A.2d 1124 (1979). See also In re Allan S., 282
Md. 683, 387 A.2d 271 (1978) (seven years since last shoplifting offense).
132. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 183 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1966).
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for exclusion.183 The court's definition of moral turpitude is broad
enough to include "everything done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals" and "act[s] of baseness, vileness or de-
pravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and man."' " The
Florida Supreme Court has rejected the moral turpitude standard
as too narrow. Instead, that court would permit the finding of a
lack of good moral character when a person is found to have en-
gaged in "acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to
have substantial doubts about an individual's honesty, fairness,
and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state
and nation. 1 3 5 The distinction appears to be one of semantics
rather than of substance. Regardless of whether the standard is la-
belled as moral turpitude, it is clear that the more heinous the of-
fenses the more likely it is that the applicant will be found to lack
good moral character.
At least two courts have shown sympathy to applicants who
had a criminal record but whose crimes were considered the result
of past conditions of drug addiction or alcoholism.136 While suffer-
ing from alcoholism one applicant had, among other things, com-
mitted a battery on his wife and had pointed a firearm at his
son.137 Another applicant was arrested on a series of larceny and
shoplifting offenses during a period when he was addicted to illegal
drugs.133 While the drug addiction and alcoholism did not excuse
the applicant's behavior, they did change the weight given by the
court to the offenses. Thus, the inferences of bad character drawn
from those acts were not as great as would normally be the case.13 9
133. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 452-53, 421 P.2d 76, 81,
55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (1966).
134. In re Alkow, 64 Cal. 2d 838, 840-41, 415 P.2d 800, 802, 51 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914
(1966) (citations omitted).
135. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978).
136. In re Application of AT., 286 Md. 507, 408 A.2d 1023 (1979) (drug addiction); In
re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665 (1966) (alcoholism). In the absence of evidence of
past addiction, the courts appear to treat drug offenses in the same manner as other crimi-
nal acts. See, e.g., In re Dileo, 307 So. 2d 362 (La. 1975); In re Estes, 580 P.2d 977 (Okla.
1978).
137. In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 222 A.2d 665 (1966).
138. Applicant used heroin, morphine, and dilaudid. In re Application of A.T., 286
Md. 507, 408 A.2d 1023 (1979).
139. Observing that the applicant's difficulties with the law ended concurrently with
his overcoming alcoholism, the court reasoned that his difficulties were not an inherent part
of his character. In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 60, 222 A.2d 665, 671 (1966).
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Because evidence of criminal activity almost always provides
some inference of bad moral character reflecting adversely on the
applicant's fitness to practice law, courts require considerable evi-
dence of present good moral character. The ultimate inquiry, of
course, is the determination of whether the applicant has the pre-
sent good moral character needed to be admitted to the bar.140 The
criminal record is therefore imoortant only insofar as it provides a
clue to the applicant's present character. Thus, the court's task is
to determine if the applicant has demonstrated his rehabilitation
from his former criminal nature.
4 1
A broad spectrum of factors affect the court's finding of reha-
bilitation. Especially important are the absence of criminal con-
duct over a substantial period of time 42 and evidence that the ap-
plicant has been productive-either by being gainfully employed or
by having pursued an education-during that time. 43 Also rele-
vant is the applicant's renunciation of his past behavior24 4 and his
candor in completely informing the investigating body of his per-
sonal history.145 If the applicant had been convicted of drug or al-
cohol related offenses, then it is extremely important that he show
that he has abstained from their use for a significant period of
time."46 Finally, the granting of a pardon will have a positive influ-
ence on the good character determination, but the past criminal
activity is still relevant."47
140. E.g., In re Dreier, 258 F.2d 68, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1958); In re Application of Allan S.,
282 Md. 683, 690, 387 A.2d 271, 275 (1978); In re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 57, 222 A.2d 665,
670 (1966).
141. E.g., In re Application of A.T., 286 Md. 507, 515, 408 A.2d 1023, 1027 (1979); In
re Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 690, 387 A.2d 271, 275 (1978).
142. E.g., In re Dileo, 307 So. 2d 362, 364-65 (La. 1975); In re Application of Allan S.,
282 Md. 683, 692, 387 A.2d 271, 277 (1978).
143. E.g., In re Application of A.T., 286 Md. 507, 513, 408 A.2d 1023, 1027 (1979).
144. E.g., March v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 67 Cal. 2d 718, 731-32, 433 P.2d 191,
200, 63 Cal. Rptr. 399, 408 (1967); In re Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 691, 387 A.2d
271, 276 (1978).
145. E.g., In re Application of Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 691, 387 A.2d 271, 275 (1978).
146. E.g., In re Application of A.T., 286 Md. 507, 515, 408 A.2d 1023, 1028 (1979); In
re Monaghan, 126 Vt. 53, 66, 222 A.2d 665, 675 (1966).
147. E.g., Lark v. West, 289 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 865 (1961); In
re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 361 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1978); In re Dileo, 307 So. 2d 362 (La.
1975); In re Cassablanca, 30 P.R.R. 368 (1922). Some state statutes provide for the
mandatory exclusion of convicted felons. For example, a Florida statute forbids anyone
"who has been convicted of an infamous crime" from the practice of law. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
454.18 (West 1965). Restoration of civil rights will allow a convicted felon to be considered
for the bar. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 183 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1966). In Florida, civil
rights may be restored if the felon has received a full pardon, served the maximum term of
his sentence, or been granted a final release by the parole and probation commission. FLA.
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(3) Sexual Behavior
Recent applicants have not been denied admission to the bar
on grounds of their homosexuality or cohabitation.148 The homo-
sexuality of bar applicants has been addressed in only two rather
limited cases, one of which was not an initial admission case. 14' In
In re Application of Kimball'" the Court of Appeals of New York
reversed for reconsideration the denial of admission of a homosex-
ual applicant who had, sixteen years earlier, been disbarred in
Florida following a sodomy conviction. While finding the appli-
cant's status contrary to accepted norms, the court held that his
homosexuality was relevant but not controlling in assessing moral
character for purposes of admission to the bar. 51
In response to a certified question from the Florida Board of
Bar Examiners, the Florida Supreme Court held that an otherwise
qualified applicant could not rationally be denied admission be-
cause of his sexual orientation or preference. 1 '5 The court, how-
ever, reserved judgment on circumstances when evidence estab-
lishes that the applicant had engaged in homosexual acts.' " The
narrowness of the Florida holding is doubtless the result of the jus-
tices' concern about the applicant's violation of the state's sodomy
law.1" The technical illegality of homosexual acts has provided the
STAT. ANN. § 940.05 (West 1973).
148. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978); In re Application of
Kimball, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973); Cord v. Gibb, 219 Va.
1019, 254 S.E.2d 71 (1979).
149. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978); In re Application of
Kimball, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973).
150. 33 N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973).
151. Id.
152. In re Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 358 So. 2d 7, 10 (1978). The court repeated
the reasoning of one of its judges on this issue in a related context-
The present record contains no evidence-scientific, medical, pathological or other-
wise-suggesting homosexual behavior among consenting adults is so indicative of
character baseness as to warrant a condemnation per se of a participant's ability ever
to live up to and perform other societal duties, including professional duties and re-
sponsibilities assigned to members of The Bar.
Id. (quoting with approval Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378, 380 (Fla. 1970) (Ervin, C.J.,
specially concurring)).
153. 358 So. 2d at 8.
154. Florida law proscribes "any unnatural and lascivious act with another person."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976). Citing this statute, one judge dissented: "There
should not be admitted to The Florida Bar anyone whose sexual life style contemplates
routine violation of a criminal statute." 358 So. 2d at 10 (Boyd, J., dissenting). A similar
concern was expressed by the dissent in Kimball: "It cannot be denied that the Appellate
Division has full and complete authority to deny admission to the Bar, to one who is an
avowed and admitted persistent violator of any criminal statute." In re Application of Kim-
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only significant argument against the admission of homosexuals.1 55
In Cord v. Gibb'56 the only reported case involving an appli-
cant living with a person to whom she was not married, the court,
considering the nature of the applicant's act, said, "While Cord's
living arrangement may be unorthodox and unacceptable to some
segments of society, this conduct bears no rational connection to
her fitness to practice law.' 57 Cord's living arrangements were de-
scribed by the court in a carefully worded statement: "[Applicant]
and a male to whom she was not married jointly owned and re-
sided in the same dwelling."'" This description of Cord's living ar-
rangement enabled the court to avoid the troublesome issue of her
apparent violation of Virginia's fornication statute.
59
Recognizing that homosexuality and cohabitation are not sig-
nificantly related to one's fitness to practice law,160 courts have
found no sufficient inference of bad moral character in the appli-
cants' sexual preference or behavior that would prohibit admission
to the bar. When the inference of bad character is insubstantial or
nonexistent, the court need not make a thorough examination of
the applicants' evidence of good moral character. One problem still
unresolved in this context is the sodomy and fornication statutes
that, though rarely enforced,''1 continue to exist on the books of
many states.'62 Until such statutes are repealed, such applicants
are likely to face continued challenges of bad moral character.
(4) Bankruptcy
Avoiding the repayment of student loans by filing a voluntary
petition of bankruptcy is another type of behavior that has been
ball, 33 N.Y.2d 586, 588, 301 N.E.2d 436, 437, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (1973) (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
155. See 56 J. URB. L. 123, 138 (1978). An attorney, it is argued, cannot remain faith-
ful to his oath and willfully violate the law at the same time. Id. Also advanced as reasons
for excluding homosexuals is the protection of the reputation of the bar, but see note 50
supra, and the potential for blackmail that would jeopardize attorney-client confidences. 56
J. URB. L. at 138.
156. 219 Va. 1019, 254 S.E.2d 71 (1979).
157. Id. at 1022, 254 S.E.2d at 73.
158. Id.
159. "Any person, not being married, who voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse
with any other person, shall be guilty of fornication ... " VA. CODE § 18.2-344.
160. See notes 151-52 & 157 supra.
161. See State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 206 n.3, 381 A.2d 333, 336 n.3 (1977); W.
Barnett, SEXUAL FREDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1973).
162. See Note, The Right of Privacy: A Renewed Challenge to Laws Regulating Pri-
vate Consensual Behavior, 25 WAYNE L. Rzv. 1067, 1069 (1979) (fornication statutes); 56 J.
Urn. L. 123, 129 (1978) (sodomy statutes).
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considered strong evidence of bad moral character. The courts
have confronted this issue on at least three occasions and twice
have upheld the bar examiners' determination to exclude the ap-
plicant.163 The courts have indicated that failure to repay student
loans is strong evidence of bad character absent a showing that the
applicant has suffered some unusual misfortune or financial
catastrophe.
16 '
In Florida Board of Bar Examiners re G.W.L.1 5 the Florida
Supreme Court set forth two issues: first, would a reasonable man
have substantial doubts about the applicant's good moral charac-
ter; and second, is the conduct involved rationally related to his
fitness to practice law. 6' Defining lack of moral character to in-
clude "acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to
have substantial doubts about an individual's honesty, fairness,
and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state
and nation,"1 7 the court concluded that G.W.L.'s conduct in
avoiding repayment of student loans was morally reprehensible.'"
The court based its decision on the circumstances surrounding the
bankruptcy application, not on the act of filing bankruptcy. ' The
court considered significant the fact that G.W.L. had initiated the
bankruptcy proceedings before he had exhausted the job market or
given his creditors an opportunity to adjust repayment sched-
ules.17 0 The court determined that G.W.L. was motivated not by a
need to straighten out insurmountable financial difficulties, but
rather by a desire to defeat creditors who had substantially
financed seven years of higher education. Such conduct, according
to the court, indicated a disregard not only for the creditors, but
also for future student loan applicants.1 7 1 G.W.L.'s failure to act
163. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978) (applicant
admitted); Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978) (applicant
excluded); Application of Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979) (applicant excluded). For a
discussion of the supremacy clause issues presented by these cases, see notes 308-59 infra
and accompanying text.
164. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978); Florida Bd. of
Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978); Application of Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826
(Minn. 1979).
165. 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978). For a discussion of the facts of G.W.L., see notes 308-
21 infra and accompanying text.
166. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 459 (Fla. 1978).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 459.
169. Id. at 455.
170. Id. at 459. The bankruptcy petition was filed almost a year before the first install-




responsibly with respect to his own financial obligations caused the
court to question "the propriety of his being a counselor to others
in their legal affairs, and is rationally connected to his fitness to
practice law." 171 The court affirmed the exclusion without examin-
ing evidence of G.W.L.'s good character-because he had declined
an opportunity for a formal hearing, evidence of good character
was not in the record.17 3
In a later case, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the
underlying circumstances in Florida Board of Bar Examiners re
Groot'17 were different from those present in G. W.L. so that when
Groot filed bankruptcy to avoid repaying student loans the nature
of his conduct did not indicate bad moral character. Unlike in
G.W.L., the court in Groot found that the applicant had suffered
unusual misfortune. During the period shortly before filing bank-
ruptcy Groot's personal life was in disarray: he had become a fa-
ther, divorced his wife, and been unable to secure reasonable em-
ployment. 7 5 In addition to his student loans, Groot's financial
obligations included hospital debts for the birth of a child, contin-
uing support for his two children in his custody, and alimony pay-
ments."7 6 Although Groot was reasonably certain of obtaining em-
ployment at the time he filed bankruptcy, the court found the
bankruptcy reasonable because Groot had a "valid present need to
devote his entire employment income to his current, not past,
financial responsibilities. 17 7 Finding the nature of Groot's conduct
insufficient to justify exclusion, the court did not examine further
the evidence of Groot's good moral character.
In Application of Gahan,17 8 a case very similar to G.W.L., the
Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of an applicant
who, in the absence of unusual financial problems, filed a voluntary
petition of bankruptcy in order to avoid repayment of student
loans. The Minnesota court criticized the Florida court for consid-
ering the morality of G.W.L.'s motivations for filing bankruptcy as
172. Id.
173. The court upheld the exclusion without prejudice to the applicant to apply for a
formal hearing before the bar examiners to present evidence of good moral character. Id. at
460.
174. 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978). For a discussion of the facts of Groot, see notes 322-39
infra and accompanying text.
175. 365 So. 2d at 167.
176. Id. at 166-68.
177. Id. at 168.
178. 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979). For a discussion of the facts of Gahan, see notes
340-52 infra and accompanying text.
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in violation of the supremacy clause.179 The holding of the Minne-
sota court, however, was very similar to that of the Florida court:
We hold that applicants who flagrantly disregard the rights of others and
default on serious financial obligations, such as student loans, are lacking in
good moral character if the default is neglectful, irresponsible, and cannot be
excused by a compelling hardship that is reasonably beyond the control of
the applicant.16 0
The court expressly refused to consider Gahan's present willing-
ness or ability to pay the loans"81 and did not discuss other fact~rs
that might indicate good moral character. Such factors should have
been considered even though it seems likely that, because of the
short amount of time that had passed since the filing of bank-
ruptcy,182 evidence of good moral character would not, in the
court's opinion, have outweighed the negative inferences of the ap-
plicant's conduct in avoiding repayment of the loans. Financial ir-
responsibility is an appropriate ground for exclusion; however, if
courts are to exclude applicants who have exercised their legal
right to declare bankruptcy, it is important that the judicial rea-
soning be clear and complete so that future applicants who are
contemplating bankruptcy will have guidance about when the
avoidance of student loans will be deemed evidence of bad charac-
ter. The current standard-the existence of unusual misfortune or
financial catastrophe-is, like the good moral character standard
itself, susceptible to widely varying interpretations. 88 Therefore,
clearly reasoned judicial opinions are needed to reduce much of the
inherent ambiguity.
(b) Inquiries into Political Associations and Beliefs: Due
Process Review of Rulemaking Determinations
(1) Introduction
The first amendment to the Constitution, as applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment,' " provides that a state
"shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech.., or
179. 279 N.W.2d at 831.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 829.
182. Id. at 827.
183. For a criticism of G.W.L. and Groot charging that the cases illustrate inconsistent
results under the good moral character standard, see 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 876 (1979).
184. The first amendment applies to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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the right of the people peaceably to assemble." 185 From this lan-
guage, the Supreme Court has implied the "freedom of associa-
tion," which prohibits a state from "excluding a person from a pro-
fession or punishing him solely because he is a member of a
particular political organization or because he holds certain be-
liefs."1 86 Because freedom of association "lies at the foundation of
a free society, 1 87 the Court has declared it to be a fundamental
right.188 As such, state regulations may not infringe on rights of
association absent a showing of a substantial state interest served
through the least restrictive alternatives available.189 Furthermore,
the state may not indirectly infringe on the right of association by
penalizing an individual for his associations by withholding or
withdrawing state benefits.1'0 Such an indirect infringement is im-
permissible unless the state can meet the same substantial interest
test used in a direct infringement case. 191
The Supreme Court has also recognized that the state has a
legitimate interest in inquiring into some aspects of the political
associations and beliefs of bar applicants to insure that they pos-
sess the requisite good moral character.'" These inquiries almost
always take the form of questions that appear on the application
form to be completed by bar applicants; the answers to these ques-
tions are used as a basis for further investigation. Because these
questions appear on standardized forms and must be answered by
all candidates, they fall into the category of rules of general appli-
cation.193 Thus, these inquiries must constitute the least restrictive
means available to serve a substantial state interest.
This section of the Special Project examines the intersection
of the good moral character requirement and the first amendment
to determine the scope of permissible state inquiry into political
beliefs and associations. The section first examines two cases that
set the foundation for first amendment analysis in the bar admis-
185. U.S. CONST. amend. L
186. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
485-87 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
187. Shelton v. Tucker, 864 U.S. 479, 486 (1960).
188. Id. at 488.
189. Id. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1967); Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966).
190. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
191. Id.
192. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,
45-46 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960).
193. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
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sion context. The section then reviews and analyzes three Supreme
Court decisions rendered in 1971 that established the current Su-
preme Court position on state inquiries into the political beliefs
and associations of bar applicants. Finally, this section examines
and analyzes two recent cases in which bar applicants have chal-
lenged application questions about their political beliefs and
associations.
(2) The 1961 Bar Admission Cases
Konigsberg v. State Bar (Konigsberg 11)194 and In re Anas-
taploles were the first Supreme Court decisions to address ex-
pressly the first amendment issues presented by a bar applicant's
refusal to answer questions about his political beliefs and associa-
tions. In Konigsberg II the applicant refused to answer questions
concerning his membership in the Communist Party because he
believed such inquiries violated his first amendment rights to free-
dom of speech and association."" California denied Konigsberg ad-
mission to the bar because his refusals to answer had obstructed a
full investigation into his qualifications.19 In upholding the exclu-
sion, the Court carefully distinguished between exclusion for re-
fusal to answer relevant questions and exclusion for substantive
reasons. 198 Speaking for the majority, Justice Harlan reasoned that
since the answers to these questions may serve as the basis for fur-
ther investigation 9 the scope of inquiry is necessarily broader
than the substantive grounds for denial.200 The Court rejected Ko-
194. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
195. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
196. 366 U.S. at 40. In Konigsberg v. State Bar (Konigsberg 1), 353 U.S. 252 (1957),
the applicant refused to answer questions about his alleged affiliation with the Communist
Party. California refused to admit him to the bar because he failed to show he was of good
moral character. Relying on a companion case, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232 (1957), the Supreme Court reversed the California determination on due process
grounds and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that Konigsberg's refusal to
answer could not give rise to an inference of bad moral character. Konigsberg v. State Bar,
353 U.S. at 261-62. Thus, the Court did not reach the first amendment issue. On remand
Konigsberg again refused to answer. This time, however, California excluded him solely on
the basis of a procedural rule providing for an applicant's automatic exclusion if he refused
to answer questions. It is this issue that the Court faced in Konigsberg 1I.
197. 366 U.S. at 43.
198. Id. at 45-48.
199. Id. at 46. Justice Harlan noted the bar examiner's response to Konigsberg's re-
fusal to answer: "You see, by failing to answer the initial question there certainly is no basis
and no opportunity for us to investigate with respect to the other matters to which the
initial question might very well be considered preliminary." Id. at 47.
200. Id. The Court reasoned that the associational question might be preliminary to
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nigsberg's argument that any questions by the bar examiners about
political affiliation violated the first amendment freedoms of
speech and association. 0' Instead, the Court balanced the state's
legitimate interest in ascertaining the fitness of bar candidates
against the effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory
disclosure in the circumstances.202 The Court concluded that the
state's interest in ensuring that attorneys are devoted to the pro-
cess of orderly change outweighed the "minimal effect" on the can-
didate's right of free association.03 In dissent2 '" Justice Black dis-
agreed with the majority's balancing analysis. In his opinion the
Bill of Rights "put the freedoms protected there completely out of
the area" of government control.'25
In the companion case to Konigsberg II, In re Anastaplo,20
the Court sustained an Illinois rule that required a denial of ad-
mission to bar applicants who refused to answer questions. Anas-
taplo refused to answer questions relating to membership in the
Communist Party, and the bar examiners denied him admission.2°
Relying on Konigsberg II, the Court held that a state may deny
admission to the bar solely on the ground that an applicant refused
to answer relevant questions concerning political affiliations and
that a state may inquire into an applicant's membership into the
Communist Party consistent with the first amendment10s Further-
an investigation into whether Konigsberg "himself believed in violent overthrow or know-
ingly belonged to an organization advocating violent overthrow" of the government. Id. at
46.
201. Id. at 49. The Court explicitly rejected the view that any government regulation
infringing on first amendment freedoms is void automatically.
With more particular reference to the present context of a state decision as to charac-
ter qualifications, it is difficult, indeed, to imagine a view of the constitutional protec-
tions of speech and association which would automatically and without consideration of
the extent of the deterrence of speech and association and of the importance of the
state function, exclude all reference to prior speech or association on such issues as
character, purpose, credibility, or intent.
Id. at 51.
202. Id. at 51-52.
203. Id. at 52.
[W]e regard the State's interest in having lawyers who are devoted to the law in its
broadest sense, including not only its substantive provisions, but also its procedures for
orderly change, as clearly sufficient to outweigh the minimal effect upon free associa-
tion occasioned by compulsory disclosure in the circumstances here presented.
Id.
204. Id. at 56 (Black, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 61 (Black, J., dissenting).
206. 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
207. Id. at 85-86.
208. Id. at 88-90.
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more, the Court expanded the scope of permissible state inquiry
into political associations by concluding that the state's investiga-
tion into political associations is justified whether it is prompted
by information already available to the bar examiners or "arises
merely from a good faith belief in the need for. . questioning of
the applicant. 2 09 Justice Black again dissented, stating that the
first amendment should be enforced to the "full extent of its ex-
press and unequivocal terms."'
1 0
(3) The 1971 Bar Admission Cases
In 1971 the Court decided three cases that reexamined the
scope of the state's power to inquire into the political associations
and beliefs of bar applicants. In Baird v. State Bar" Sara Baird
refused to answer a question on the Arizona bar application that
asked whether she had ever been a member of the Communist
Party or any other organization that advocated the "overthrow of
the United States government by force or violence.' 1 ' Justice
Black, writing for a plurality of the Court, admitted that prior de-
cisions in similar association cases had produced "thousands of
pages of confusing formulas, refined reasonings, and puzzling hold-
ings. '213 Instead of attempting to reconcile these cases, however,
Black proceeded to examine the facts and relate them to the first
amendment.2 1 4 He stated,
The First Amendment's protection of association prohibits a State from ex-
cluding a person from a profession... solely because he is a member of a
particular organization or because he holds certain beliefs .... Similarly,
when a State attempts to make inquiries about a person's beliefs or associa-
tions, its power is limited by the First Amendment. Broad and sweeping state
inquiries into these protected areas... discourage citizens from exercising
rights protected by the Constitution.2
5
Black noted that when a state seeks to inquire about an individ-
ual's beliefs and associations "a heavy burden lies upon it to show
209. Id. at 90. Note that in Konigsberg II California possessed testimonial evidence
that Konigsberg had some previous affiliation with the Communist Party. Illinois had no
similar evidence regarding Anastoplo. Id. at 85-86.
210. Id. at 98 (Black, J., dissenting).
211. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
212. Id. at 4-5.
213. Id. at 4.
214. Id. Baird had already answered a prior question that asked her to list every or-
ganization with which she had been associated since she was 16. Id. The Court invalidated
this type of blanket inquiry in the companion case to Baird, In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
See notes 227-31 infra and accompanying text.
215. 401 U.S. at 6.
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that the inquiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state inter-
est." 16 In the bar context, Black expressed no doubt that Arizona
could require an applicant to demonstrate good moral character;
however, in assessing character the state could not legitimately in-
quire into an applicant's views and associations.217 "[W]e hold that
views and beliefs are immune from bar association inquisitions
designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the
practice of law. 21 8 In his concurring opinion21' Justice Stewart
stated that in past cases the Court had permitted "under some cir-
cumstances simple inquiry into present or past membership in the
Communist Party. '220 Justice Stewart found the Arizona statute to
be invalid not because it inquired into political associations but
because it did not limit the inquiry to "knowing membership. '221
Justice Blackmun in dissent 2 2 stated that while the plurality opin-
ion did not overrule either Konigsberg IPI" or In re Anastaplo,"'
4
the 'Court had seriously undermined both cases. In Blackmun's
opinion, states could refuse to admit applicants solely because they
refused to answer questions" 5 and could legitimately inquire into
an applicant's mere membership in some types of organizations."
In a companion case to Baird, In re Stolar,"7 the Court simi-
larly invalidated the use of three questions on the Ohio bar appli-
cation. The application required the following information from
the applicant: first, to state whether he had ever been a member of
any organization that advocated the overthrow of the United
States government by force; second, to list all organizations to
216. Id. at 6-7.
217. Id. at 7.
218. Id. at 8. Black specifically rejected Arizona's contention that it was entitled to an
answer as a basis for determining whether further investigation was in order. Id. at n.8.
219. Id. at 9 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion here and in
In re Stolar, notes 232-34 infra, are of particular importance because they are, in effect, the
law that the lower courts must follow. Under the "lowest common denominator" rule, the
common ground shared by the plurality opinion and any concurring opinions necessary to
constitute a majority becomes the prevailing rule. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
193 (1977).
220. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. at 9.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan
and White joined in Blackmun's dissent. Additionally, Justice White wrote a separate opin-
ion, as did Justice Harlan.
223. See notes 196-203 supra and accompanying text.
224. See notes 206-10 supra and accompanying text.
225. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. at 13-14.
226. Id. at 22.
227. 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
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which he currently belonged; and third, to list all organizations to
which he had belonged since registering as a law student.'28 When
Stolar refused to answer these questions, Ohio refused to admit
him to the bar. Again writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice
Black first addressed the requirements of listing "all" organiza-
tions to which the applicant belonged prior to or since registration
as a law student. Black found that such a broad requirement
chilled a law student's exercise of first amendment rights and thus
was an impermissible question under the Court's decision in
Shelton v. Tucker."" Furthermore, Black rejected the state's con-
tention that such a listing served a legitimate state interest.'30 Re-
lying on Baird, Black also invalidated the remaining inquiry be-
cause he could find "no legitimate state interest which is served by
a question which sweeps so broadly into areas of belief and associa-
tion.12 1 Justice Stewart concurred in the result because the listing
requirements were "plainly unconstitutional under Shelton v.
Tucker '*2 and because the membership question did not require
knowing membership.'3 In dissent Justice Blackmun again ob-
jected on the grounds that the applicant had obstructed the pro-
cess and that the state had legitimate grounds for inquiry.'"
Finally, in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc.
v. Wadmond25 various groups "seeking or planning to seek admis-
sion"23e to the New York Bar requested declaratory and injunctive
228. Id. at 27.
229. Id. at 27-28. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the Court invalidated an
Arkansas statute that required every teacher, as a condition of employment in a state sup-
ported school or college, to file annually an affidavit listing every organization that he be-
longed to or contributed to within the preceding five years. Id. at 480. Although the state
had a substantial interest in insuring the loyalty of its teachers, the Court found that this
interest could be protected through less drastic alternatives than requiring a disclosure of all
organizational affiliations. Id. at 488-90.
230. In re Stolar, 401 U.S. at 28-29.
231. Id. at 30. The Court also relied on Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967), a public employment case, in determining that the Ohio bar question was impermis-
sibly "overbroad." In Keyishian the Court stated that "[w]here statutes have an overbroad
sweep. . . 'the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of [first amendment] rights may be
critical'... since those covered by the statute are bound to limit their behavior to that
which is unquestionably safe." Id. at 609. For a full exploration of the overbreadth doctrine,
see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. Rzv. 844 (1970).
232. 401 U.S. at 31 (Stewart, J., concurring).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 33-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and Harlan joined in this dissent. In addition, Justices Harlan and White wrote separate
dissenting opinions.
235. 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
236. Id. at 157.
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relief against the system used by New York to screen applicants
for good moral character.2 37 Petitioners claimed that the New York
system worked a chilling effect upon the exercise of free speech
and free association by future applicants to the New York Bar.
They objected in particular to questions that inquired into an ap-
plicant's willingness to take a loyalty oath, his good faith in doing
so, his knowing membership in organizations that advocate the vio-
lent overthrow of the government, and his specific intent to further
such goals.238 As to the loyalty questions, Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority, concluded that they were valid because the New
York construction of the rule only required an applicant to be will-
ing to swear or affirm in good faith to uphold the Constitution239
As to the questions concerning organizations, the Court noted that
the questions were "tailored to conform to the relevant decisions of
this Court. ' 240 Since a state could legitimately deny admission to a
candidate who was knowingly a member of an organization seeking
to overthrow the government by force while specifically intending
to further these aims, the Court reasoned that a state may specifi-
cally inquire about those attributes in evaluating the fitness of bar
237. Id.
238. Id. at 164-65. The questions were as follows:
26. (a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of any
organization or group of persons which, during the period of your membership or asso-
ciation, you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the United States
or any state or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or overturned by
force, violence or any unlawful means? - If your answer is in the affirmative, state the
facts below.
(b) If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, during the period of such
membership or association, have the specific intent to further the aims of such organi-
zation or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the United
States or any state or any political subdivision thereof by force, violence or any unlaw-
ful means?
27. (a) Is there any reason why you cannot take and subscribe to an oath or affirma-
tion that you will support the constitutions of the United States and of the State of
New York? If there is, please explain.
(b) Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you are, without any mental
reservation, loyal to and ready to support the Constitution of the United States?
239. Id. at 166.
240. Id. at 165. The Court stated:
Our cases establish that inquiry into associations of the kind referred to is permissible
under the limitations carefully observed here. We have held that knowing membership
in an organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by force or violence, on
the part of one sharing the specific intent to further the organization's illegal goals,
may be criminally punishable. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-230.
Citing Konigsberg II, the Court went on to state that "[b]ar examiners may ask about Com-
munist affiliations as a preliminary to further inquiry into the nature of the association and
may exclude an applicant for refusal to answer." Id. at 165-66.
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applicants.24 1 Although these questions alone would be invalid as
constitutionally overbroad, taken together, the inquiry was limited
to an applicant's specific intent to further illegal goals-an area of
legitimate state inquiry. In dissent, Justice Black stated that "[i]n
my view, the First Amendment absolutely prohibits a State from
penalizing a man because of his beliefs."'2 4' Thus, he found that a
state could not require that an applicant believe in the American
form of government before being admitted to the bar."8 Further-
more, because the first amendment was intended to protect even
"dangerous and unpopular" speech and associations, Black main-
tained that states could not, consistent with the first amendment,
"exclude an applicant because he has belonged to organizations
that advocate violent overthrow of the Government, even if his
membership was 'knowing' and he shared the organization's
aims.,,)44
The 1971 bar admission cases represent a classic disagreement
among the members of the Court concerning the viability of gov-
ernment regulation that touches first amendment rights. Justice
Black, who dissented in Konigsberg II and Anastaplo but wrote
the plurality opinion in Baird and Stolar, clearly articulates an ab-
solutist view of the first amendment-that is, if government regu-
lation infringes on first amendment rights, then it is not legitimate.
On the other hand, Justice Stewart, who concurred in Baird and
Stolar and wrote the majority opinion in Wadmond, obviously
views such government regulation as valid in some cases if the
means of regulation are narrowly drawn. Justice Blackmun, who
dissented in Baird and Stolar, seems to accord the government
even broader power to regulate in this area. Thus, these opinions
represent a wide divergence of views concerning the proper result
when bar applications inquire into political beliefs and associations
of prospective lawyers.
These cases certainly limit the obstructionist doctrine an-
nounced in Konigsberg II and Anastaplo by finding some circum-
stances in which bar applicants may legitimately refuse to answer
the questions of the bar examiners. This does not mean, however,
that Konigsberg II and Anastaplo are overruled. As Justice Black-
mun pointed out in Baird, the 1961 cases still stand albeit modi-
241. Id.
242. Id. at 174 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. Id. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 177-79 (Black, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 175-76.
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fled to some degree. Furthermore, despite Justice Black's view, it is
also clear that under some circumstances states may legitimately
inquire into a bar applicant's political beliefs and associations.
Wadmond provides an explicit example of such a legitimate in-
quiry, but it by no means defines the contours of such inquiries.
Thus, at the "lowest common denominator," these 1971 cases
stand for the proposition that in the area of political beliefs and
associations sometimes bar applicants can legitimately refuse to
answer questions (i.e., Baird and Stolar) and sometimes they can-
not (i.e., Wadmond), and that sometimes bar examiners can legiti-
mately ask questions (i.e., Wadmond) and sometimes they cannot
(i.e., Baird and Stolar). The obvious problem is that such a diffu-
sion of opinion gives little guidance to bar applicants, bar examin-
ers, or lower courts. Two recent cases demonstrate the problems
encountered in applying the holdings of the 1971 cases.
(4) Recent Applications of the 1971 Standard
In Pushinsky v. West Virginia Board of Law Examiners2 the
Supreme Court of West Virginia examined the constitutional va-
lidity of questions posed to bar applicants by the state's board of
law examiners. The bar application presented the question
whether the applicant advocated or knowingly belonged to an or-
ganization that advocated the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment.2 48 The applicant was required to check one of three an-
swers-"yes," "no,") or "decline to answer." Pushinsky checked
"decline to answer," and subsequently the bar examiners informed
him that his application would not be processed until he answered
two additional questions.2 47 The first question asked whether he
advocated the violate overthrow of the government;U8 the second
question asked whether he was a knowing member of any organiza-
tion that advocated the violent overthrow of the government.u
9
245. 266 S.E.2d 444 (W. Va. 1980).
246. Id. at 445. The question read:
21. Do you advocate or knowingly belong to an organization or group which advocates
the overthrow of the Government of the United States of America or the State of West
Virginia? Yes -.No .... _Decline to Answer
If the answer is "yes" give details.
247. Id. at 445-46. Essentially, these additional questions broke the bar application
inquiry into two parts and required the applicant to furnish a "yes" or "no" answer.
248. Id. at 445. The question read: "No. 1. Do you advocate the overthrow of the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America or the State of West Virginia by force or
violence?"
249. Id. at 446. The question read. "No. 2. Do you knowingly belong to any organiza-
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Pushinsky refused to answer these questions, claiming that the in-
quiry unconstitutionally infringed on his freedom of speech, associ-
ation, and belief.250 Based upon this refusal, the bar examiners ex-
cluded him from the bar on the ground that he had obstructed the
admissions process and alternatively that the questions posed met
the standards enunciated in Wadmond.25 1 The court, however,
held that all of these questions were impermissibly overbroad. As
to the inquiry into the applicant's beliefs, the court stated that it
impermissibly infringed on Pushinsky's first amendment rights be-
cause it encompassed all forms of advocacy.252 Citing Stolar and
Baird, the court noted that a bar applicant could not be penalized
solely because he espoused illegal aims. Instead, advocacy could be
punished only if it was "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."258
Thus, because the West Virginia bar examiners failed to distin-
guish between permissible and impermissible advocacy, the ques-
tion was fatally overbroad. 2 " The court also denied the use of the
second question because it failed to inquire whether the applicant
had the specific intent to further the illegal goals of the organiza-
tions involved. Again citing Baird and Stolar, the court concluded
that Justice Stewart's concurrences required that questions probe
both knowing membership and "specific intent to further the ille-
gal goals of the organization.'' Under this standard, the second
question clearly failed. The bar examiners then argued that their
two inquiries, when read together, met the Wadmond knowing
membership/specific intent test. The court, however, rejected this
contention, stating that the questions did not probe specific
intent.2 56
In Carfagno v. Harris257 plaintiffs filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, alleging
that two questions on the Arkansas bar application unconstitution-
tion or group which advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States of
America or the State of West Virginia by force or violence?"
250. Id. at 446.
251. Id. at 446, 448. Note, however, that the Wadmond standard allows inquiry into
"knowing membership" in an organization advocating the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment and into "specific intent" to carry out that purpose.
252. Id. at 447-48.
253. Id. at 447 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
254. Id. at 448.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 448-49.
257. 470 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
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ally infringed on their first amendment freedoms. The first ques-
tion asked whether the applicant had ever been a member of the
Communist Party;5 8 the second question asked whether the appli-
cant had ever been a member of any organization that advocated
the illegal overthrow of the government.2 "5 The court relied on Ko-
nigsberg IP 60 and Anastaplo2 6 1 in deciding that Arkansas' inquiry
into an applicant's membership in the Communist Party was not
unconstitutional given the state's legitimate purpose of regulating
the bar.262 Relying on Wadmond, however, the court invalidated
the second question as unconstitutionally overbroad since it in-
cluded neither a requirement of knowing membership nor a re-




In Pushinsky the West Virginia Supreme Court correctly ap-
plied the first amendment standards announced in Baird and Sto-
lar to invalidate the bar examiners' question dealing with personal
advocacy. The plurality and concurring opinions in Baird and Sto-
tar made clear that the first amendment bars a state from acting
against any person merely because of his beliefs. Although
Wadmond permitted a state to ask an applicant to affirm his loy-
alty to the Constitution, the Court indicated that it was only New
York's "extremely narrow" construction of this question that ren-
dered it constitutionally valid.2 " Thus, West Virginia's inquiry
into mere advocacy of a bar applicant could not stand. The court
also invalidated the second inquiry-a result that is less certain
under the 1971 Supreme Court cases and that demonstrates the
problems in applying Baird, Stolar, and Wadmond. The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court cited Baird and Stolar for the proposition
that, to be constitutionally valid, inquiries into an applicant's orga-
nizational memberships must probe both scienter and specific in-
258. Id. at 220. The question read: "Are you now, or have you at any time been, a
member of the Communist Party?" Id.
259. Id. at 220-21. The question read: "Are you now, or have you at any time been, a
member or supporter of any party, organization, or group that believes in or teaches the
overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
methods?" Id.
260. See notes 196-203 supra and accompanying text.
261. See notes 206-10 supra and accompanying text.
262. 470 F. Supp. at 222-23.
263. Id. at 223.
264. 401 U.S. at 163.
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tent to further illegal goals. The Baird and Stolar opinions, how-
ever, do not clearly support this proposition. Justice Black's
plurality opinions would void any infringement of first amendment
freedoms, while Justice Stewart's critical concurring opinions are
unclear about the specific intent requirement. In Baird Justice
Stewart first cited Konigsberg II and Anastaplo for the proposi-
tion that "under some circumstances simple inquiry into ... Com-
munist Party membership.., is not as such unconstitutional." 5
He then found the Baird inquiry impermissible because it did not
probe "knowing membership." Finally, he cited Wadmond to sup-
port the statement that mere membership "can be quite different
from knowing membership in an organization advocating the over-
throw of the Government by force or violence, on the part of one
sharing the specific intent to further the organization's illegal
goals."22" Thus, it is not clear whether Baird requires bar examin-
ers to probe specific intent in order to pass constitutional muster.
Furthermore, Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Wadmond does
not totally resolve this question because it is unclear whether the
New York form of inquiry establishes a constitutional minimum.
Although the Wadmond Court stated that New York's two part
inquiry was tailored to relevant case law, it also cited Konigsberg
II with approval, stating that "[iut is also well settled that Bar ex-
aminers may ask about Communist affiliations as a preliminary to
further inquiry into the nature of the association and may exclude
an applicant for refusal to answer.' 267 In Konigsberg II, however,
the initial question was preliminary to a determination whether
the ap'plicant "advocates the overthrow of the Government of the
United States . . . by force, violence, or other unconstitutional
means."'"
The Carfagno decision further exemplifies the problems that
courts face in applying the Supreme Court's 1971 bar admission
cases. In Carfagno the court relied on Konigsberg II and Anas-
taplo to uphold the validity of the first question, which asked if
the applicant was a member of the Communist Party. If there is
any common ground between Baird, Stolar, and Wadmond, how-
ever, it is that questions probing mere membership alone are im-
permissible. Since the state did not employ a follow-up question in
the event that the bar applicant either admitted membership or
265. 401 U.S. at 9.
266. Id.
267. 401 U.S. at 165-66.
268. 366 U.S. at 37.
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refused to answer, the court should have struck this inquiry. As to
the second question, which inquired into the applicant's organiza-
tional ties, the court correctly ruled that this inquiry was imper-
missible. The court, however, should not have based its decision
upon the belief that Wadmond established a minimum level of
permissible inquiry. Instead, the court should have invalidated the
use of the question because it failed to inquire into knowing mem-
bership, which is the common requirement of Baird, Stolar, and
Wadmond. By allowing the state to inquire into Communist mem-
bership but not other subversive organizations, the Carfagno court
implied that membership in the Communist Party differs from
other potentially subversive organizational memberships. Such a
result clearly fails to follow logically, but it is not surprising in
light of the confusing Supreme Court precedent in this area.
(6) Conclusion
Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo set the foundation for the
permissible scope of inquiry into the political beliefs and associa-
tions of bar applicants. The 1971 cases-Baird, Stolar, and
Wadmond-modified these holdings but created much confusion
concerning their ultimate meaning. Recent decisions applying the
rationale of these 1971 cases demonstrate the confusion generated
and the need for clear guidelines in this area. If this confusion is
allowed to remain, it will have a "chilling effect" on bar applicants'
exercise of political beliefs and associations-a result that should
be avoided when dealing with first amendment freedoms.
2. The Supremacy Clause-Bankruptcy and the Good Moral
Character Requirement
(a) Introduction
The supremacy clause is a constitutionally imposed limitation
on the state's internal police power. Article VI of the Constitution
provides,
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.11"
In Gibbons v. Ogden2 70 Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the
269. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
270. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
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supremacy clause to mean that any state action that either inter-
feres with, or runs contrary to, federal law is invalid.27 1 Further-
more, in Hines v. Davidowitz27 2 the Court expanded the scope of
the supremacy clause by holding that state action standing "as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
...of Congress" is invalid.78
The Constitution also gives Congress the power "to establish
* .. uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States. 2 7 4 In 1898 Congress enacted the first comprehen-
sive bankruptcy statute2 75 for the purpose of giving the debtor "a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, un-
hampered by the pressure .. .of pre-existing debt. 27 6 More re-
cently in an attempt to modernize bankruptcy law, Congress has
enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.277 To protect a
debtor's "fresh start" after bankruptcy, Congress included a sec-
tion in the new law providing that "a governmental unit may not
deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license.., to ... a
person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a bank-
rupt." 7 8 The legislative history of this provision states that Con-
gress intended it to apply to "governmental or quasi-governmental
organizations that perform licensing functions, such as a state bar
association.
2 7 9
As noted above, states may legitimately condition admission
to the bar on an applicant's demonstration of good moral charac-
ter.2 8 In the past, bar examiners have determined on occasion that
an applicant's motivations in seeking bankruptcy indicated a lack
of good moral character and justified a denial of admission.281 Such
inquiries arguably interfere with federal bankruptcy policy, render-
ing them susceptible to constitutional challenge under the
316, 436 (1819), in which the Court held that a state may not "retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control, the operation of the constitutional laws enacted by congress."
271. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 17.
272. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
273. Id. at 67.
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL. 4.
275. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
276. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
277. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.
(Supp. M 1979)).
278. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (Supp. MI 1979).
279. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5787, 5867.
280. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).




This section of the Special Project analyzes the supremacy
clause issue presented when bar examiners scrutinize an appli-
cant's motivations in seeking bankruptcy. First, the section exam-
ines a series of cases beginning with Perez v. Campbell,2 82 in which
the Supreme Court developed the supremacy clause analysis in the
bankruptcy context. Next, the section reviews three bar admission
cases dealing with this issue and analyzes them in light of the new
bankruptcy law's antidiscrimination and student loan provisions.
(b) Legal Background
In Perez v. Campbell2 83 the Supreme Court announced a two-
step process to determine whether a state statute conflicts with
federal law and thus falls under the supremacy clause. The Court
stated that first the two statutes must be construed, and then, they
must be compared to determine whether they are in conflict.2" In
deciding whether the statutes conflict, the Court stated that both
the purpose and the effect of the state law must be evaluated.2 85
Perez involved an Arizona automobile financial responsibility
law, which provided for the suspension of a driver's license if he
failed to pay a judgment resulting from an automobile accident.
The law further provided that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy follow-
ing the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the judg-
ment debtor from any of the requirements of this article."'52 Perez
claimed that the Arizona provision conflicted with the bankruptcy
law, which stated that a discharge in bankruptcy fully relieved the
debtor from all but certain specified judgments.2 87 The Court
found that the state designed the statute to protect the public
from financially irresponsible drivers.288 Although conceding the le-
gitimacy of this purpose, the Court nevertheless concluded that the
Arizona law compelled payment from a bankrupt in direct contra-
vention of the federal policy. Consequently, the Court invalidated
the Arizona statute, holding "that any state legislation which frus-
282. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 644.
285. Id. at 649-54. The Court overruled two prior decisions that looked only to "the
purpose rather than the effect of state laws." Id. at 652.
286. Id. at 642 (quoting ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 28-1163(B) (1976)). To enforce the
provision, Arizona withheld driving privileges from the adjudged bankrupt until he satisfied
the judgment. Id.
287. Id. at 643.
288. Id. at 644-48.
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trates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by
the Supremacy Clause."2 " Thus, a state law that conditions a priv-
ilege such as driving on the relinquishment of federally granted
bankruptcy rights is unconstitutional under the supremacy clause.
It is important to note that Perez involved a direct frustration
of federal bankruptcy policy since Arizona required payment of the
discharged debts if a driver wished to retrieve his license. The
question remaining after Perez, however, was whether a state could
penalize an individual for filing bankruptcy if that penalty did not
involve payment of the discharged debt. Two competing interests
emerge from analysis of this issue. On the one hand, invalidation of
such laws may prevent a state from regulating a broad area in
which it possesses a substantial and legitimate interest. On the
other hand, state imposed penalities may discourage individuals
from exercising their federal rights. In resolving this conflict, sev-
eral courts have held that even indirect state encroachments on the
operation of federal policy are invalid under the supremacy clause.
In Grimes v. Hoschler2e° the Supreme Court of California in-
validated a California law that threatened contractors with the loss
of their licenses if their debts were discharged in bankruptcy.' 1
Although the state claimed that the law was not designed to com-
pel the payment of discharged debts, the court reasoned that the
potential revocation of a contractor's license effectively denied cer-
tain debtors the benefits of federal bankruptcy.2 2 Furthermore,
the court found that the revocation of a contractor's license con-
flicted with the federal bankruptcy policy to "give debtors a new
opportunity in life.
'293
Several other courts have adopted the Grimes rationale when
confronted with a conflict between state law and federal bank-
ruptcy policy2 " For instance, in Rutledge v. City of Shreveport' 5
289. Id. at 652.
290. 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1974).
291. Id. at 312, 525 P.2d at 69, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 629. The law provided that a license
would not be reinstated unless the contractor repaid the discharged debt. The statute in
Grimes did not automatically result in the loss of a contractor's license; instead, it merely
provided that discharge of debts in bankruptcy could be taken into account in disciplinary
proceedings. Nevertheless, the court found that the bankruptcy was the sole cause for revo-
cation of Grimes' contracting license. Id. at 313, 525 P.2d at 70, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Handsome v. Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978); Rutledge
v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975); In re Loftin, 327 So. 2d 543 (La.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 331 So. 2d 851 (La. 1976). But cf. Marshall v. District of Columbia,
559 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (police department could use bankruptcy as a factor in evalu-
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the district court invalidated a police department rule that sub-
jected a policeman to dismissal for filing a bankruptcy petition.2 "
While recognizing the state's legitimate interest in achieving a "re-
liable and respected police force, 297 the court found that the effect
of the rule was to deny the policeman debtor "a clear field for fu-
ture effort. 2  Therefore, the court held that the rule conflicted
with the stated purpose of the Federal Bankruptcy Act in violation
of the supremacy clause.299 In Handsome v. Rutgers Universitys°°
a university rule prevented students who had discharged previous
student loans in bankruptcy to register or obtain transcripts.301
The district court found that "the Supremacy Clause prevents a
state from frustrating even the spirit of a federal law.'"3 02 Hence,
the court concluded that the state violated the supremacy clause
by withholding Handsome's transcripts., 3
The results in Grimes, Rutledge, and Handsome are consistent
with the rationale underlying the Supreme Court's holding in Pe-
rez v. Campbel.8 °4 Although the cases subsequent to Perez clearly
expand the scope of the supremacy clause, the results comport
with the Supreme Court's focus on the effect of state law:
We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine.. -. that state law may
frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature in pass-
ing its law had some purpose in mind other than one of frustration ....
[S]uch a doctrine would enable state legislatures to nullify nearly all un-
wanted federal legislation by simply... articulating some state interest or
policy... that would be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law
:.... [S]tate legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law
is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause."°5
These cases set standards for state legislatures to follow.
(c) The Bar Admission Cases
Several cases decided under the old bankruptcy law have ex-
amined issues arising when bar applicants who have discharged
ating applicant's fitness for employment).
295. 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975).
296. Id. at 1278.
297. Id. at 1280.
298. Id. (quoting Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971)).
299. Id.
300. 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
301. Id. at 1363-64.
302. Id. at 1367.
303. Id.
304. 402 U.S. 637 (1971). See notes 283-89 supra and accompanying text.
305. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971).
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student loan debts through bankruptcy are denied good moral
character status by the bar examiners. A bar applicant's conduct in
meeting his financial obligations is widely utilized as a relevant
factor in assessing good moral character .3 " Furthermore, most
states agree that the failure of an applicant to honor his legal com-
mitments may evince a disregard for the rights of others and thus
may indicate a lack of fitness for the practice of law.50 Neverthe-
less, federal bankruptcy law allows certain individuals to avoid sat-
isfying some financial obligations. Hence, there is a conflict be-
tween the state policy of ensuring the good moral character of the
bar and federal bankruptcy policy of providing a new opportunity
in life and a clear field for future effort. In three recent cases,
courts attempting to sidestep this supremacy clause problem have
carefully pointed out that they were focusing not on the appli-
cant's act of filing bankruptcy but on the circumstances surround-
ing such actions. Three cases-two in Florida and one in Minne-
sota-illustrate how this approach results in arguably inconsistent
decisions.
In Florida Board of Bar Examiners re G.W.L. 08 the Florida
Supreme Court sustained the bar examiners' refusal to admit
G.W.L. based upon a determination that the circumstances sur-
rounding the discharge of his student loans in bankruptcy demon-
strated a lack of moral character.0 9 In detailing the facts of
G.W.L.'s bankruptcy the court stressed "that it is not the act of
filing for bankruptcy but the circumstances surrounding this par-
ticular bankruptcy application" that prompted its decision. 10
G.W.L. financed his undergraduate and legal education largely
306. See In re Heller, 333 A.2d 401 (D.C.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975).
307. See In re Connor, 265 Ind. 610, 358 N.E.2d 120 (1976). See generally Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 301 (1959).
308. 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978).
309. Id. at 459. While an undergraduate, G.W.L. received approximately $1900 in 3
1/2 % interest student loans from the university, with repayment to be completed within 10
years after termination of his status as a full time student. After entering law school, G.W.L.
financed his legal education by borrowing approximately $2500 per year from a private bank
under the government guaranteed student loan program, which provided for a 10 year re-
payment schedule at 7% interest. At the time of his graduation from law school G.W.L.'s
financial obligations totalled $9893; initial payments, however, were not due to commence
for nine months, with the bulk of the payments scheduled to begin in three years. The court
found that the financial "obligations appeared normal for any student attending undergrad-
uate and graduate educational programs on student loans." Id. at 456. Most importantly,
the court found "no exceptional financial problems or identified misfortunes" that would
hinder G.W.L. from meeting his obligations. Id.
310. Id. at 455.
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from government sponsored student loans.$"" For some months
prior to his graduation, G.W.L. attempted unsuccessfully to obtain
local legal employment. 12 On May 20, 1976, three days before he
graduated, and nine months before student loan payments were to
commence, G.W.L. executed a voluntary petition for bank-
ruptcy.31s In June 1976 G.W.L. made informal arrangements with
his bankruptcy trustee to defer action on his petition so that if he
did find a job he could begin repaying his creditors.3 14 G.W.L. re-
mained unemployed until December 20, 1976, when he found em-
ployment as a law clerk for $70 per week, and, coincidentally, re-
ceived a discharge in bankruptcy from all his debts.31 5 G.W.L.
passed the Florida bar examination, but during the customary
background investigation the board of bar examiners discovered
the bankruptcy petition. G.W.L. appeared before the board at an
informal hearing held in January 1977.318 Immediately following
the hearing G.W.L. arranged to repay the discharged debts and no-
tified the board of his actions while declining a formal hearing on
the matter.31 17 The board, however, declined to admit G.W.L. to the
Florida bar because he lacked good moral character. 818 On appeal
to the Florida Supreme Court, G.W.L. argued that as a statutory
right, bankruptcy cannot demonstrate lack of moral fitness, and
that neither the board's charges nor the record demonstrated any
fraud or taint to his transactions.3 19 Addressing the first conten-
tion, the court recited the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act and
311. Id. at 456.
312. Id. The court found that the timing of G.W.L.'s filing for bankruptcy particularly
evinced "absolutely no regard for his moral responsibility to his creditors... [and] indi-
cate[d] a lack of the moral values upon which we have a right to insist for members of the
legal profession." Id. at 459.
313. Id. at 456.
314. Id. The court took little notice of this fact, which mitigates against the finding
that G.W.L. held "absolutely no regard for his moral responsibility to his creditors." Id. at
459.
315. Id. at 456.
316. Id. At the informal hearing G.W.L. asserted that "his motivation for bankruptcy
was in part pressure from creditors" alleging the receipt of "dunning" letters. Id. at 457.
G.W.L. could not produce copies of the "dunning" correspondence, but indicated that they
had been destroyed. "The Board found his claim. . . unbelievable." Id. Justice Hatchett, in
dissent, pointed out that G.W.L.'s failure to produce written evidence of correspondence at
an informal hearing proved nothing. "The Referee in Bankruptcy found sufficient evidence
to grant the applicant's petition in bankruptcy. This court is prohibited from further inves-
tigation into that finding." Id. at 461 (dissenting opinion).
317. Id. at 456-57.
318. Id. at 457.
319. Id.
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noted that, although it discharged the legal obligation to pay,
bankruptcy did not discharge the moral obligation to satisfy one's
debts. The court also remarked that "[t]he filing of the bankruptcy
petition was not illegal, but in our view it was done in such a mor-
ally reprehensible fashion that it directly affects his fitness to prac-
tice law. '8 20 The court dismissed the contention that this holding
conflicted with the "fresh start" purpose of bankruptcy. Instead,
the court claimed that G.W.L. had "obtained far more than the
fresh start contemplated by the Bankruptcy Act ... because
[G.W.L.] ... secured ... a continuing, life-long economic
benefit." s3 21
In Florida Board of Bar Examiners re Groot32 2 the Florida Su-
preme Court reversed a determination by the board of bar examin-
ers that the circumstances surrounding a bar applicant's bank-
ruptcy demonstrated a lack of requisite moral character for
admission to the bar. Groot, who graduated from Florida State
University Law School in June 1976, had financed his undergradu-
ate and legal education through government guaranteed student
loans.323 Several months after passing a portion of the bar exami-
nation,3 24 Groot quit his job 25 and moved to Montana.32 6 Nine
months later, however, Groot abruptly quit both jobs in Mon-
tana3 17 and moved to North Carolina where he remained unem-
320. Id. at 459. Note, however, that the court approved the board's finding "without
prejudice to G.W.L. to apply for a formal hearing before the Board to present evidence of
his present good moral character." Id. at 460. Since G.W.L. waived his opportunity for a
formal hearing previously, he could not present evidence of good moral character to offset
the damaging circumstances. Perhaps the court felt that G.W.L.'s subsequent resurrection
of his debts should have a bearing on the board's decision. If so, this would constitute com-
pelled payment of discharged debts.
321. Id. at 460 (quoting Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1278 (8th Cir.
1977)). The Girardier decision is inapplicable because it turned on the lack of state action;
the court specifically ruled that Perez is inapplicable to private entities. Furthermore, the
benefit of receiving a legal education is dubious if a law graduate is denied admission to the
bar.
322. 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978).
323. Id. at 165. At the time of Groot's law school graduation, his student loan debts
approximated $8530, with repayment scheduled to commence not later than one year after
he ceased being a full time student. Id.
324. Groot passed the multistate portion, Part H of the Florida Bar Examination. Id.
325. In November 1976, Groot worked in the Office of the Speaker of the Florida
House of Representatives at an annual salary of $14,000. Id.
326. In Helena, Montana, Groot took two jobs. First, Groot worked as a counselor with
Tri-County DD (Developmentally Disabled) Inc., receiving compensation of $4800, plus liv-
ing quarters, food, and utilities. Second, Groot secured employment with the Montana Leg-
islative Council at a salary of approximately $13,000 per year. Id. at 165-66.
327. Groot left both jobs despite representations to the Council that he would remain
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ployed, but incurred gasoline credit charges and hospital debts for
the birth of a child.32 8 In May and July Groot passed the other
parts of the Florida bar examination and applied for admission to
the Florida Bar. s s In August Groot filed a petition for bank-
ruptcy,s30 seeking the discharge of his medical, travel, and student
loan debts. He also accepted an $18,000 per year job at this time.3 31
After undertaking its customary investigation and an informal
hearing,8 2 the board denied Groot admission to the Florida Bar
because the circumstances surrounding his bankruptcy indicated a
lack of moral character, rendering Groot unfit for the practice of
law." 3 In reversing the board's decision, the court first stated that
Groot obviously "intended to unburden himself of accumulated
debts," which is "precisely the reason that the bankruptcy laws ex-
ist."33 In this regard, the court cited G.W.L. for the proposition
that "[t]he filing of a petition for bankruptcy, standing alone, does
not constitute sufficient cause to deny admission.33s 5 Instead, the
court focused on whether Groot's conduct was morally reprehensi-
ble under the circumstances and concluded that it was not.336 In
making this determination, the court carefully distinguished
G.W.L. on the facts, stressing especially that Groot supported two
children and a former wife. 7 In the court's view, Groot's circum-
for at least one full year and to Tri-County that he would remain for nine months. Neither
employer, however, expressed any dissatisfaction with Groot's early departure, and each in-
dicated a willingness to rehire him. Id. at 166-67.
328. These debts were also discharged in bankruptcy. Id. at 166.
329. Id. Sometime in this period Groot divorced his wife. Id. at 167.
330. Groot filed for bankruptcy in the United States District Court, Eastern District
of North Carolina. Id. at 166.
331. Groot accepted a position as staff director of the Florida House of Representa-
tives' Committee on Standards and Conduct. Id.
332. Groot, like G.W.L., declined a formal hearing with the board. Id.
333. The board concluded that "Groot knowingly engaged in a course of conduct
which (i) contributed to his inability to satisfy his debts in a timely and responsible manner,
and (ii) caused them to be discharged without any attempt on his part to pay or renegotiate
them." Id.
334. Id. at 167.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 168.
337. Id. One may question the court's distinctions on the facts. Although there was
evidence in the record of Groot's personal problems, he also twice left employment that
would have provided a comfortable means to pay his debts. Furthermore, when Groot filed
for bankruptcy he knew that his prospects were excellent for obtaining employment at
$18,000 per year ($375/week). Although Groot had two dependent children and a former
wife, one may contrast Groot's ability to pay with that of G.W.L., who was clerking for $70
per week. The court found that Groot experienced "unusual misfortune," which justified his
effort to devote current income to current needs. In contrast, the court maintained that
G.W.L. did not have such misfortune, although G.W.L. could not find prosperous legal em-
704
BAR ADMISSIONS
stances "warranted his turning to the remedy provided by federal
law .... ,'88 Accordingly, the court directed the board to admit
Groot to the Florida Bar."'
The Minnesota Supreme Court confronted the issue of the ef-
fect of bankruptcy upon denial of admission to the bar in In re
Gahan-40 and it seemed to adopt an approach similar to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court in G.W.L. Gahan financed his legal education
at the University of San Francisco under a federally guaranteed
student loan program with repayment to commence about nine
months after his graduation in 1976.41 Having passed the Califor-
nia bar, Gahan began work in an Oakland law firm in December
1976 at an annual salary of $15,000. In August 1977, however, after
working without pay for two months, Gahan terminated the em-
ployment.4M After two months of unemployment, Gahan began
work at another California law firm at $18,000 per year.us Never-
theless, during his unemployment Gahan defaulted on his student
loan obligations3 44 and filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.u 5
Immediately prior to filing for bankruptcy Gahan engaged in
several financial transactions,"O which resulted in the bankruptcy
court discharging only his student loans.34 7 Although nothing in
the record suggested fraud or deceit, the Board of Law Examiners
found that Gahan lacked good moral character and denied him ad-
mission to the Minnesota Bar.3 4 8 On appeal, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court affirmed the board's finding. Initially, the court ac-




340. 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979).
341. Gahan's student loan obligations totalled about $14,000, requiring a monthly pay-
ment of approximately $175. Id. at 827.
342. Id. Gahan subsequently received his unpaid wages. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. Gahan claimed that he made some initial payments on the loan. Id.
345. Gahan filed in the United States District Court of the Northern District of Cali-
fornia. Id.
346. Gahan mortgaged his 1959 Jaguar to a friend for $2500 and deposited the pro-
ceeds, the maximum allowable, in exempt bank accounts. At the time he filed for bank-
ruptcy, Gahan owed the balance on his student loans, and a $1600 loan from a private bank.
After regaining employment, but before his discharge in bankruptcy, Gahan paid the bank
loan in full, reasoning that he might need an additional loan in the future. Following his
discharge in bankruptcy, Gahan used the balance in the exempt account to pay back his
friend and release the mortgage. Id. at 827-28.




filing for bankruptcy would frustrate federal bankruptcy policy
and violate the supremacy clause.3 4 9 Citing Perez v. Campbell,3"
the court stated that both the purpose and effect of the state ac-
tion must be examined to determine whether it interferes with the
federal bankruptcy policy of giving debtors a "new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort."3 51 The court specifically re-
jected the holding of Marshall v. District of Columbia,5 ' in which
the circuit court sustained a city policy that denied employment on
the police force to adjudicated bankrupts. Reasoning that "state
law may not chill the exercise" of federal bankruptcy rights, the
court concluded that the rule frustrated bankruptcy policy.3 5 Fur-
thermore, the court criticized the Groot and G.W.L. cases,35 stat-
ing that:
[T]he Florida court failed to squarely address the constitutional issue of de-
nying employment licenses on the basis of bankruptcy. We have reservations
as to whether it was constitutional... to consider the morality of any moti-
vations for filing bankruptcy when the Federal Government has declared the
bankruptcy proceeding to be legal .... 35
Nevertheless, the court decided it could constitutionally consider
Gahan's financial conduct prior to filing bankruptcy in assessing
his moral character as long as it did not label his bankruptcy "im-
moral" or "irresponsible" and deny admission for that reason.3"
The court then held that the circumstances surrounding Gahan's
default on his student loan obligations "demonstrate [d] lack of
good moral character and reflect[ed] adversely on his ability to
perform the duties of a lawyer. 3 57 The court reasoned that it could
prevent future problems s arising from "such irresponsibility by
denying admission, rather than seek to remedy the problem after it
occurs and victimizes a client.
3 5 9
349. Id. at 828-29.
350. 402 U.S. 637 (1971). See notes 283-89 supra and accompanying text.
351. In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826, 829 (Minn. 1979).
352. 559 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See note 294 supra.
353. In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 1979).
354. See notes 308-39 supra and accompanying text.
355. 279 N.W.2d at 831.
356. Id. at 829-30.
357. Id. at 831-32.
358. According to the court, these problems concerned the applicant's lack of fitness
demonstrated by his disregard of the rights of creditors and of other students by defaulting




(d) The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 "to
modernize the bankruptcy law. '23 0 In doing so, Congress did not
alter the "fresh start" policy underlying the old law, and, in fact,
enacted certain provisions to enhance this policy.
3 61
Two provisions of the new law are pertinent to the bar admis-
sion situation. Congress designed section 525 to protect bankrupts
against discriminatory treatment. This section provides that
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a
license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a
grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment
to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment
against, a person that is or has beeni a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or
a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bank-
rupt or debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is
or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of the case... or
during the case... or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable... or that
was discharged .... 
86
The legislative history reveals that this provision codified the re-
sult of Perez v. Campbell.363 Although the enumeration of various
forms of discrimination is extensive, Congress did not intend for
this list to be exhaustive.36 Instead, the legislative history reveals
that Congress designed this provision to permit further develop-
ment of case law "to prohibit actions by governmental or quasi-
governmental organizations that perform licensing functions, such
as a State bar association or a medical society ... that can seri-
ously affect the debtors' livelihood or fresh start."36 5 This new sec-
tion, however, does not prohibit consideration by a governmental
unit of other factors, "such as future financial responsibility or
ability. "366
A second pertinent provision of the new law deals with the
discharge of student loans. Section 523(a)(8) prevents the dis-
charge of student loans for the first five years of the loan repay-
360. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 279, at 1.
361. The new code contains an express policy against reaffirmation of debts previously
discharged in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c), (d) (Supp. I1 1979), as well as an antidis-
crimination provision to protect those individuals declaring bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 525
(Supp. m 1979).
362. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (Supp. mI 1979).
363. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 279, at 81.
364. Id.
365. Id. Congress also designed this section to strengthen the policy against reaffirma-




ment period unless survival of the obligation would impose undue
hardship on the debtor.3 67 This law follows a startling increase in
the number of student loans discharged in bankruptcy over the
past several years.-36
(e) Analysis and Conclusion
The Minnesota and Florida positions on bankruptcy and good
moral character discourages bar applicants from exercising their
federal bankruptcy rights because of the possibility of denial of ad-
mission. In each of these cases the courts were careful to point out
that the mere fact of a discharge of debts in bankruptcy did not by
itself render an applicant unfit for the practice of law. Instead, in
G.W.L. and Groot the court focused on the applicants' motives in
seeking bankruptcy, while in Gahan the court looked to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the applicant's default prior to filing for
bankruptcy. The use of such reasoning, however, permits the
courts to avoid the supremacy clause issue that arises because of
an interference with federal bankruptcy policy. Clearly, the state's
denial of bar admission to the applicants in G.W.L. and Gahan
interfered with the federal bankruptcy policy of providing them a
new opportunity in life. Furthermore, although the Groot court
eventually admitted the applicant to the bar, the court's unsatis-
factory reasons for distinguishing G.W.L. offer future applicants no
guidance in this area. Thus, a bar applicant, aware that the cir-
cumstances of his bankruptcy will be heavily scrutinized, might
hesitate to discharge debts in bankruptcy; consequently, the con-
gressional intent behind the bankruptcy law is thwarted.
Although the Supreme Court in Perez v. Campbell3 " did not
confront the question of whether indirect frustration of federal
bankruptcy policy by a state law is invalid under the supremacy
367. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. 11 1979). This section provides that-
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt-
for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made
under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit
institution of higher education, unless-
(A) such loan first became due before five years... before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue
hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents ....
368. See Note, Skipping out on Alma Mater: Some Problems Involving the Collection
of Federal Student Loans, 15 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 317, 323-24 (1980).
369. See notes 283-89 supra and accompanying text.
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clause, the Court did state the "controlling principle" in
supremacy clause cases is whether the state law "frustrates the full
effectiveness of federal law."370 Indeed, in areas other than bank-
ruptcy, the Supreme Court has invalidated state law on supremacy
clause grounds even when the federal law was not directly contra-
vened.37' Additionally, following the Perez rationale, Grimes,
372
Rutledge,s77 and Handsome3 74 held that state legislation indirectly
interfering with federal bankruptcy policy is unconstitutional
under the supremacy clause. The Grimes and Rutledge courts in-
validated state attempts to deprive citizens of their livelihood be-
cause of their exercise of federal bankruptcy rights. In G.W.L. and
Gahan the bar applicants were denied the chance to earn their
livelihood because of the states' refusal to admit them to the bar
based upon their exercise of federal bankruptcy rights. Clearly,
preventing a bar applicant from practicing law constitutes an in-
fringement of federal policy that is as substantial as the withhold-
ing of a driver's license or college transcript, the revocation of a
contractor's license, or the termination from a police force. There-
fore, because in the bar admission cases the state has penalized the
bar applicant's right to declare bankruptcy, the state interference
should be unconstitutional under the supremacy clause.
The provisions of the new bankruptcy law do not eliminate
the supremacy clause problem created by decisions like Gahan,
Groot, and G. W.L. First as to the new student loan provision, there
is no indication that bar examiners are concerned only with the
discharge of student loans in bankruptcy. Since the articulated
character defect demonstrated by G.W.L. and Gahan was irre-
sponsibility in dealing with creditors, the type of loan involved in
discharge makes no difference. Those applicants who do receive a
discharge in bankruptcy under the undue hardship exception have
no guarantee that the bar examiners will agree with the bank-
ruptcy judge's determination on this issue. As evidenced by the
Florida and Minnesota decisions, the bankruptcy judge's decision
on an applicant's good faith in seeking bankruptcy does not bind
the bar examiners. As one commentator has noted, these courts
370. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971). See text accompanying note 305
supra.
371. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Huron Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
372. See notes 290-94 supra and accompanying text.
373. See notes 295-99 supra and accompanying text.
374. See notes 300-03 supra and accompanying text.
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"had few qualms about undertaking, in effect, a determination of
whether the bar applicants ought to have received a discharge at
all. "375
Second, as to the new antidiscrimination provision, even
though the legislative history expressly refers to licensing by "a
State bar association," state courts may continue to draw a distinc-
tion between the circumstances surrounding bankruptcy and the
bankruptcy itself.37 6 The possibility that a bar applicant might re-
ceive a discharge of student loans in recognition of "undue hard-
ship" only to have this issue relitigated is particularly distressing.
The federal policy that persons who have received discharges in
bankruptcy ought to receive a "fresh start" and that such individu-
als ought not to be discriminated against by governmental units
clearly is infringed by cases such as G.W.L., Groot, and Gahan.
Thus, courts should "mark the contours of the antidiscrimination
provision"3 77 by invalidating such state bar admission practices as
violative of the supremacy clause.
B. The Bar Examination
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners7 8 the Supreme Court
held that a state could constitutionally require a demonstration of
"proficiency in its law" before admitting an applicant to the bar.'7 '
With few exceptions, this demonstration takes the form of a pass-
ing grade on a bar examination.380 The most commonly articulated
purpose for the bar examination is to insure that applicants pos-
sess "minimum competence" to practice law.381 Theoretically, the
requirement of minimum competence provides protection to the
375. Note, supra note 368, at 348.
376. With regard to this provision, it is the view of two commentators that "[t]he
prohibition of discriminatory treatment... does not prevent a bar association character
committee from investigating and considering the circumstances surrounding an applicant's
bankruptcy to determine whether there is independent evidence of bad moral character." B.
WEiNTRAmB & A. RsNSCK, BNKRuTcY LAw MANUAL 13.06, at 3-23 (1980).
377. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 279, at 81.
378. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
379. Id. at 239.
380. The exception to this rule is admission by "diploma privilege." In a few states,
graduates of an accredited law school within the state are not required to take the bar ex-
amination. Instead, these applicants automatically are admitted if they satisfy all other gen-
eral eligibility requirements. See, e.g., MoNT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 37-61-204 (1979); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-16-6.1 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 30-2-1 (1980); Wis. Sup. CT. R.
40.02(1) (1980).
381. Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 748 (4th Cir. 1976), modified, 563 F.2d
1130 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d
1089, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976).
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public and integrity to the judicial system.8 2 The examination typ-
ically consists of two sections-multiple choice questions and essay
questions.5 5s A few states add a third area pertaining exclusively to
ethics or professional responsibility.'" In a recent attempt to pro-
vide greater uniformity among state bar examinations, the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiners prepared the Multistate Bar
Examination (MBE). Currently, forty-three states have adopted
the MBE, se 5 supplemented in each case by the examiners' own es-
say questions.
Although constitutional challenges to the bar examination are
not as numerous as challenges to good moral character determina-
tions, three topics merit analysis. This section of the Special
Project first explores the procedural due process protections that
must be afforded to an applicant who fails the bar examination.
Next, the section examines the substantive due process issue asso-
ciated with limitations on the number of times an applicant may
take the bar examination. Finally, the section analyzes equal pro-
tection challenges to bar examinations by failing minority candi-
dates in particular and by failing candidates in general.
1. Procedural Due Process-Challenges to Post-examination
Procedures
(a) Introduction
In a number of jurisdictions, bar examiners provide no oppor-
tunity for failing applicants either to review their tests or to chal-
382. Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Comm., 116 Conn. 409, 415, 165 A. 211, 213
(1933). See generally Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 301, 304-09 (1959).
383. Generally the applicant writes the test although some states allow oral examina-
tions at the discretion of the examiners. State statutes or court rules usually set forth the
range of subjects covered. A typical list includes the following. Civil Procedure, Criminal
Law and Procedure, Torts, Contracts, Personal Property, Real Property, Future Interests in
Real and Personal Property, Trusts, Secured Transactions, Public and Private Corpora-
tions, Agency and Partnership, Creditor's Rights, Administrative Law, Taxation, Constitu-
tional Law, and Legal Ethics. A few states include additional subjects peculiarly relevant to
their own economic interest-for example, Mining Law and Water Rights in Montana. See
generally F. KunN, S. Lmzxo & J. MAvrrY, BAR ADMISSION RuLs AND STUDNT PRACTICE
RuLFa 29-42 (1978).
384. Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, and Georgia are among the
states that require a separate examination on ethics. In those states a candidate must pass
the ethics section for an overall passing score, regardless of performance on the remainder of
the test. F. KLmN, S. LmmAno & J. MAvrrY, supra note 383, at 38-39.
385. NATIONAL BAR EXAMNAnTN DIoFET 2 (1980). If an applicant has received a pass-




lenge the results.3 6 This situation has given rise to several proce-
dural due process challenges by failing bar applicants. 87 The
fourteenth amendment requires procedural due process safeguards
if the state deprives an individual of a protected liberty or prop-
erty interest.38 8 Thus, a reviewing court initially must ask whether
the state action in question infringes on an individual's protected
fourteenth amendment interest. Once a court determines that an
individual possesses such an interest, the remaining inquiry fo-
cuses on the type of procedure required. The essential elements of
procedural due process are notice of the impending state actions8
and an opportunity for the affected party to be heard.3 9 0 Because
due process is a flexible concept, the specific procedures required
will depend upon the nature of the individual interest affected, the
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the proce-
dures used, the benefit of additional procedural safeguards, and
the nature of the government's interest.3 91
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examinerss9 the Supreme Court
held that bar applicants have a protected fourteenth amendment
interest in admission to the bar.3 9 8 Thus, procedural due process
safeguards are constitutionally required.3" This section of the Spe-
cial Project discusses the forms of review generally available to the
386. See 52 B.U. L. Rzv. 286, 297 (1972).
387. See, e.g., Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976), modified, 563
F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); Whitfield v. Illinois
Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974); Feldman v. State Bd. of Bar Examin-
ers, 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971).
388. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
389. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
390. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
391. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). Thus, depending on the
circumstances, in addition to notice and an opportunity to be heard, procedural due process
may require confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, Winner v. Committee on
Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); presence of counsel if desired, Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970); or a specified burden of proof, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
392. 353 U.S. 232 (1957). For a discussion of the due process issues presented by
Schware, see notes 83-109 supra and the accompanying text.
393. 353 U.S. at 238-39. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Court
identified this interest as a liberty interest. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
Most courts accord broad discretion to the bar examiners in carrying out their duties and
place a heavy burden on unsuccessful applicants who attempt to prove wrongful conduct on
the part of the examiners. See Ex parte Ross, 196 Ga. 499, 26 S.E.2d 880 (1943); In re
Hughey, 62 Nev. 498, 156 P.2d 733 (1945).
394. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974).
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failing bar examinee and whether those procedures satisfy the re-
quirements of procedural due process.
(b) Judicial Developments
Most procedural due process challenges by failing bar examin-
ees to the lack of post-examination review have been unsuccessful.
The recent case of Tyler v. Vickerys5 illustrates this point. Tyler
was a class action on behalf of all black persons who had taken and
failed the Georgia bar examination. The complaint alleged that the
exam violated both the equal protections" and due process clauses
of the fourteenth amendment. In the due process count, plaintiffs
claimed that the state violated consitutionally mandated procedure
by failing to provide a review of the examination for failing appli-
cants.39 7 Traditionally, blacks have experienced difficulty in pass-
ing the Georgia bar examination. In July 1972, none of the forty
black examinees passed, and in February and July 1973, slightly
more than fifty percent of the black applicants failed as compared
to a failure rate of twenty-five to thirty-three percent among white
examinees.39 8 The district court ruled that the Constitution did not
require a procedure to review a failing grade because "an unquali-
fied right to retake the examination at its next regularly scheduled
administration both satisfies the purposes of a hearing and affords
its protection." 99 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the court
below. Initially, the court found that "the safeguards of the due
process clause are of course available to a failing bar applicant."' °
Having concluded this, the court stated that the procedures re-
quired must be determined by balancing the applicant's interest in
achieving a level of competency through additional procedure
against the state's interest in denying the procedure.0 1
While acknowledging the significant interest of the examinee
in pursuing his chosen profession, the court nevertheless stated
that due process required a hearing only if the petitioners demon-
strated that hearings provided greater protection than the unqual-
ified right of reexamination offered by Georgia. The court reasoned
395. 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976).
396. For discussion of the equal protection claim in Tyler, see notes 453-66 infra and
accompanying text.
397. 517 F.2d at 1093.
398. Id. at 1092.
399. Id. at 1103.
400. Id. The court cited Schware as support for this conclusion.
401. Id. at 1104 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970)).
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that the opportunity to take the next scheduled examination pro-
vided significantly quicker relief to an applicant erroneously failed
and that a hearing entailed too great an administrative burden on
the state. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that failure to provide
for a review procedure did not violate due process.40 2
Like Tyler, the decision reached in Whitfield v. Illinois Board
of Law Examiners4' 0  indicates that post-examination hearings are
not constitutionally mandated if reexamination is available. After
failing the Illinois bar examination five times, Whitfield filed a civil
rights action alleging, among other things, that he had a procedu-
ral due process right to review his examination and to compare it
with model answers. The Seventh Circuit rejected this allegation
and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case for failure to
state a cause of action.40 ' The court pointed out that Whitfield had
taken the bar five times and that "there is no allegation that in the
future, he will be denied the same opportunity. ' 40 5 Thus, the court
reasoned that the Illinois provisions for reexamination adequately
protected an applicant from grading errors, and that hearings were
402. 517 F.2d at 1104. In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit also rejected the con-
tention that a hearing provided a superior remedy to reexamination in removing whatever
stigma attaches to a failing examinee when such failure is unjustified. The court carefully
noted and distinguished Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963),
in making this conclusion. In Willner the Supreme Court held that an individual's interest
in pursuing his livelihood required that he be afforded a hearing, including the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, when the bar examiners denied him admission for
failure to demonstrate good moral character. Id. at 103. The Fifth Circuit stated that the
instant case presented "entirely different issues" than presented in Willner.
While an adverse determination on character and fitness tends to exert a continuing
detrimental effect on an individual's opportunity to be admitted to practice, unless and
until rebutted, failure on a bar examination does not stigmatize an individual as "in-
competent," but merely indicates that he did not demonstrate minimal competence on
a particular examination. Upon reexamination, such an individual is entitled to have
his paper graded by the same standards as those of everyone else, and if he passes, to
be admitted on precisely the same basis as an applicant who had not previously taken
the examination. For these reasons, we consider the "liberty interest" a failing ex-
aminee has at stake to be a minor, if not a nonexistent one.
517 F.2d at 1104-05.
Thus, an applicant must be afforded a hearing when denied admission for lack of good
moral character but not for failure to pass the bar examination. For a discussion of procedu-
ral due process requirements in the good moral character context, see note 81 supra. See
also 52 B.U. L. Rzv. 286 (1972).
403. 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
404. Id. at 476.
405. Id. at 478. The Illinois Supreme Court Rules provided an applicant the unquali-
fied right to retake the bar exam five times. Upon failing the fifth retake, an applicant could
sit again for the exam only if granted permission by the bar examiners or by the state su-




not constitutionally mandated because of the "intolerable burden"
that they would place on the bar examiners.
40 8
One panel of the Fourth Circuit has disagreed expressly with
the idea that procedural due process does not require a hearing for
a failing bar examinee. In Richardson v. McFadden07 plaintiffs,
four black law school graduates who had failed the South Carolina
bar examination, brought suit alleging that the examination vio-
lated their rights under the federal due process and equal protec-
tion clauses. 08 Specifically, petitioners claimed that South Caro-
lina's lack of post-examination review violated their procedural
due process rights. The district court rejected most of petitioners'
arguments, but abstained from ruling on the procedural due pro-
cess claim until plaintiffs presented it to the state supreme
court.40 9 On appeal, the bar examiners argued that the right of re-
examination satisfied procedural due process and that the district
court had therefore erred in failing to dismiss this claim. The
Fourth Circuit panel rejected this argument, stating that a person
need not repeatedly demonstrate his competence to practice law
because it took work, effort, and money to prepare for the exami-
nation. The court further noted that because of the value of a li-
cense to practice law, "delay in getting it is an injury."' 10 Specifi-
cally referring to Tyler and Whitfield, the court stated that "[ilt is
true that some courts have held that reexamination is a more effec-
tive remedy than review because the administrative burden of al-
406. A number of courts have rendered decisions similar to the Tyler and Whitfield
holdings that federal procedural due process does not require a hearing for a failing bar
examinee. See, e.g., Sutton v. Lionel, 585 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1978); Feldman v. State Bd.
of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699, 703 n.6 (8th Cir. 1971); Chaney v. State Bar, 386 F.2d 962,
967 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1011 (1968); In re Mead, 372 Mass. 253, 361
N.E.2d 403, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 858 (1977); In re Pacheco, 85 N.M. 600, 514 P.2d 1297
(1973).
407. 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976), modified, 563 F.2d 1130 (1977) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
408. For a discussion of the equal protection issues presented by Richardson, see notes
474-79 infra and accompanying text.
409. The bar examiners, in cross-appealing this decision, claimed that the Fourth Cir-
cuit had no jurisdiction as to the procedural due process issue since only the Supreme Court
can review state court decisions. Furthermore, the examiners claimed that in grading the
examinations, they exercised a judicial function, which rendered them immune from suit.
The Fourth Circuit panel rejected this argument, stating that "[w]hile both propositions are
correct in principle, it is crystal clear that in giving and grading examinations and certifying
passing scores the Board of Bar Examiners neither renders judicial decisions nor exercises
judicial functions." 540 F.2d at 746 n.2. This jurisdictional issue is more fully discussed at
notes 11-28 supra and accompanying text.
410. 540 F.2d at 752.
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lowing challenges was perceived to be too great. We are not per-
suaded.' 411 The court did note a distinction in the cases-in Tyler
and Whitfield the applicants had an unlimited opportunity to re-
take the bar, while in the instant case the applicants were limited
to three reexaminations.'1 ' On rehearing en banc, the full panel did
not address this issue but did affirm all aspects of the district court
decision.13
A number of jurisdictions have relied upon nonconstitutional
grounds in permitting an unsuccessful bar applicant to invoke an
adversary proceeding with the right to review his exam paper.41'
For example, in In re Peterson41 5 the Alaska Supreme Court or-
dered that a failing examinee be allowed to review his examination,
despite the absence of such a requirement in the bar rules and the
availability of reexamination. The court based its decision solely
upon state law and did not reach the federal due process issue. 416
(c) Analysis
Tyler, Whitfield, and Richardson present a somewhat confus-
ing picture concerning the procedural due process requirements
that must be afforded an applicant who fails the bar examination.
411. Id.
412. Id. n.20. For a discussion of the substantive due process issues presented when a
state limits the number of times an applicant may retake the bar, see notes 426-40 infra and
accompanying text. The court also considered it significant that the state voluntarily estab-
lished review procedures after the initiation of this suit. 540 F.2d at 752 n.19.
413. 563 F.2d 1130, 1132 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978). The Fourth
Circuit panel granted relief to two plaintiffs who claimed that their tests were arbitrarily
and capriciously graded by the bar examiners. 540 F.2d at 750-52. The full court rejected
this aspect of the panel's decision, reinstating the district court's decision in full. 563 F.2d at
1132. It should be noted that the full panel was divided concerning whether the district
court had jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' individual claims regarding the results on their par-
ticular tests. The court did not decide this issue because a clear majority felt that in any
event these plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. Id. at 1131.
414. See 52 B.U. L. Rzv. 286, 296-97 (1972), stating that
A survey and tabulation of the pamphlets and circulars given out by the board of bar
examiners in forty-eight jurisdictions demonstrate that twenty-eight make no mention
of specific review procedures for failing examinees nor do they prescribe a general pro-
ceeding that might cover review of an examination grade. Six, like Alaska, have provi-
sions so vague that it is unclear whether review of examination grades is permit-
ted.... Georgia and Missouri expressly provide that an applicant shall have no view
or review of his examination paper. Pennsylvania and Tennessee expressly exclude re-
view of the examination from the procedure provided for appealing denial of bar ad-
mission. Finally, eight states provide for review similar to that required by the Peter-
son court.
415. 459 P.2d 703 (Alaska 1969).
416. Id. at 709.
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Tyler and Whitfield suggest that reexamination is enough, but the
extent of these holdings is unclear because the states in question
provided unlimited reexamination. In Whitfield the Seventh Cir-
cuit carefully noted that there was no evidence that the applicant
would be denied an opportunity to take the exam again, even
though additional education might be required after five examina-
tions.417 In Tyler the Fifth Circuit stressed that Georgia provided
an "unqualified" right of reexamination, even though after three
failures the applicant could take additional exams only if he sub-
mitted "evidence of having attended law school for one additional
school year.' '418 Both of these comments indicate that the case
would be different if at some point the state imposed an absolute
barrier to reexamination.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Richardson strengthens the
argument that absent reexamination opportunities a state must
provide some form of procedural review to a failing bar applicant.
On its face, the Richardson court's admonition that an applicant
must demonstrate his competence only once in light of the work,
effort, and money required to take the bar examination indicated
that the basis for its decision was, unlike Tyler and Whitfield, its
belief that procedural hearings would not impose upon the state an
undue administrative burden. An equally viable proposition, how-
ever, is that the Fourth Circuit's concern rested upon the fact that
the state had imposed an absolute barrier to reexamination. In this
regard, the court distinguished Tyler and Whitfield because in
those cases the applicants had "unlimited opportunity to take the
bar," while in South Carolina an applicant had "only three oppor-
tunities to take the examination.'' If this latter interpretation is
correct, then the Fifth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits seem to agree
that absolute barriers to reexamination create a troublesome pro-
cedural due process issue. The state obviously has a legitimate in-
terest in erecting some barriers to unlimited reexamination; since
an applicant's repeated failures may signal incompetency, the state
may decide that, at some point, absolute limitations are needed to
protect the public and the judicial system. In fact, in the substan-
417. See note 405 supra and accompanying text.
418. At the time that the Tyler applicants took the bar, the following Supreme Court
rule was in effect. "Any applicant who fails to make a grade of 70 percent on three examina-
tions... shall be eligible to take additional examinations only after submitting evidence of
having attended law school for one additional school year." GA. Con ANN. § 9-122 (1973)
(repealed Aug. 1, 1977).
419. Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 752 n.20 (4th Cir. 1976).
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tive due process context, the Tenth Circuit"10 recently upheld Col-
orado's limitation on reexamination as a "rational policy adopted
in the exercise of the State's recognized authority to assure a com-
petent bar. '42 1 On the other hand, an individual obviously has an
important and legitimate interest in pursuing his chosen career.422
Completion of law school represents a significant outlay of time,
effort, and money, and the applicant's future livelihood and repu-
tation hinge on obtaining a law license. Thus, the issue becomes
what does procedural due process require if a state limits reexami-
nation opportunities. In view of the reasoning articulated in Tyler,
Whitfield, and Richardson, and upon a weighing of the interests
involved, the scales tip in favor of the applicant."' Thus, a state
choosing to limit opportunities for reexamination should be re-
quired to provide failing applicants with some form of post-exami-
nation review.
4' 4
Another question that arises from the relevant case law is
whether a state may qualify or condition reexamination on further
education without providing an examination review procedure. One
commentator has suggested that such qualification absent review
would violate due process.2 5 The courts in Tyler and Whitfield,
however, reached a contrary conclusion. In both of those cases the
applicable supreme court rules contained conditions requiring fur-
ther education after a specified number of failures. Nevertheless,
both courts ruled that the available reexamination provisions satis-
fied due process. An applicant might fare better than this in the
Fourth Circuit. In Richardson the court specifically rejected the
contention that the administrative burdens of review outweighed
the applicant's interest in a hearing. Of course, the court relied
upon the absolute barrier to reexamination after three failures to
distinguish Tyler and Whitfield, but the opinion still shows sym-
pathy for the applicant's position. Thus, a different rule on condi-
tions to reexamination might prevail in the Fourth Circuit.
420. Younger v. Colorado State Bd. of Law Examiners, 625 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1980).
421. Id. at 378.
422. See Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1104 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
940 (1976).
423. A similar conclusion was reached in 52 B.U. L. Rzy. 286, 301 (1972).
424. Review might take the form of a comparison of the applicant's answers to model
answers or a meeting with the bar examiners to discuss the applicant's answers.




When an applicant fails the bar examination, he is entitled to
procedural due process protections. Most courts deciding this issue
agree that if an applicant has an unlimited opportunity for reex-
amination then no hearing is required. If, however, reexamination
is limited, then an applicant must be afforded some form of review.
Requirements that reexamination be premised on further educa-
tion have been upheld in both the Seventh and Fifth Circuits. In
the Fourth Circuit, however, it is less clear that such conditions
would withstand procedural due process scrutiny.
2. Substantive Due Process-Challenges to Limited
Reexamination Rules
(a) Introduction
As noted earlier, states may require a demonstration of an ap-
plicant's proficiency in law through performance on a bar examina-
tion.428 Although no state limits an applicant to one examination, a
majority of the states have adopted rules that limit the number of
times an applicant may take the bar examination.42 Because a lim-
ited reexamination rule is a general rule that applies to all bar ap-
plicants, it falls into the category of a rulemaking determination. 3
Thus, to pass substantive due process review, such a classification
must bear a rational relationship to fitness to practice law.42 This
section of the Special Project examines a recent Tenth Circuit de-
cision that analyzes this substantive due process question. The sec-
tion concludes that states can limit opportunities for reexamina-
tion consistent with substantive due process.
(b) The Tenth Circuit Decision
In the recent case of Younger v. Colorado State Board of Bar
Examiners43 ° Colorado's Rule 214,431 which allows applicants to
426. See notes 379-80 supra and accompanying text.
427. Younger v. Colorado State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 625 F.2d 372, 374 (10th Cir.
1980) ("[alt least 31 other states limit the number of times an applicant may take a bar
examination ... ").
428. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
429. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
430. 625 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1980).
431. COLo. R. Cxv. P. 214 provides that an applicant who fails to obtain a passing
grade on the bar examination may take the succeeding examination. "If he then fails he will




take the bar examination three times and occasionally a fourth
time, came under constitutional challenge. The plaintiff, Glenn F.
Younger, failed the Colorado bar examination twice. Pursuant to
Rule 214, he then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court and ob-
tained permission to take the test a third time. After failing the
third examination, the supreme court denied Younger permission
to take the test a fourth time. Plaintiff then filed suit alleging dep-
rivations of due process and equal protection.3 2 The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado granted plaintiff re-
lief,433 ruling that the final preclusion of any opportunity for reex-
amination, regardless of requirements for further study, work ex-
perience, or development, violated the fourteenth amendment.
Applying the rational basis test,4  the district court concluded
that the Colorado rule bore no rational relation to the state's inter-
est in insuring the professional competence of the bar. Instead the
court ruled that because the examination tests professional compe-
tence, the number of times an applicant takes the examination
before passing is irrelevant.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed.135 Although the parties
agreed that the examination validly measured minimum legal com-
petency, the court concluded that success on the test did not con-
stitute an absolute determinant of that capacity. Instead, the court
held that a state could legitimately take into account concerns gen-
erated by an applicant's repeated failures on the bar examination
in assessing competence, despite the fact that an applicant might
eventually pass. 43 6 Applying the rational basis test, the Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that the Colorado rule "is a rational policy adopted
in the exercise of the State's recognized authority to assure a com-
petent bar. ' 437 The court further held that the rule did not inval-
idly create a conclusive and irrebuttable presumption of incompe-
tence; instead, the court found that the rule was based upon a
general classification policy.
43
432. 625 F.2d at 375-76.
433. Younger v. Colorado State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 482 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Colo.
1980).
434. Id. at 1246 (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)).
435. Younger v. Colorado State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 625 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1980).
436. Id. at 377. The court reasoned that three failures might well be indicative of an
individual's lack of competence to practice law. In support of this view, the court noted that
statistics show a very low pass rate for those taking the exam a fourth time. Id.




(c) Analysis and Conclusion
In Younger plaintiff presented the court with an infringement
of a nonfundamental interest. Thus, as dictated by Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners," Colorado needed only to show that
Rule 214, which limited an applicant's opportunity to retake the
bar, bore a rational relationship to an applicant's capacity to prac-
tice law. Although the district court found the rule to be irrational,
the Tenth Circuit had little trouble reversing this determination.
The Tenth Circuit readily agreed that repeated failures could legit-
imately be considered in an assessment of an applicant's ultimate
capacity to practice law. Given the deferential standard of review,
which the court correctly utilized, this result is not surprising. In
this regard, it seems unlikely that bar applicants can successfully
challenge )rules that limit an applicant's opportunity to take the
bar.4
40
3. Equal Protection-Challenges to the Bar Examination by
Minority Candidates
(a) Introduction
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
mandates that no state shall deny to persons within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.441 Thus, an equal protection prob-
lem arises whenever the state employs classifications that treat
similarly situated persons unequally. The appropriate degree of
scrutiny required when a court reviews such a classification varies
with the type of interest at stake and with the basis used to draw
the classification. If the interest involved is mere economics, then
the classification must only bear a rational relationship to some
legitimate governmental objective." 2 Under this deferential ap-
proach, courts almost always uphold the governmental classifica-
tion.443 When the classification disadvantages persons within a
439. 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
440. The more interesting aspect of this decision is its relationship to procedural due
process. See notes 417-24 supra and accompanying text.
441. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
442. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
443. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 18-
20 (1972). The rational basis test rests on the theory that legislators, as elected representa-
tives, should be given great latitude by the courts in drawing classifications that touch eco-
nomic and social interests.
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"suspect class' '444 or impinges on a "fundamental interest,"'445 the
compelling interest test applies, and the government must show
that the classification serves a compelling state interest through
the least restrictive means available. 46 States rarely succeed in
carrying this difficult burden; thus, such classifications consistently
fall under the equal protection clause.447 During the last decade,
courts have expanded this traditional two-tiered approach to en-
compass a middle level of review for classifications involving im-
portant noneconomic individual interests." 8 Under this approach,
the classification must bear a substantial relation to a legitimate
state objective.449 Thus, depending upon the interest at stake and
the classification at issue, courts apply three different levels of
scrutiny to review governmental actions challenged under the
equal protection clause.
While classifications based upon race clearly call for the strict-
est judicial scrutiny under current equal protection analysis, recent
bar examination cases have presented the courts with facially neu-
tral actions that disproportionately affect minorities. In these
cases, the challenged classifications are not drawn on racial lines,
and they disadvantage both whites and nonwhites. These classifi-
cations, however, proportionately burden minorities significantly
more than they do whites. In particular, there have been several
challenges to state bar examinations that disproportionately ex-
clude minorities from the practice of law.450 Almost all states re-
444. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race).
445. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(access to appeal in criminal cases); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation).
446. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967).
447. See Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court, the 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975
Sup. CT. REv. 1, 11-12.
448. This strand of equal protection analysis has developed over the past ten years
and provides heightened judicial scrutiny for important noneconomic interests that the
court has not declared fundamental and for "semi-suspect" classes. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (invalidating a state statute that provided for the commitment
of incompetent criminal defendants on terms different from all other individuals); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating a gender based classification); Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235 (1970) (invalidating a state statute that exposed indigents to incarceration beyond
*the statutory maximum to "work off" their fines). See also Gunther, supra note 443, at 17-
18; Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights: On Protecting Fundamental and
Not-So-Fundamental "Rights" or "Interests" Through a Flexible Conception of Equal
Protection, 1977 DuKE L.J. 143.
449. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
450. See, e.g., Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976), modified en
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quire a passing score on the bar examination as a condition for
practicing law;451 consequently, states classify bar applicants by ex-
cluding from the practice of law those that fail the examinations
while admitting those that pass. Since minority applicants fail the
bar examinations at a strikingly higher rate than do white candi-
dates, 45 2 these classifications disproportionately exclude minorities
from the practice of law. The crucial issue in these challenges thus
becomes what level of scrutiny the courts should apply to facially
neutral classifications that disproportionately affect minorities.
This section of the Special Project first examines recent case
law in which failing minority candidates have challenged various
state bar examinations on equal protection grounds and concludes
that these cases essentially foreclose traditional equal protection
challenges by minority candidates. This section then explores a
possible alternative avenue for minority candidates to challenge
the bar examination.
(b) Review and Analysis of Applicable Case Law
The Fifth Circuit addressed the equal protection problem
presented by disproportionately high minority failure rates on
state bar examinations in Tyler v. Vickery.'" In Tyler the court
reviewed a constitutional challenge on behalf of all black persons
who had failed the Georgia bar examination. The challenge fol-
lowed the July 1972 test, in which all forty of the minority candi-
dates received a failing grade.4" Since the standard of review is
crucial to the success of any equal protection challenge, plaintiffs
in Tyler first argued that Title VII,4 5 not traditional constitutional
bane, 563 F.2d 1130 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d
1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Pettit v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp. 282
(D. Md. 1977).
451. See notes 379-80 supra and accompanying text.
452. There is general agreement that a significantly higher percentage of minority can-
didates fail the state bar examinations than do white candidates. For some instructive sta-
tistical data, see Symposium-The Minority Candidate and the Bar Examination, 5 BLACK
L.J. 119, 123-29 (1976). See also Bias in the Bar Exam?, STuDmrr LAw., Jan. 1980, at 14.
453. 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976). Accord, Parrish
v. Board of Comm'rs of Alabama State Bar, 533 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1976). For a full discus-
sion of the procedural due process issues presented in Tyler, see notes 395-402 supra and
accompanying text.
454. 517 F.2d at 1092. "On the February and July, 1973, examinations, slightly more
than one-half of the black applicants were unsuccessful, as compared to a failure rate of
roughly one-fourth to one-third among white examinees." Id.
455. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1976). Title
VII was enacted to combat sex and race discrimination in hiring and promotion for employ-
ment generally. As construed by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
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standards, should apply by analogy.45 The court found that
Geduldig v. Aiello,457 in which the Supreme Court declined the op-
portunity to equate the equal protection clause with Title VII in
an analogous situation, controlled the question of the proper rela-
tionship between the two.458 Thus, the Fifth Circuit rejected plain-
tiffs' contention and instead employed a traditional constitutional
analysis to the equal protection claim. Plaintiffs then argued that
because the disproportionately high minority failure rate consti-
tuted a classification based upon race, it should be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny.459 The court, however, rejected the use of a com-
pelling interest test. It relied upon two Supreme Court decisions,
Jefferson v. Hackney460 and James v. Valtierra,461 for the proposi-
424 (1971), Title VII precludes the use of testing procedures that disproportionately exclude
protected minorities, regardless of intent or motivation, unless they are "demonstrably a
reasonable measure of job performance." Id. at 436. Under the relevant Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines in effect for the Tyler court,
[t]he use of any test which adversely affects hiring, promotion, transfer or any other
employment or membership opportunity of classes protected by Title VII constitutes
discrimination unless: (a) the test has been validated and evidences a high degree of
utility as hereinafter described, and (b) the person giving or acting upon the results of
the particular test can demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promo-
tion procedures are unavailable for his use.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1974). The present regulations are essentially the same. 29 C.F.R. §
1607.3 (1980).
456. Several of the bar examination cases have expressly held that bar examinations
are not covered under Title VII. See Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1096 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Delgado v. McTighe, 442 F. Supp. 725, 730 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211, 212 (E.D. Va. 1976),
aff'd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Supreme Court of N.M., 19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 448 (D.N.M. 1977); Lewis v. Hartsock, 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Ca. 831 (S.D.
Ohio 1976).
457. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig the Supreme Court dealt with the question of
whether the California Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund's exclusion of disabil-
ities associated with normal pregnancy from the fund's coverage violated the equal protec-
tion clause. Although this plan fell outside the literal scope of Title VII, the pertinent regu-
lations promulgated by the EEOC under Title VII stated that payments under any
temporary disability plan must apply to disabilities due to pregnancy on the same terms
and conditions as to other disabilities covered. The Supreme Court applied a rational basis
test, sustained the state plan, and failed to distinguish or mention the EEOC's contrary view
under Title VII. The Tyler court inferred from this decision that Title VII standards have
no application to equal protection challenges, which instead must be decided under tradi-
tional constitutional analysis.
458. The Fifth Circuit had previously refused to apply Title VII standards to public
employment testing in Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972). Allen provided
further support for the result in Tyler. 517 F.2d at 1097.
459. 517 F.2d at 1099.
460. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). In Jefferson the Supreme Court rejected the contention that
an Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program violated the equal protection
clause because Congress funded it at a lower percentage of recognized need than other cate-
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tion that an otherwise legitimate classification does not become
constitutionally suspect simply because greater numbers of a racial
minority fall in the disadvantaged group.462
Plaintiffs then contended that the district court erred in fail-
ing to apply a middle tier of heightened judicial scrutiny. Although
in its discussion of the appropraite level of review'6s the Fifth Cir-
cuit cited Reed v. Reed,'6 in which the Supreme Court utilized
this intermediate approach, the court nevertheless rejected plain-
tiffs' contention.46 5 Instead, the court applied a traditional rational
basis test and readily found that Georgia had a legitimate interest
in requiring its bar candidates to demonstrate minimal competence
to practice law and that the Georgia bar examination bore a ra-
tional relationship to that state interest.' 66
A year later in Washington v. Davis467 the Supreme Court
held for the first time that absent proof of discriminatory purpose
the rational basis test applies to disproportionate impact cases. In
Davis applicants for positions as police officers challenged the va-
lidity of a qualifying test that-excluded a disproportionately higher
number of blacks than whites.46' The Court held that dispropor-
tionate impact alone does not trigger strict scrutiny review under
the equal protection clause; instead, proof of a racially discrimina-
tory purpose must also be demonstrated.469 The Court expressed
gories of assistance. Plaintiffs argued that AFDC recipients were a suspect class because of
the higher percentage of minority recipients in the AFDC category. The Court maintained
that such an approach would render suspect each difference in treatment among grant clas-
ses and would therefore trigger strict scrutiny review and jeopardize many rational welfare
programs despite the total lack of racial motivation in drawing the classification. Id. at 548-
49.
461. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). James concerned the constitutionality of a California consti-
tutional provision that required approval by referendum for low income housing projects.
Plaintiffs argued that the provision created a racial classification because of the high corre-
lation between the poor and racial minorities. The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the provision required referendum approval for all low rent housing projects,
not just for projects that would be occupied by racial minorities. The Court further held
that the evidence did not support an inference that the facially neutral provision served as a
pretext for racial discrimination. Id. at 141-43.
462. 517 F.2d at 1099.
463. Id.
464. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
465. 517 F.2d at 1101.
466. Id. at 1101-03.
467. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
468. Id. at 232-36.
469. The Court stated:
Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends other-
wise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection
19811
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concern that the application of strict scrutiny upon the mere show-
ing of disparate impact "would be far reaching and would raise se-
rious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that
may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black
than to the more affluent white." 470 Furthermore, the Court reaf-
firmed the principle that Title VII standards do not apply to equal
protection cases that challenge classifications resulting in disparate
impact.7 1 Consequently, the Court applied the rational basis test
and sustained the police qualifying tests. 47 2 Thus, the Davis ap-
proach43 confirmed the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in
Tyler and guaranteed a deferential level of review for equal protec-
tion challenges to state bar examinations, absent proof of discrimi-
natory intent.
Richardson v. McFadden4 ' is illustrative of the results in
these later bar examination decisions. In Richardson four black
law school graduates who had failed the South Carolina bar exami-
Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidi-
ous racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not
trigger the rule. . . that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scru-
tiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.
Id. at 242.
Of course, if some form of purposeful discrimination in the bar examination grading
process can be inferred from the evidence, then a court will undoubtedly uphold the equal
protection challenge. The Court stated in Davis that "discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts," including disproportionate impact. Id. The
Court noted that under special circumstances the disparate impact "may for all practical
purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because. . . the discrimination is very difficult to
explain on nonracial grounds." Id. The Court has reaffirmed and explained its requirement
of discriminatory purpose in subsequent disproportionate impact cases. See Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (disparate impact upon women); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (disparate impact upon racial
minorities).
It should be noted that the goal of this section is not to analyze the requirement of
discriminatory purpose, but rather to illustrate how courts have decided cases that involve
disparate minority failure rate on the bar examination and to explore alternative avenues
for these challenges.
470. 426 U.S. at 248.
471. Id. at 238-39, 246-47. The Supreme Court left open the possibility that Title VI
standards could be used in lieu of a strict scrutiny review if discriminatory purpose was
proven. Id. at 246-47.
472. Id. at 249-52.
473. The Supreme Court has subsequently reaffirmed its holding in Davis. See, e.g.,
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See also
City of Memphis v. Greene, 49 U.S.L.W. 4389 (April 21, 1981).
474. 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976), modified en banc, 563 F.2d 1130 (1977), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
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nation challenged the test on equal protection grounds. Plaintiffs
argued that the bar examination was not job related and that the
examiners had arbitrarily and capriciously applied their own stan-
dards in grading the exams of two plaintiffs.47' Citing Washington
v. Davis, the Richardson court concluded that since purposeful dis-
crimination had not been demonstrated, a rigorous judicial review
under either constitutional or Title VII standards was not appro-
priate.'7 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit followed the Tyler ap-
proach and applied the rational basis test to the examination
scheme.477 After concluding that the test design and passing score
were rationally related to fitness to practice law, the court sus-
tained the test's validity.4 7 8 Equal protection challenges to bar ex-
aminations in other states having disproportionately high minority
failure rates have been similarly resolved.'
(c) An Alternative Approach
The uniqueness of the state bar admission process presents a
possible method for challenging the disproportionate impact of
state bar examinations. Since attorneys are officers of the courts,
the responsibility of admitting attorneys to the practice of law ulti-
mately rests with the courts and not the legislature. 480 Further-
more, in a majority of states, jurisdiction over the bar admission
selection process vests exclusively in the judiciary, usually the state
supreme court.41 The methods employed by states to select the
475. Id. at 746.
476. Id. at 746-48.
477. Id. at 748-50. See note 466 supra and accompanying text.
478. 540 F.2d at 749-50. The Fourth Circuit did hold that the South Carolina bar
examiners acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of both the due process and equal
protection rights of two of the failing applicants because there was no consistently applied
distinction between the scores of failing applicants and passing applicants. Id. at 750-52.
Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit later overruled the panel's decision on this issue. 563
F.2d 1130, 1130-32 (4th Cir. 1977).
479. See, e.g., Pettit v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp. 282 (D. Md. 1977) (challenge to Mary-
land bar examination); Harper v. District of Columbia Comm. on Admissions, 375 A.2d 25
(D.C. 1977) (challenge to District of Columbia bar examination); Lewis v. Hartsock, 18 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 831 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (challenge to Ohio bar examination).
480. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S.
939 (1969); Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 707, 712-13, 281 N.W.
432, 433-34 (1938); In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 476-77, 172 P. 1152, 1153 (1918); Jacobson
v. Avestruz, 81 Wis. 2d 240, 245-46, 260 N.W.2d 267, 269 (1977). See generally Steele,
Cleaning Up the Legal Profession: The Power to Discipline-The Judiciary and the Legis-
lature, 20 ARz. L. REv. 413 (1978).
481. Power to admit applicants to the bar inherently resides with the courts. Feldman
v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971); Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga.
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judges of their highest courts vary widely, but they essentially fall
into one of three categories. Approximately twenty-five states use
popular elections,82 in which campaign activities are severely re-
stricted. For instance, the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted in
virtually all the states, provides,
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that is filled
either by public election between competing candidates or on the basis of a
merit system election ... should not make pledges or promises of conduct
in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of
the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or mis-
represent his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.
48 3
With such campaign restrictions on judicial candidates, the selec-
tion process clearly precludes popular political input on such issues
as bar admission examinations. Furthermore, approximately fifteen
states use the "Missouri plan,"48' in which a candidate initially is
appointed and after a specified term is subjected to approval or
disapproval by popular vote. If disapproved, the candidate leaves
office and another individual is appointed to take his place.4 5
Candidates under this sytem are also subject to the same ethical
constraints concerning campaigning as are popularly elected
judges. 4 6 Thus, there is even less popular political input in this
system. Finally, in the remaining states,487 judges are simply ap-
pointed-a system placing them clearly outside the realm of popu-
lar political input. The rational basis standard of review rests on
102, 166 S.E.2d 718, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 939 (1969); In re Daniel, 153 W.Va. 839, 173
S.E.2d 153 (1970). Eleven states specifically delegate responsibility for admission to the bar
to the judiciary. ARK. CONsT. amend. 28; FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 15; IND. CONST. art. VII, § 4;
LA. CONsT. art. V, § 5(B); MONT. CONsT. art VII, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 3; N.D.
CONsT. art. IV, § 87; OHO CONsT. art. IV, § 2(B); PA. CONsT. art. V, § 10(e); S.C. CoNsT. art.
V, § 4; VT. CONST. § 30. Thirty-eight states do not expressly delegate the authority for regu-
lating admission to the bar. In some of these states, the state legislatures do pass general
regulations concerning bar admission. See, e.g., MICH. CoM. LAws ANN. §§ 600.91-600.949
(1981). In the majority, however, the judiciary controls the admission process in exercise of
their inherent powers. See, e.g., Wis. Sup. CT. R. 40.01-40.16 (1980).
In one state, South Dakota, the state supreme court is given the power to govern bar
admissions, however, the legislature is given the power to change these rules. S.D. CONsT.
art. V, § 12. See Note, An Inevitable Clash of Power? Determining the Proper Role of the
Legislature in the Administration of Justice, 22 S.D. L. REv. 387 (1977).
482. See Flango & Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make?
Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JusT. Sys. J. 25, 29 (1979); Note,
Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study with Proposals for Reform, 4 HOFSTRA L.
Rnv. 267, 342-53 (1976).
483. A.B.A. CODE OF JuDnmLc CoNDuCT, Canon 7 B(1)(c).
484. See Flango & Ducat, supra note 482, at 26-29.
485. See, e.g., CoLo. CONsT. art. 6, §§ 20, 24-26.
486. See text accompanying note 483 supra.
487. See Flango & Ducat, supra note 482, at 29.
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the theory that, if a legislative classification is rationally related to
a legitimate state purpose, then the courts should defer to that
judgment because it reflects the wishes of the majority through
their representatives.4 88 In the case of the bar admission selection
process, however, the safeguard of popular input is missing. In-
stead, this process presents a unique situation in which those af-
fected by the classifications have little or no opportunity to change
the situation through the political process. In other words, a bar
applicant cannot lobby his local board of bar examiners to make
sure that the bar examination, in fact, tests minimum competence.
Thus, an individual's only recourse is through the adjudicative pro-
cess. Because of this situation, courts reviewing such classifications
in the equal protection context should apply a heightened degree
of scrutiny. This "middle level" of review would require the bar
examination to be, substantially related to the state's legitimate
goal of insuring that bar applicants are minimally competent to
practice law. 89
Under this heightened level of jildicial scrutiny, a state should
be required to demonstrate that the bar examination is a valid in-
dicator of an applicant's fitness to practice law. This requirement
takes into account the fact that failure to pass the bar after several
years of law school disqualifies an applicant not only from a spe-
cific job but also from a general livelihood. Although it has been
definitely resolved that Title VII standards of review do not apply
to equal protection cases,"0 the test validation requirements in the
Title VII area still present an analogous and instrqctive means for
courts to utilize in determining whether a state has shown a sub-
stantial relationship between the bar examination and a finding of
minimum competence. As interpreted in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,491 an employer subject to Title VII proscriptions must show,
by professionally acceptable methods, that his employment test is
"predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements
of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs
for which candidates are being evaluated."' 9 Applying this method
of validation to the bar examination area, a state should be re-
quired to demonstrate by professional validation studies that the
bar examination tests minimum competence to practice law. This
488. See note 443 supra.
489. See note 448 supra and accompanying text.
490. See note 456 supra.
491. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
492. Id. at 433 n.9.
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approach, if accepted by the courts, would give new life to state
bar examination challenges since it is unlikely that these tests have
ever been factually correlated to minimal competence to practice
law. 4
9 3
The use of an intermediate level of review in bar examination
cases would represent only a narrow exception to the use of a ra-
tional basis standard and would not be applicable to areas in which
the safeguard of popular input into the legislative process is pre-
sent. Thus, this analytical approach overcomes the problem that
the Court foresaw in Washington v. Davis49 4 concerning the appli-
cation of strict scrutiny review to disproportionate impact chal-
lenges generally. Furthermore, although all challenges to the bar
examination would receive heightened scrutiny, minority candi-
dates would benefit to a greater degree because of the dispropor-
tionately high failure rate of minorities. Given the long-standing
exclusion of minorities from the legal profession as with other ar-
eas of employment, the use of an intermediate level of review
would demonstrate greater sensitivity to the frustrations of minor-
ity bar applicants by requiring proof that bar examinations test
minimal competence to practice law.
(d) Conclusion
The disproportionately high failure rate of minority candi-
dates on the bar examination has been the subject of several equal
protection challenges. In all of these cases, however, courts have
applied a traditional rational basis standard of review and have
upheld application of the bar examination. Thus, relevant case law
clearly discourages such challenges. Nevertheless, the failing bar
examinee might still be able to mount a successful equal protection
challenge against his state's bar examination. Because the bar ad-
mission process does not comport with the political reality under-
lying the rational basis test, it can be argued that equal protection
challenges to bar examinations should receive heightened judicial
scrutiny. Under such increased scrutiny, states should be required
to demonstrate by professional validation studies that the bar ex-
amination tests minimal competence to practice law.
493. Both the Tyler and Richardson courts noted that the bar examinations at issue
could not withstand a Title VII analysis since they had not been professionally validated.
517 F.2d at 1096; 540 F.2d at 746-47.




A majority of the states maintain some type of residency re-
quirements for applicants that seek admission to the bar.4"  The
forms of residency mandated by states vary, but they generally fall
into one of three categories: durational, simple, and continuing.
Durational residency requires an applicant to reside in the state
for a fixed period of time prior to a specified event, such as the
administration of the bar examination. 9 Simple residency re-
quires an applicant to reside in the state at the time of an event,
such as admission. 497 Finally, continuing residency requires that an
applicant declare his intent to reside in the state after admission to
the bar.9 8
Attorneys are increasingly engaged in interstate practice and
in interstate movement. With this increased interstate mobility,
residency requirements have been challenged in a number of
cases.99 This section of the Special Project examines three types of
constitutional challenges to bar admission residency requirements.
First, the section analyzes equal protection challenges that have
been advanced based on the applicant's right to travel. Next the
section explores a more theoretical challenge based on the com-
merce clause. Finally, the section analyzes perhaps the newest ba-
sis for challenging residency requirements, the privileges and im-
munities clause of Article IV.
495. Thirty-nine states presently maintain residency requirements for admission to
the bar. National Bar Examination Digest, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Profes-
sional Publications, Inc. (1980).
496. The time periods vary from ten days to six months prior to either the date of
application deadline, examination, or admission. Id.
497. Approximately twenty states have some form of simple residency requirements.
These involve establishing residency in a state at the time of application, examination, or
admission, or within a certain period before or after admission. Several states require only
some indication of intent to establish residency rather than actual residency by a specified
date. Id.
498. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.934 (1981) (an applicant must intend "in
good faith to practice or teach law in this state"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-61-202 (1979) (an
applicant must be a resident who has declared his or her bona fide intent to become a
citizen).
499. See, e.g., Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980) (challenging
Alaska's requirement that an applicant reside in state at least 30 days prior to the bar ex-
amination); Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309,
422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979) (challenging New York's requirement that an applicant reside in
state for six months prior to admission); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp.
1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (challenging North Carolina's requirement that an applicant reside in
state for one year prior to the bar examination).
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1. Equal Protection-The Right to Travel
(a) Introduction
As stated above, 00 the equal protection clause provides that
no state shall deny persons within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws. 0 1 Courts reviewing classifications challenged
under the equal protection clause apply one of three standards of
review. If the classification involves mere economics, then the state
must show that the classification bears a rational relation to a le-
gitimate state interest.50 2 When the classification involves a suspect
class503 or fundamental interest,50 the state must show that the
classification serves a compelling interest through the least restric-
tive means available. 5  Finally, if the classification involves a sig-
nificant noneconomic interest, then the state must show that the
classification bears a substantial relationship to an important state
interest.50
6
Bar admission residency requirements have many different
time periods, which in some cases present a significant obstacle for
nonresidents to overcome.0 7 In the last decade, dissatisfaction
with these residency requirements has resulted in numerous equal
protection challenges.508 While the challenges to durational resi-
dency requirements of one year or more have been consistently
successful,509 the courts have generally upheld simple residency re-
quirements and durational requirements of less than one year. 10
500. For a more complete discussion of current equal protection analysis, see notes
411-49 supra and accompanying test.
501. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
502. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
503. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race).
504. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting).
505. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
506. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also note 448 supra and accompa-
nying text.
507. See note 495 supra.
508. See notes 544, 555, 556, 563, & 564 infra and accompanying text.
509. See notes 544-55 infra and accompanying text.
510. See notes 556-65 infra and accompanying text. In one case, however, a six month
residency requirement that could be satisfied at any time after reaching the age of fifteen
was invalidated as being arbitrary and capricious under a rational basis analysis. See Potts
v. Hawaii, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971). Since the residency requirement could be
fulfilled at anytime after attaining the age of fifteen, the justification successfully argued by
other states, that the bar examiners need a reasonable period in which to investigate and
certify moral character, was inappropriate. Id. at 1398. Consequently, the court correctly
invalidated this requirement as having no relationship to fitness to practice-law. Id.
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The purpose of this section is to discuss briefly the rationale be-
hind these decisions and to analyze the present status of state bar
residency requirements under the equal protection clause.
(b) The Right to Travel as a Fundamental Interest
(1) Foundation Cases
In Shapiro v. Thompson511 the Supreme Court caused consid-
erable uncertainty over the proper standard of review to be utilized
in equal protection challenges to state residency requirements by
invalidating various statutory schemes that conditioned eligibility
for welfare benefits upon one year's residency in the jurisdiction.512
The Court held that any classification that penalized an individ-
ual's right to travel by discriminating between residents solely on
the basis of the length of residency would trigger the compelling
interest test.513 Although this holding appeared broad on its face,
the Shapiro Court went on to limit its decision by stating that it
expressed "no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence
requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-
free education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt
or fish, and so forth. 5 1 4 Furthermore, the Court intimated that
some residency requirements "may not be penalties upon the exer-
cise of the constitutional right of interstate travel." 5115
Subsequent to Shapiro, the Court has attempted to delineate
the scope of the right to travel in several decisions. For example, in
Dunn v. Blumstein5 e the Court struck down Tennessee's one year
residency requirement for voting eligibility,517 relying in part upon
the Shapiro right to travel analysis. 518 The Court held that Ten-
nessee's durational residency requirement "directly impinge[d] on
511. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
512. Id. at 642.
513. Id. at 634. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that
[t]he waiting-period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise eligible applicants
solely because they have recently moved into the jurisdiction. But in moving from
State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional
right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional.
Id. at 634 (emphasis in original).
514. Id. at 638 n.21 (emphasis in original).
515. Id.
516. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
517. Id. at 353-54, 360.
518. Id. at 338-42.
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the exercise of a second fundamental personal right, the right to
travel."5 19 Consequently, the Court subjected the residency re-
quirement to the compelling interest test520 and concluded that
Tennessee did not offer an adequate justification for the durational
residence law. Thus, the Court declared the law to be
unconstitutional.
52 1
Similarly, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County52 2 the
Supreme Court further extended the Shapiro rationale to medical
benefits.2 3 In Maricopa County an Arizona statute denied free
medical assistance to indigent residents who had not resided in the
county for twelve months. 2 ' Finding that the residency require-
ment penalized an individual's fundamental right to travel, the
Court followed Shapiro in applying strict scrutiny and invalidated
the statute.5 25 Despite its holding, the Court again cautioned that
some residency requirements may not be penalties and cited its
affirmance of durational residency requirements for in-state tuition
benefits. 26 In fact, the Court has summarily affirmed several
types5 27 of residency requirements since Maricopa County, includ-
ing a residency requirement for bar admission.2
One year after Maricopa County, in Sosna v. Iowa,5 2 9 the Su-
preme Court indicated that not all durational residency require-
ments were subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection analy-
sis. In Sosna an Iowa court had denied a bona fide resident the
right to file for a divorce because she failed to meet the state's one
519. Id. at 338.
520. Id. at 342.
521. Id. at 360.
522. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
523. Id. at 254-62.
524. Id. at 252.
525. Id. at 269-70.
526. Id. at 258-59. The Court upheld a durational residency requirement for tuition
benefits in Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), af'g mem., 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn.
1970).
527. Sununu v. Stark, 420 U.S. 958 (1975), afg mem., 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H.
1974) (candidacy for political office); Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 U.S. 891, affig mem., Civil No.
74-1356 (D.S.C. Nov. 3, 1974) (candidacy for political office); Sturgis v. Washington, 414
U.S. 1057-58, af'g mem., 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973) (tuition); Chimento v. Stark,
414 U.S. 802, aft'g mem., 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H. 1973) (candidacy for political office);
Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), af'g mem., 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970)
(tuition).
528. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020, af'g mem. sub nom. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339
F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972). See notes 556-64 infra and accompanying text.
529. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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year durational residency requirement.530 Appellant argued that
the residency requirement violated equal protection because it pe-
nalized her recently exercised fundamental right to travel.53 1 The
Court rejected this claim, distinguishing Shapiro, Dunn, and Mari-
copa County from the instant case. 532 The Court maintained that
Sosna required a different result from the Shapiro line of cases
because of Iowa's special interest in "avoiding officious intermed-
dling in matters in which another State has a paramount interest,
and in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to
collateral attack. 53 3 According to the Court, these state interests,
in comparison with the budgetary and administrative convenience
considerations argued unsuccessfully in Shapiro, Dunn, and Mari-
copa County, required "a different resolution of the constitutional
issue presented ....
(2) Analysis
On its face, the holding in Shapiro would seem to dictate the
application of strict scrutiny to bar admission residency require-
ments.5 3 5 The Court, however, did not clearly delineate the scope
of its decision because it expressly refused to comment on the va-
lidity of state residency requirements in connection with obtaining
a professional license. Although the Court reiterated the funda-
mental nature of the right to travel in Dunn, that decision did lit-
tle to clarify whether bar admission residency requirements would
trigger strict scrutiny. Dunn involved not only the right to travel
but also the right to vote, which had also been declared fundamen-
tal1 6 While reconciling these Supreme Court right to travel deci-
sions poses a difficult task, it seems reasonably clear that residency
requirements for bar admission do not penalize the right to travel
530. Id. at 395.
531. Id. at 405.
532. Id. at 406-09.
533. Id. at 407.
534. Id. at 409. The Court further distinguished Sosna on the grounds that the Sha-
piro line of cases involved persons being irretrievably foreclosed from obtaining some part of
what they sought whereas the Iowa divorce requirement merely delayed a person from ulti-
mately obtaining the same opportunity. Id. at 406.
535. In Shapiro the Court declared the right to travel to be a fundamental interest
triggering strict scrutiny. Since bar admission residency requirements penalize a migrant's
right to travel just as much as the welfare rule in Shapiro, the literal holding of Shapiro
compels strict scrutiny in bar admission cases. See note 513 supra.
536. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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in such a way as to invoke strict %crutiny.5 37 The limiting language
in Shapiro35 and Maricopa County,539 the summary affirmances of
various state durational residency requirements"0 including bar
admission, 41 Sosna's refusal to extend Shapiro to a divorce con-
text, 42 and the recognized strong state interest in regulating ad-
mission to the bar54 ' all compel the conclusion that state bar resi-
dency requirements need only be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest in order to withstand equal protection challenge.
With the evolution of Supreme Court treatment of residency re-
quirements as a backdrop, the various lower courts' treatment of
specific challenges to bar admission residency requirements can
now be considered.
(c) The Bar Admission Cases
In Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners5 4 the District Court
for North Carolina invalidated that state's durational residency re-
quirements for admission to the state bar. Plaintiffs in Keenan
challenged the requirement that an applicant must reside in North
Carolina for a period of at least twelve months prior to the date of
the bar examination.45 Since the bar examiners administered the
test only once a year, the requirement effectively forced an appli-
cant to wait from twelve to twenty-four months after establishing
residency before taking the examination."' The Keenan court
maintained that, while a state can require high standards of quali-
fication in licensing attorneys, such qualifications must bear a ra-
tional connection to the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law.5 47 The court found that North Carolina's one year residency
537. See note 513 supra.
538. See notes 514-15 supra and accompanying text.
539. See note 526 supra and accompanying text.
540. See note 527 supra and accompanying text.
541. See note 528 supra and accompanying text.
542. See notes 532-34 supra and accompanying text.
543. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971) ("[o]f course Arizona has a
legitimate interest in determining whether petitioner has the qualities of character and the
professional competence requisite to the practice of law"); Schware v. Board of Bar Examin-
ers, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957) ("[a] State can require high standards of qualification, such as
good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar
544. 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
545. Id. at 1352.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 1359. The Keenan court relied on language from Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
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requirement had no rational connection with the state's interest in
admitting only morally and professionally fit applicants.5 8 The
state contended that out-of-state investigations of an applicant's
background would be unduly expensive and burdensome, but the
court stated that administrative inconvenience did not justify an
arbitrary classification." 9 Although the court conceded that a rea-
sonable residency requirement might withstand constitutional
scrutiny, it refused to express a definite opinion on such a require-
ment.5 5 0 After invalidating the North Carolina law under a rational
relationship analysis, the Keenan court also applied a more strin-
gent review based on Shapiro's right to travel approach" 1 and eas-
fly found that the requirement failed this stiffer test.552 No other
court has applied Shapiro's rigorous review in a bar admission
residency challenge, 5 3 and Keenan's partial reliance on Shapiro
now appears misplaced given the post-Shapiro and Keenan devel-
opments discussed above.5" Several courts, however, have followed
the Keenan rationale in voiding one year residency requirements
because they are not rationally related to fitness to practice law.555
Under equal protection analysis, courts generally have upheld
both durational residency requirements of six months or less and
simple residency requirements as rational means of serving the le-
gitimate state interest in licensing attorneys. For example, in Suf-
548. 317 F. Supp. at 1359-60. The Board argued that its residency requirement would
provide the applicant with knowledge of state government and its customs, allow an appli-
cant to develop a permanent stake in the community, and give the community an opportu-
nity to observe the applicant's moral character. The court summarily rejected the first two
reasons as bearing no relation to minimum competence. The court agreed that investigating
moral character was a proper state concern, but found that a one year residency require-
ment was irrationally suited for that purpose. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id. at 1362 n.17.
551. See notes 511-13 supra and accompanying text.
552. 317 F. Supp. at 1361-62. Obviously, any rule that fails under a rational relation-
ship review would clearly fail under the compelling interest analysis of Shapiro.
553. In fact, courts that have specifically addressed Shapiro in bar admission cases
have rejected that approach. See Kline v. Rankin, 352 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (N.D. Miss.
1972); Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D.N.M.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Rose v.
Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972); Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 403-04 (N.D. Miss.
1971).
554. See notes 538-43 supra and accompanying text.
555. Smith v. Davis, 350 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. W. Va. 1972) (one year residency require-
ment for admission); Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (one year
residency requirement before application for admission); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp.
1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (one year residency requirement for admission). Similarly, one court
invalidated as irrational a six month residency requirement that could be satisded anytime
after attaining age fifteen. Potts v. Hawaii, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971).
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fling v. Bondurant5" a federal district court sustained a New Mex-
ico Supreme Court rule that required six months residency before
admission to the bar.557 In Suffling the six month period could be-
gin as late as the day of the bar examination, although regulations
required that the bar examiners had to make a finding of good
moral character prior to the examination.5 58 The court expressly
rejected the strict scrutiny approach, noting that the Shapiro
Court left open the possibility of exceptions to its decision.'a 9 It
concluded that the six month requirement provided a reasonable
period for the bar examiners to investigate and to certify the good
character of bar applicants.560 Despite the dissent's persuasive ar-
gument that this particular requirement was in fact arbitrary since
good moral character had to be certified prior to the examination,
whereas residency could commence on the day of examination," 1




In sustaining similar durational residency requirements, other
courts have also emphasized the state's interest in assuring good
moral character.56 3 Furthermore, in approving simple residency re-
quirements, courts have accepted the state's contention that such
regulations protect its citizens from misconduct by itinerant or
nonresident practitioners.5 Thus, while courts have invalidated
556. 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S.
1020 (1972).
557. 339 F. Supp. at 260.
558. Id. at 259. The court dismissed this apparent inconsistency by stating that the
regulations were ignored in those cases in which time did not permit the finding of good
moral character until after the examination. Id.
559. Id. at 258-60. See also note 553 supra and accompanying text.
560. 339 F. Supp. at 260.
561. Id. at 261-62.
562. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020, af'g mem. sub nom. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339
F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972).
563. Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 452 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978) (re-
quired to be domiciliary twenty days prior to examination), dismissed as moot, 614 F.2d 943
(4th Cir. 1980); Tang v. Appellate Div., 373 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y.) (requiring six month
residency prior to application for admission and continuous residency until final disposition
of application), affd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
906 (1974); Kline v. Rankin, 352 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (requiring residency ninety
days prior to examination), vacated and remanded for convention of three judge court, 489
F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1974) (no reported subsequent history); Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F.
Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (requiring residency ninety days prior to the examination); In
re Gordon, 67 A.D.2dc 215, 414 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1979) (requiring six months residency prior to
application for admission), rev'd on other grounds, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
See also Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (approving reasonable du-
rational residency requirements in dicta).
564. See Aronson v. Ambrose, 479 F.2d 75, 77-78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162
(1973) (requiring statement in application of intention to reside in Virgin Islands if admit-
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some residency requirements for being arbitrarily long,'" both
simple residency requirements and durational requirements of up
to six months have met judicial approval under the rational basis
test.
(d) Conclusion
Presently, no state bar residency requirements exceed the six
month borderline established by court decisions;566 there are, how-
ever, numerous state residency requirements within the six month
benchmark. 67 Since reasonable residency requirements clearly
have a rational connection 568 with the state's interest in insuring a
competent bar, these remaining residency requirements should
withstand an equal protection challenge under traditional rational
basis analysis. In all probability, the only chance for these require-
ments to be invalidated on equal protection grounds would be an
application of strict scrutiny under a Shapiro right to travel ap-
proach. This, however, appears to be unlikely.'" As others have
correctly pointed out,'70 the right to travel is touched by so many
types of state action that a literal application of Shapiro is untena-
ble.571 Consequently, the existing residency requirements for bar
ted); Tang v. Appellate Div., 373 F. Supp. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (requiring actual resi-
dency at admission), affd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 906 (1974); Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 403 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (requiring
residency at time application submitted, which in effect required residency at least ninety
days prior to the examination). Simple residency was approved in dicta in Wilson v. Wilson,
416 F. Supp. 984 (D. Or. 1976), affld mem., 430 U.S. 925 (1977).
565. See notes 544-55 supra and accompanying text.
566. National Bar Examination Digest, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal and Profes-
sional Publications, Inc. (1980).
567. Id.
568. Reasonable durational residency requirements may not be the most effective or
least restrictive means of assuring a morally and professionally qualified bar, but under the
deferential standard of review ordinarily given to such governmental action, these require-
ments clearly bear a rational relation to this legitimate state concern. See notes 527-28
supra and accompanying text.
569. See notes 538-43 supra and accompanying text.
570. Chief Justice Warren, in his dissent in Shapiro, made the following comment:
The Court's decision reveals only the top of the iceberg. Lurking beneath are the
multitude of situations in which States have imposed residency requirements including
eligibility to vote, to engage in certain professions or occupations or to attend a state-
supported university. Although the Court takes pains to avoid acknowledging the
ramifications of its decision, its implications cannot be ignored.
394 U.S. at 655.
571. The Court's refusal to extend Shapiro to other types of residency requirements
demonstrates the unwillingness of courts to accept the undesirable results that a strict ap-
plication of Shapiro would produce.
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admission should be permissible under a rational basis analysis. 7
2. The Commerce Clause
(a) Introduction
A prominent criticism of the Articles of Confederation was the
lack of a provision guaranteeing free trade between citizens of the
several states.5 73 Each state, with its differing agricultural and in-
dustrial production, is now vitally dependent upon its sister states
for its economic survival. The nation is one economic unit, and
state borders ought to play an insignificant role in the functioning
of that unit. With this obvious interdependence and the related
dangers of economic protectionism and discriminatory state legis-
lation57 4 in view, the framers of the Constitution drafted the com-
merce clause575 to provide the national government with the means
to safeguard "the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom
from local restraints. 5 7 6
The courts have developed two lines of commerce clause cases
in their efforts to protect these interdependent states and their cit-
izenry by ensuring a national market for goods and services. One
572. Other avenues of constitutional challenge, however, remain open. See Gordon v.
Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641
(1979), rev'g, 67 A.D.2d 215, 414 N.Y.S.2d 692. Gordon involved a challenge to New York's
requirement of six months' residency prior to application for the bar. The lower court found
that the requirement was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and rejected the
equal protection challenge. On appeal, the requirement was stricken under the more rigor-
ous review of the privileges and immunities clause. For a discussion of this privileges and
immunities challenge, see Part H, Section C, subsection 3, infra and accompanying text. For
a discussion of commerce clause challenges to bar residency requirements, see Part H, Sec-
tion C, subsection 2 infra and accompanying text.
573. B. SCHwARTZ, A CoumNTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
PowERs OF GOVERNmENT 7-8, 178 (1963); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
567-86 (1937).
574. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949). See, e.g.,
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
575. 'U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce... among the several States .... "
576. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945). The Supreme Court
first interpreted and defined the national commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824), in which Chief Justice John Marshall used his strong federalist ideals to
support a broad definition of congressional commerce authority. See notes 580-81 infra and
accompanying text. One scholar stated that "Marshall's use of the commerce clause [in Gib-
bons] greatly furthered the idea that though we are a federation of states we are also a
nation, and gave momentum to the doctrine that state authority must be subject to such
limitations as the Court finds it necessary to apply for the protection of the national com-
munity." F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 18-19 (1937).
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line has focused upon the limits on the affirmative grant of con-
gressional power to define and regulate interstate commerce.5 " An-
other group of commerce clause cases concentrates on the negative
implications of the clause by determining the validity, in the ab-
sence of congressional regulation, of state regulations that impact
on interstate commerce.578 The United States Supreme Court has
never focused upon the commerce clause in its resolution of cases
challenging state bar admission requirements. Recent cases in the
antitrust area, however, indicate that Congress possesses the au-
thority to regulate some aspects of the practice of law, and the
evolving nature of the interstate practice of law suggests that the
area merits closer commerce clause examination. This section of
the Special Project examines congressional authority to regulate
admission to the state bars, pursuant to the commerce clause's af-
firmative grant of power. Recognizing that Congress has not exer-
cised that regulatory power, this section of the Special Project also
discusses the validity of state residency requirements in light of
the dormant side of the commerce clause.
(b) Congressional Authority to Regulate Bar Admission
Requirements
(1) Legal Background
The commerce clause affirmatively grants Congress the power
to regulate commerce between the states. 57 9 Chief Justice Marshall
outlined the broad scope of the congressional commerce power in
Gibbons v. Ogden:580
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which com-
merce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.""
The validity of congressional action, however, is limited by consti-
tutional restraints upon congressional regulation of interstate com-
merce. The Supreme Court has established that "interstate com-
577. See notes 579-97 infra and accompanying text.
578. See notes 632-50 infra and accompanying text.
579. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
580. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
581. Id. at 196 (dictum). Although dictum, the Chief Justice's standards have survived
as concrete foundations for the modem commerce clause power. Justice Clark, writing for
the Court in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964), stated that "[t]his rule is as
good today as it was when Chief Justice Marshall laid it down almost a century and a half
ago."
1981]
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merce consists of intercourse and traffic between the citizens or
inhabitants of different States, and includes not only the transpor-
tation of persons and property and the navigation of public waters
for that purpose, but also the purchase, sale and exchange of com-
modities. ' 5 82 Accordingly, the Court has approved of congressional
regulation of navigable rivers that are accessible from other
states,58 3 bridges that span navigable waters between two states,"
coastal traffic between two states,585 actual shipment of goods from
one state to another,58 interstate shipment of noxious or harmful
items,587 and related instrumentalities of interstate commerce.5
Furthermore, the mere buying and selling of goods may be a part
of the stream of interstate commerce, if the goods have been trans-
ported into or out of another state.
58 9
Under the modern interpretation of the commerce clause,
Congress may regulate not only those activities that are actually in
interstate commerce, but also those activities that substantially af-
fect interstate commerce.5 90 Justice Stone, writing for the Court in
United States v. Darby,591 declared that "[tihe power of Congress
582. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241 (1899).
583. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (reg-
ulation approved to maintain rivers free from obstructions to interstate navigation); United
States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211 (1900).
584. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 532 (1894) ("to meet the
demands of interstate commerce by land"); The Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454
(1870).
585. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (federal license to engage in
coast-trade between New York and New Jersey held valid).
586. See Louisville & N. R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911) (federal act prohibiting
issuance of railroad passes found valid); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290 (1897) (railroad company engaged in interstate transportation of goods); Cincin-
nati, N.O. & Tex. Pac. Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184 (1896) (regulation of shipment rates im-
posed by railway carrier on goods between Cincinnati, Ohio and Georgia).
587. See Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (federal act prohibiting inter-
state transportation of stolen automobiles held valid); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U.S. 45 (1911) (prohibition of interstate shipment of adulterated foods); Champion v. Ames
(Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (prohibition of interstate shipment of lottery tickets).
588. See ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452 (1910) (coal cars used for company
coal are instruments of commerce and thus subject to congressional power).
589. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (buying and selling are only steps
between transportation of live stock in and transportation out as meat and are a sufficient
part of the stream of interstate commerce to authorize congressional regulation).
590. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). "The broad authority of
Congress under the Commerce Clause has, of course, long been interpreted to extend be-
yond activities actually in interstate commerce to reach other activities that, while wholly
local in nature, nevertheless substantially affect interstate commerce." McLain v. Real Es-
tate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980) (application of the Sherman Act to real estate bro-
kerage activities) (emphasis in original).
591. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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over interstate commerce ... extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means
to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted
power . ... "' Thus, if an activity "affects" commerce, then it
comes within the ambit of congressional power. The Court will also
focus on the aggregate effects upon commerce of all similarly situ-
ated activities, rather than on the effects of a single isolated activ-
ity."'2 Furthermore, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
592. Id. at 118. The Darby Court attempted to answer two issues:
[F]irst, whether Congress has constitutional power to prohibit the shipment in inter-
state commerce of lumber manufactured by employees whose wages are less than a
prescribed minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage are greater than a
prescribed maximum, and, second, whether it has power to prohibit the employment of
workmen in the production of goods "for interstate commerce" at other than pre-
scribed wages and hours.
Id. at 108. Justice Stone left no doubt that Congress possessed the power under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 to prohibit the interstate shipment of such lumber when he
concluded that "[w]hatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not
infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress
by the Commerce Clause." Id. at 115. That manufacturing or production per se was not
interstate commerce complicated Justice Stone's treatment of the second issue. Conceding
that the congressional attempt to regulate production employment was an attempt to regu-
late a wholly intrastate activity, Justice Stone concluded that the Act was a reasonable
means by which Congress could exclude from interstate commerce all goods not conforming
to specified labor standards. Id. at 123. "The means adopted by [Congress] for the protec-
tion of interstate commerce by the suppression of the production of the condemned goods
for interstate commerce is so related to the commerce and so affects it as to be within the
reach of the commerce power." Id.
593. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court held that under the com-
merce clause Congress could reach any individual activity that, when combined with other
similar activities, created a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 125.
The Wickard Court considered the question of congressional power under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 to regulate the production and price of wheat via acreage quotas
and penalties. In ruling that the Act, as applied "to production not intended in any part for
commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm," constituted a valid exercise of power,
id. at 118, the Court rejected earlier characterizations of manufacturing and held that actual
effects upon commerce were determinative. The Court stated that "questions of the power
of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give controlling
force to nomenclature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the
actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce." Id. at 120. The Court's
examination of the wheat industry revealed that a substantial portion of the nation's aver-
age annual wheat crop remained on the farms on which it was grown. Because this home-
grown wheat competed with wheat sold in commerce, changes in home consumption influ-
enced substantially the price and the market conditions of wheat. Defendant's home con-
sumption itself was inconsequential. Defendant's demand "contribution, taken together
with that of many others similarly situated," id. at 128, however, was sufficient to exert
substantial pressure on the wheat market. Since "[o]ne of the primary purposes of the Act
... was to increase the market price of wheat," id., regulation of home-grown wheat was
appropriate to secure that intended price.
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States594 Justice Clarli placed the judgment of congressional mo-
tives beyond the competence of the Court 595 when he affirmed the
validity of the Civil Rights Act of 1964598 as applied to local ra-
cially discriminatory activities. Whether congressional authority to
regulate an activity can withstand a commerce clause challenge
now depends largely upon the existence of a rational basis for a
congressional determination that the activity sought to be regu-
lated affects interstate commerce.
5 9 7
(2) Practice of Law as Commerce
Until recently, the majority of courts held that, because the
practice of law involved no personal effort that "related to produc-
tion"'598 of commodities, the provision of legal as well as other pro-
fessional services was not a subject of commerce.5 " Thus, the
courts excluded the provision of such services from those activities
properly regulated by Congress. Although the Supreme Court ex-
panded the meaning of "trade or commerce" to encompass the sale
of personal services,60° the practice of law, apparently because of
594. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
595. See notes 587, 591 supra.
596. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 42 U.S.C.).
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), the government
sought to prohibit a motel's refusal to accept blacks as guests. The motel admittedly en-
gaged in interstate commerce by soliciting and accepting patronage from out-of-state visi-
tors. Id. at 243.
597. The Heart of Atlanta Court limited its examination by stating that "[t]he only
questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that [the local activity]
affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate
that evil are reasonable and appropriate." Id. at 258-59 (emphasis added). The Court
searched the legislative history of the Act and found that Congress determined that racially
discriminatory treatment of guests by motels affected the interstate movement of people.
The Court found this determination rational and therefore upheld the validity of the con-
gressional regulation. See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
598. Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 209 (1922). In National League plaintiff alleged a conspiracy to monopolize the
professional baseball business in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976). Holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the baseball business did not
affect interstate commerce, Justice Holmes commented that "the exhibition [of baseball],
although made for money would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted
use of those words." Id. at 209. According to Justice Holmes, the sale of personal services
was simply not commercial in nature, and he illustrated his view by concluding that "a firm
of lawyers sending out a member to argue a case... does not engage in such commerce
because the lawyer ... goes to another State." Id.
599. See Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 512,84 L.R.R.M.
1321 (1973).
600. See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950)
(business of a real estate broker involving sale of personal services is "trade" within the
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its noncommercial nature, fell within the "learned professions" ex-
ception to Sherman Act 0 antitrust regulation. The Supreme
Court refused to settle the issue of the commercial nature of the
practice of law 02 until it applied the Sherman Act to a state bar
association in 1975. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar03 a husband
and wife contracted to purchase residential property in Fairfax
County, Virginia, and the lender, who financed the purchase, re-
quired the couple to obtain title insurance. Only a member of the
defendant Virginia State Bar could legally perform the requisite
title examination. After attempting unsuccessfully to find an attor-
ney who would provide a title examination for a fee less than that
prescribed by defendant's minimum fee schedule, the couple
brought suit against the Virginia State Bar alleging a per se price-
fixing violation of section one of the Sherman Act.?° The Bar As-
sociation argued that the noncommercial practice of law, as a
"learned profession," was not trade or commerce and was therefore
outside the scope of the Sherman Act.605 The Supreme Court
unanimously rejected this argument and concluded that
"[w]hatever else it may be ... the exchange of such a [legal] ser-
vice for money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of that
word."60  Two years later in Bates v. State Bar607 the Court again
meaning of the Sherman Act).
601. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States." Id. at § 1. The "learned professions" exception to the application of the Sher-
man Act apparently originated in dictum in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Sutherland stated that "medical practitioners . . . follow a
profession and not a trade, and are not engaged in the business of making or vending reme-
dies but in prescribing them." Id. at 653. More recently, the District of Columbia Circuit
recognized a "learned profession" exemption when it commented that "the proscriptions of
the Sherman Act were 'tailored . . . for the business world,' not for the non-commercial
aspects of the liberal arts and the learned professions." Marjorie Webster Junior College,
Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (holding that a voluntary, nonprofit educational cor-
poration that denied accreditation to a junior college could not be enjoined from denying
the accreditation under the group boycott proscriptions of the Sherman Act).
602. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in United States v. National Ass'n of
Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950), concluded, "we do not intimate an opinion on the
correctness of the application of the term [trade or commerce] to the professions." Id. at
491-92.
603. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
604. Id. at 778.
605. Id. at 786. The Bar Association argued that the "learned profession" exception
implies that noncommercial activity cannot restrain interstate commerce and thus lies
outside the purview of the commerce power of Congress. Id.
606. Id. at 787-88.
607. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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supported a commercial characterization of the practice of law and
concluded that "the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade
has become an anachronism."60 8
Although Goldfarb and Bates provide support for the charac-
terization of the practice of law as commerce in general,6'0 neither
opinion supports the view that the practice of law is interstate
commerce.1°0 In Goldfarb, the Bar Association argued that its ac-
tivities were neither in interstate commerce nor affecting interstate
commerce.6 11 The Court narrowly restricted its holding to the par-
ticular legal services at issue, title examinations, and stated,
Where, as a matter of law or practical necessity, legal services are an integral
part of an interstate transaction, a restraint on those services may substan-
tially affect commerce for Sherman Act purposes. Of course, there may be
legal services that involve interstate commerce in other fashions, just as there
may be legal services that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus
are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.12
Clearly, some local activities of the legal profession are free from
congressional regulation under the commerce power, at least in the
minds of the Goldfarb majority.61e This Special Project, however,
limits its analysis to admission to the bar rather than to the broad,
general practice of law.
(3) Admission to the Bar as Interstate Commerce
Bar admissions that result in the provision of legal services are
interstate in character, and thus subject to congressional authority,
if they entail commerce among two or more states.1 The Goldfarb
608. Id. at 371-72. In 1977 the National Labor Relations Board also overruled its prior
decision that the provision of legal services was not commercial activity, see note 599 supra,
and asserted jurisdiction over a law firm pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151-69 (1976 & Supp. m 1979). Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456, 95
L.R.R.M. 1041 (1977).
609. See Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements
Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 HAv. L. Rzv.
1461, 1474 (1979).
610. In Bates the Court invalidated a ban on advertising by legal clinic attorneys, but
did not base its holding upon the Sherman Act. The implication, however, is that the ban
would have violated the Sherman Act but for the applicable state action exemption to Sher-
man Act violations.
611. 421 U.S. at 783. The Bar Association urged the Court to view the legal services as
local in nature since they were performed wholly intrastate, and since any effects on inter-
state commerce were incidental and remote. Id.
612. Id. at 785-86.
613. See also Bain v. Henderson, 621 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1980) (local selection of local
attorneys for a list from which to choose counsel for indigent criminal defendants free of
Sherman Act regulation).
614. See notes 582-89 supra and accompanying text.
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Court based its characterization of certain legal services upon the
"ground that the activities of the attorneys were within the stream
of interstate commerce."815 The Court approached this issue by fo-
cusing initially on the nature of the entire transaction-obtaining
financing of Virginia residential property. 16 A substantial amount
of the monies used to finance residential property purchases in
Fairfax County, Virginia, originated in other states, and govern-
ment agencies in the District of Columbia guaranteed "significant
amounts of [home] loans. '161 7 On the basis of these relationships,
the Supreme Court viewed the entire process of obtaining financ-
ing for the purchase of residential property as an interstate trans-
action. 18 Turning its focus to the particular legal services involved,
the Court noted that "a title examination is an integral part of an
interstate transaction," because "in a practical sense, title exami-
nations are necessary in real estate transactions to assure a lien on
a valid title of the borrower."' ' 9 Thus, in general terms, the Gold-
farb Court focused first on the nature of the entire transaction,
and second on whether the activity in question was an essential,
integral part of the entire transaction. If the entire transaction is
interstate in nature, and if the activity in question is an essential,
integral part of the entire transaction, then the activity is in the
stream of interstate commerce and therefore subject to congres-
sional authority.
20
Because admission to the bar is necessary for an attorney to
practice law within the jurisdiction of that bar, admission arguably
is an essential, integral part of the provision of legal services by a
615. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 244 (1980) (dictum interpreting
Goldfarb opinion).
616. 421 U.S. at 783.
617. Id.
618. Id. at 783-84. The Court stated, "Thus in this class action the transactions which
create the need for the particular legal services in question frequently are interstate transac-
tions." Id.
619. Id. at 784 (emphasis supplied).
620. The Ninth Circuit recently applied Goldfarb to the selection of attorneys for a
list from which the court made appointments to represent indigent criminal defendants.
Bain v. Henderson, 621 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1980). The Bain court recognized the interstate
commerce element of criminal activity, but held that the process of selecting local attorneys
was not "an 'integral part' of the interstate commerce of crime" and therefore not subject to
federal antitrust penalties. Id. at 960-61. The court based its reasoning upon a comparison
of the legal services of Goldfarb with those in Bain. In Goldfarb every real estate financing
transaction required a title examination during the course of obtaining the financing. On the
other hand, the selection of an attorney to defend a criminal defendant after the alleged
criminal act has no impact on either the planning or the implementation of interstate crimi-
nal activities. Id. at 961.
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potential practitioner.2 1 By restating and applying the Goldfarb
test, one can argue that admission to the bar is in the stream of
interstate commerce if the nature of the entire transaction (the
provision of legal services) is interstate. Of course, admission to the
bar has a direct effect on two groups of potential practitioners: out-
of-state attorneys and recent law school graduates who seek initial
admission to a state bar. The provision of legal services in one
state by an attorney from another state is clearly an interstate
commercial transaction that is subject to congressional author-
ity. s2 Furthermore, authorization of the attorney's practice of law,
whether on a limited or on an on-going basis, is an important part
of this interstate transaction; indeed, it is as essential to the prac-
tice of law in the new state as a title examination is to residential
property financing in Virginia. Courts should therefore view admis-
sion to the bar, either by motion pro hac vice or by reciprocal
agreements, 62 3 as an activity in the stream of interstate commerce
and thus subject to regulation by Congress. The interstate reloca-
tion of a practitioner also necessitates bar admission considera-
tions. Whether the potential practitioner is an experienced attor-
ney contemplating a change in residence or a law school graduate
moving to another state to begin practice, admission to the new
state's bar will be an essential part of the practitioner's profes-
sional relocation. Here again, admission to the bar, arguably in the
stream of interstate commerce under Goldfarb, is a proper subject
of congressional regulation. On the other hand, admission to the
bar may be an integral part of an initrastate transaction if a recent
law school graduate enters the practice of law without changing his
residence.
It is important to note that Congress can regulate bar admis-
sion requirements only if they substantially affect interstate com-
merce. 24 Thus, the search in a commerce clause analysis must be
for possible impacts of bar admission requirements upon interstate
commerce or for a rational basis for a congressional determination
of the same. 2 5 Bar admission requirements effectively operate as a
621. Applying the reasoning of the Bain court, see note 620 supra, interstate legal
services require admission to the bar of the state before, and not after, the provision of
those services. Therefore, bar admission requirements have a vital impact upon the planning
and the implementation of interstate legal services.
622. See notes 580-89 supra and accompanying text.
623. See Part I, Section A.
624. See notes 590-97 supra and accompanying text.
625. The Supreme Court recently employed the "effect on commerce" test to assert
jurisdiction over real estate brokerage activity in McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S.
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regulation of the number of practicing attorneys. While more re-
strictive admission requirements reduce the supply of attorneys,
less restrictive requirements tend to increase the number of legal
practitioners. With this basic relationship in mind, one could argue
that bar admissions affect several aspects of interstate commerce.
That legal services "play an important part in commercial in-
tercourse" is, clear from their impact. on business operations.2 As-
suming that bar admission requirements, by regulating the supply
of practicing attorneys, affect both the cost and the availability of
important legal services, Congress could reasonably conclude that
licensing restrictions on legal practitioners affect interstate com-
merce. Whatever influences the availability or price of these impor-
tant legal services affects the demand for and the desirability of
many other business goods and services. 2 For example, the cost or
availability of competent legal counsel may preclude a corporation
from entering into new business areas, merging with other busi-
nesses, or taking advantage of the most beneficial tax structures.' 5
These and many other business decisions may have interstate im-
232 (1980). Although the Court agreed that real estate brokers were not "necessary or inte-
gral participants in the interstate aspects of residential real estate financing," id. at 244,
inability to characterize brokerage activity as interstate commerce under Goldfarb did not
preclude an analysis of the impacts of brokerage on interstate real estate financing. The
Court concluded that "[b]rokerage activities necessarily affect both the frequency and the
terms of residential sales transactions. Ultimately, whatever stimulates or retards the vol-
ume of residential sales, or has an impact on the purchase price, affects the demand for
financing and title insurance, those two commercial activities that on this record are shown
to have occurred in interstate commerce." Id. at 246.
626. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975). The National Labor
Relations Board, following this Goldfarb language, asserted jurisdiction over law firms as a
class and cited approvingly the dissent in Bodie, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206
N.L.R.B. 512, 84 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1973) (Fanning & Pennello, dissenting):
The legal profession plays a vital role at all stages from the act of incorporation
through the obtaining of licenses or certificates which might be needed, governmental
approval of rates and/or routes, the issuance and sale of stocks and bonds, the negotia-
tions and preparation of legal contracts necessary for the holding of property, and the
purchase and sale of materials and products, to name but a few aspects, and all these
have their impact on how, where, and when a business may operate.
Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456, 457, 95 L.R.R.M. 1041, 1042 (1977) (emphasis
added).
627. A change in the demand for articles flowing in interstate commerce constituted a
sufficient impact on interstate commerce for the Supreme Court to apply the Sherman Act
to otherwise local activities. In McLain v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980), the
Court failed to find that real estate brokers were necessary or integral participants in inter-
state commerce, but noted a sufficient effect because of the brokers' control over the volume
of real estate transactions and the purchase price of real estate properties, two factors that
affect the demand for interstate financing. Id. at 246. See note 625 supra.
628. See note 626 supra.
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plications. On the other hand, consumers may be unable to
purchase certain interstate goods and services, because the cost
and availability constraints on legal services affect either the price
or the quality of the final products.2 9
Alternatively, assuming that bar admission require-
ments-again by regulation of the number of practicing attor-
neys-affect the legal profession's demand for interstate goods and
services, Congress could reasonably conclude that bar admission
requirements affect interstate commerce and subject them to its
regulatory power. Attorneys regularly purchase goods and services
that flow in the stream of interstate commerce. 30 If the demand
for these goods and services is responsive to the number of attor-
neys, then it is likely that the interstate flow of goods and services
would decline if the overall supply of lawyers declines because of
more restrictive bar admission requirements."'
629. In addition to the impact on a business' ability to offer and a consumer's ability
to purchase interstate goods and services, bar admissions requirements, by influencing the
cost and the availability of legal services, affect the demand for legal services, many of which
are themselves in the stream of interstate commerce. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
630. Attorneys purchase office supplies for the daily operation of their practice, and it
is quite likely that more than a de minimus amount of those purchases are from out-of-state
companies. The practice of law also often involves interstate services such as telephone ser-
vices, airline transportation, and, more recently, computer-aided research services such as
Lexis.
631. A decline in the purchases of interstate goods was a factor in one Supreme Court
finding of Sherman Act jurisdiction. In Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425
U.S. 738 (1976), the Court noted that "petitioner's purchases of out-of-state medicines and
supplies ... would be thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars less than
they would otherwise be," in the absence of the alleged conspiracy to monopolize hospital
services. Id. at 744. See also United States v. Azzarelli Constr. Co., 612 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.
1979) (diminished funding for highway construction caused by alleged conspiracy to submit
noncompetitive construction bids affected interstate commerce in highway construction ma-
terial); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973) (nec-
essary effect of regulation of third party hospital services payer market was to close hospital
that purchased supplies from out-of-state companies and therefore reduce the flow of goods
in interstate commerce).
The Supreme Court also recognized this type of effect on interstate commerce in Kat-
zenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), a commerce clause case. The Court found that a
local restaurant that bought 46% of its food supplies from interstate suppliers sold, and
therefore bought, less of those interstate supplies because of its racially discriminatory
practices.
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(c) Limits on State Authority to Regulate Bar Admission
Requirements
(1) Legal Background
If Congress fails to exercise its regulatory authority in a given
area, appropriate state police power legislation may fill the resul-
tant vacuum. 32 The commerce clause, however, by its negative im-
plication, functions as a bar to certain state legislation that affects
interstate commerce.6 3 3 Furthermore, the nonexistence of federal
legislation in the area is not determinative of the validity of state
legislation.6 3 4 The Supreme Court enunciated the modern test for
the validity of state legislation in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.6"'
"Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."63 6 Application of the Pike rule necessitates an analysis
that addresses three issues: first, whether the state legislation
serves a legitimate local public interest; second, whether the state
regulation discriminates against interstate commerce in order to
serve the legitimate local public interest; and last, whether an un-
due burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the putative
local benefits of the regulation.
As an absolute minimum, a state regulation that burdens in-
terstate commerce must further a legitimate local interest, such as
632. Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the commerce clause as authority for exclusive
congressional power over interstate commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
209 (1824) (dictum). Chief Justice Taney, however, in License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504,
579 (1847), stated that the individual states could regulate interstate commerce if there were
no conflict with some existing congressional regulation: "[flor if the mere grant of power to
the general government was in itself a prohibition to the States, there would seem to be no
necessity for providing for the supremacy of the laws of Congress... ." Id.
The Court established the existence of concurrent state power to regulate commerce in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851), by focusing on the need for a
single, uniform regulatory rule in the area. Under the Cooley analysis, a state could regulate
a subject of commerce if it was sufficiently local in character to require diverse treatment.
Id. at 319-20. This distinction between national and local subjects of commerce, however, is
no longer determinative of a state's power, but rather serves an important role in the bal-
ancing of legitimate local and national interests. See note 639 infra and accompanying text.
633. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
634. "'[Tlhe Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is
a limitation upon the power of the States."' Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S.
366, 370-71 (1976) (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)).
635. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
636. Id. at 142.
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the health, safety, or welfare of the state's citizens. s7 On the other
hand, economic protectionism or the reduction of competition from
interstate commerce are impermissible goals under commerce
clause analysis. ss Furthermore, an otherwise legitimate local inter-
est must survive a balancing test that regards as an important fac-
tor the need for uniform regulation of the area.639
A determination that a state regulation furthers a legitimate
local interest, however, will not end a court's inquiry. In addition
to analyzing the purpose of the regulation, the court focuses on the
existence of any discrimination against interstate commerce. 4
637. "Each State may use its police power to regulate business within its own borders
to the extent necessary to protect its citizens as to their health, safety, morals and general
welfare ... ." Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 512 (1935). See also Hunt v.
Washington State Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (power "particularly strong
when the State acts to protect its citizenry in matters pertaining to the sale of foodstuffs");
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (milk regulation in the form of
reciprocity clause did not, in fact, protect the state's health standards); Mintz v. Baldwin,
289 U.S. 346 (1933) (regulation of interstate flow of livestock valid if purposes were to pre-
vent the spread of disease among dairy cattle and to safeguard public health).
638. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (state provi-
sion reducing tax liability on security transactions if sale occurred in-state invalid because
purpose was to create a financial advantage for sales on New York stock exchanges at the
expense of regional out-of-state exchanges); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525 (1949) (state may not refuse to license in-state activity by an out-of-state business solely
to promote state's own economic advantages by curtailing interstate competition).
639. The Supreme Court initially recognized, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 143 (1851), the need in some areas for a single, uniform rule to protect the na-
tional interest in free-flowing interstate commerce. The Cooley Court noted that
the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but
exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demand-
ing a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in
every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that
diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
Id. at 152. The Court concluded that "[w]hatever subjects ... are in their nature national,
or admit only of one uniform system, a plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a
nature as to require exclusive legislation by congress." Id.
A more flexible balancing of interests, however, has since replaced the conclusory na-
ture of the Cooley national-local dichotomy. In 1945 the Court invalidated a state safety
measure that regulated the length of interstate trains because the regulation went beyond
what was essential for safety and yet had a "seriously adverse effect on transportation effi-
ciency and economy." Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781 (1945). The Court
appeared to ground its decision upon the need for national uniformity in the area and con-
cluded that it was "plain that the state interest [in safety] is outweighed by the interest of
the nation in an adequate, economical and efficient railway transportation service . . ." Id.
at 783-84. See also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (requirement of
installation of rear fender splash guards, which necessitated time-consuming alterations to
interstate trucks when entering the state, constituted an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce).
640. See South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938)
("[t]he commerce clause ... prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce,
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Differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state goods and ser-
vices, whether evident on the face of the regulation or from its
practical effects, warrants careful judicial scrutiny because of its
destructive effect upon the unrestricted flow of commerce in a na-
tional market." 1 A state may manifest this discrimination by the
intentional adoption of a state regulatory scheme that lacks facial
neutrality,6 42 or, as is more likely, by the adoption of a facially neu-
tral statute that as a practical matter discriminates in favor of lo-
cal goods and services." s For example, discrimination occurs when
a state requires "business operations to be performed in the home
State that could have more efficiently been performed else-
whatever its form or method").
641. See generally Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause
and the New Federalism: The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment of
Out-of-State Tax-Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. Rav. 473, 501-18 (1978).
642. In Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62 (1891), the Court held that a Virginia state law
that required presale inspection of flour brought into the state, but not of in-state flour, was
void because it discriminated against interstate commerce. The Court emphasized that
"[amny local regulation which in terms or by its necessary operation denies this equality in
the markets of a State is, when applied to the people and products or industries of other
States, a direct burden upon commerce among the States, and, therefore, void." Id. at 67
(quoting Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 281 (1875)). See also Memphis Steam Laundry
Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1952) (state "privilege tax" of $50 per truck for
out-of-state laundries and $8 per truck for in-state laundries is facially discriminatory and
therefore void).
643. For example, in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), discrimi-
nation was the practical effect of a city ordinance that prohibited the sale of milk not pas-
teurized and bottled at an approved plant within five miles of the center city. Although the
ordinance on its face made no distinction between out-of-state and in-state milk producers,
its practical effect was the total exclusion of the foreign bottlers from the city's local market.
In light of reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives that recognized no geographic limits,
the Court held that the city could not deprive foreign milk producers of their ability to
compete with the local business and that consequently this economic barrier was illegitimate
discrimination against interstate commerce. Id. at 354.
Similarly, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977), the Supreme Court found that unconstitutional discriminatory treatment was the
result of a North Carolina statute that prohibited. the display of state quality grades on
closed containers of apples shipped into the state. The Court discussed three forms of dis-
crimination created by the regulation that authorized only "the applicable U.S. grade or
standard or the marking 'unclassified,' 'not graded' or 'grade not determined."' Id. at 339.
First, the regulatory scheme increased the cost of doing business in North Carolina for
Washington state apple producers who, as leaders in the industry, practiced a highly com-
petitive marketing system and maintained a grading system equal or superior to the
U.S.D.A. grades in all corresponding categories. Second, the regulatory scheme, by denying
the use of superior grades, stripped away the competitive and economic advantages of
Washington's expensive and aggressive marketing system. Since North Carolina previously
had no superior grading system, there were no advantages to be stripped away, and North
Carolina producers benefited from the Washington producers' disadvantage. Third, a down-
grading of Washington's superior apples occurred in the sense that the North Carolina stat-
ute required their sale under inferior U.S.D.A. grades. Id. at 350-52.
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where. '64 4 If the plaintiff proves that the state regulatory scheme
discriminates against interstate commerce, then the burden of
proof shifts to the state "to justify [the discrimination] both in
terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the un-
availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve
the local interests at stake."'
Even absent discriminatory treatment of out-of-state goods
and services, however, a court will invalidate the regulatory scheme
if it constitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
For example, in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc."' the Court assumed
that although an Arizona "statute regulate[d] even-handedly,""
7
the imposition of "a straitjacket on the appellee company with re-
spect to the allocation of its interstate resources"" 8 unreasonably
burdened the free flow of interstate goods. The Pike Court indi-
cated that the allowable burden will "depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.""' In Pike the
Court balanced the extent of the burden on interstate commerce
against the local benefits and concluded, in light of the absence of
a compelling state interest, that the burden was "clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits.
6 5 0
644. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In Pike an Arizona statute re-
quired, with certain exceptions, that all cantaloupes grown in Arizona and offered for sale
must "be packed in regular compact arrangement in closed standard containers approved by
the supervisor." Id. at 138. Although the Court found that one purpose of the regulation was
to promote and preserve the reputation of Arizona cantaloupe growers by prohibiting decep-
tive product packaging, it recognized a "far different impact." Id. at 144. Because the stat-
ute would prohibit defendant from transporting uncrated cantaloupes from its Arizona farm
to its California plant for packing and processing, defendant would be forced to build an
expensive packing facility in Arizona. Considering the minimal state interest involved, see
note 650 infra, the Court held that the regulation was "virtually per se illegal" Id. at 145.
645. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). The
Hunt Court held that under this strict standard North Carolina did not justify the discrimi-
nation because it failed to sustain the burden on either point. By allowing out-of-state apple
growers to market their products under no classification at all, North Carolina failed to offer
its consumers any of the benefits that allegedly would result from regulation of deceptive,
differing state grades. In addition, the Court noted that the goal of consumer protection
would be furthered by requiring the out-of-state apple producer to display the applicable
U.S.D.A. grade, a uniform grading system in all states.
646. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
647. Id. at 142.
648. Id. at 146.
649. Id. at 142.
650. Id. The Court recognized a legitimate state goal of protecting and enhancing the
reputation of in-state cantaloupe growers, and it assumed the constitutional validity of the
statute as applied to in-state growers. As applied to defendant, the statute had a similar, yet
less compelling, purpose of protecting the reputation of in-state growers by requiring Ani-
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In summary, the negative implications of the commerce clause
serve as a powerful force to strike down local trade barriers that
interfere with the free flow of interstate commerce. Of course, a
state may validly exercise its police powers to protect legitimate
local interests, but whether any particular exercise of power will
survive a commerce clause challenge depends upon the existence of
unreasonable burdens upon or differential treatment of interstate
commerce. A showing of discrimination in favor of local goods and
services triggers a strict standard and places the burden upon the
state to justify the discriminatory treatment. On the other hand,
even-handed state regulation that burdens the interstate flow of
goods and services will survive a commerce clause challenge if the
local benefits outweigh the extent of the burdens-in theory, a
more lenient standard by which to judge state regulation.
zona's superior cantaloupes to be identified as originating in Arizona. The reputation of
Arizona growers was allegedly in jeopardy not "because the company is putting the good
name of Arizona on an inferior or deceptively packaged product, but because it is not put-
ting that name on a product that is superior and well packaged." Id. at 144. This danger was
minimal at best in light of the practical requirement that defendant construct an unneeded
$200,000 packing plant in Arizona.
The Supreme Court had used this balancing approach in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), to find that local nondiscriminatory safety measures placed an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. An linois safety statute required all
trucks and trailers that operated on state highways to have a special contoured mudguard
that would have made regular mudguards, which were legal in forty-five states, unusable in
Illinois. Although it noted that certain safety measures might be so innovative and the local
benefits so compelling that the burden would be outweighed, the Court concluded that "the
present showing-balanced against the clear burden on commerce-is far too inconclusive to
make this mudguard meet that test." Id. at 530. The state regulatory measure resulted in a
clear burden on interstate commerce, because the design of the mudguard differed from the
requirements of almost every other state and thus resulted in delay and inconvenience to
those interstate travelers who were forced to modify their mudguards as they entered and
exited Illinois. This burden, coupled with a finding that the new mudguards created more
hazards than safeguards, convinced the Court that any possible local benefits did not justify
the particular exercise of state power to regulate highways.
Similarly, in Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976), the Supreme
Court balanced the extent of the local benefits against the scope of the burden on commerce
when it examined a Mississippi health regulation that allowed out-of-state milk products to
be sold only if the other state accepted milk products of Mississippi on a reciprocal basis.
Admittedly, the regulation was an attempt "to assure the distribution of healthful milk
products to the people of its State," id. at 370, but the reciprocity clause, by allowing lower
standards if the other state was willing to do the same, failed to "do so in the sense of
furthering Mississippi's established milk quality standards." Id. at 375. Furthermore, there
were less burdensome alternatives such as inspection of out-of-state plants by local inspec-
tors and reliance on out-of-state quality standards that equalled those of Mississippi. Id. at
373.
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(2) Application to Bar Admission Residency Requirements
It is well established that the states have a legitimate interest
in the effective administration of their judicial systems. The prac-
tical ease of local solutions to particularized administrative
problems largely explains local control over the legal profession as
an established feature of Anglo-American jurisprudence. 51 The
Goldfarb Court recently commented that
the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within
their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect the public health,
safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards
for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions. . . .The
interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers
are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice,
and have historically been "officers of the courts." 51
Although the Supreme Court presently exercises caution when re-
viewing state bar admission requirements,5 3 a state's compelling
interest no longer justifies unlimited state power over local bar ad-
missions. Because the scope of modern legal services has been
broadened by the increased interstate mobility of attorneys and
their clients, by an obvious trend toward legal specialization, and
by the ever increasing dominance of federal and uniform laws and
regulations, bar admission requirements should help to further the
state's interest in protecting its citizenry by ensuring competent
legal practice and ethical conduct by attorneys practicing within
the state's borders. This part of the Special Project subjects one
particular bar admission requirement-residency-to commerce
clause analysis in light of the conclusion that bar admission re-
quirements may affect interstate commerce.6"
Almost every state maintains some type of residency require-
ment for admission to the bar. Some states require the potential
practitioner to establish residency for a fixed length of time prior
to the filing of the application, the taking of the examination, or
the granting of admission to the bar.655 Other states require only
651. See generally H. COHEN, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR (1929); C. WARREN, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERicAN BAR (1911).
652. 421 U.S. at 792.
653. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) ("We recognize the
importance of leaving states free to select their own bars.... ."). Justice Harlan, dissenting
in Konigsberg, stated that "this case involves an area of federal-state relations-the right of
States to establish and administer standards for admission to the bars-into which this
Court should be especially reluctant and slow to enter." Id. at 276.
654. See notes 614-31 supra and accompanying text.
655. See note 496 supra.
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simple residence at the time of one of these events.6 Finally, some
states require a showing of intent to maintain continuing residence
after admission to the bar.
657
Whether the state requires simple residence or some period of
durational or continuing residence, discrimination against out-of-
state applicants may result. A nonresident applicant who possesses
the same scholastic qualifications, examination results, legal expe-
rience, moral fiber, and reputation as a resident but who is denied
admission to the bar receives differential treatment "on the basis
of some interstate element. 65 8 Furthermore, differential treatment
of out-of-state bar applicants is evident on the face of bar resi-
dency requirements,'" therefore, the commerce clause analysis
need not involve a search for discrimination as a practical effect."O
Instead, the state must justify the facial discrimination in terms of
the local benefits of the residency requirements and the unavaila-
bility of nondiscriminatory alternatives.661
One state justification for a continuing residency requirement
after admission to the bar is the belief that the continuing physical
presence of attorneys is essential for the efficient administration of
the state's legal system.6 62 An exclusively local bar eliminates the
656. See note 497 supra and accompanying text.
657. See note 498 supra and accompanying text.
658. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 332 n.12 (1977).
659. Courts have found discrimination on the face of residency requirements in other
contexts. For example, in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), the Supreme Court con-
sidered .a South Carolina statute that regulated commercial shrimp fishing by selling li-
censes to state residents for $25 per year and to nonresidents for as much as $2,500 per year.
The Court invalidated the statute under the privileges and immunities clause, since "[b]y
that statute South Carolina plainly and frankly discriminate[d] against non-residents
...... Id. at 396. See also Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (Montana
statute discriminating between residents and nonresidents in establishing access to elk
hunting did not threaten basic right in way that violated the privileges and immunities
clause).
660. Practical discrminatory effects of residency requirements are also evident. For
example, as in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 297 U.S. 137 (1970), see note 644 supra, residency
requirements may necessitate the provision of legal services by in-state counsel even though
an out-of-state attorney could more efficiently provide these services. If an out-of-state cor-
poration faces litigation in the forum state, then it must hire local counsel if its regular
attorney cannot comply with the residency requirements or obtain admission pro hac vice.
Thus, the corporation incurs the additional legal expense of representation by a local attor-
ney who is less familiar with the foreign corporation's legal and operational problems.
661. See note 645 supra and accompanying text.
662. See, e.g., Aronson v. Ambrose, 479 F.2d 75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854
(1973); Brown v. Supreme Court, 359 F. Supp. 549, 561 (E.D. Va.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034
(1973) ("[W]e know of no other means to achieve the goal of a responsible bar in a particu-
lar state .... [W]ithout having local counsel ... [c]ontrol over the docket would be next
to impossible. The foreign attorney would assuredly not be amenable to a court appoint-
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problems generated by the inability of long distance counsel to an-
swer a docket call, "attend, pretrial conferences, meet trial calen-
dars and appear on short notice as court-appointed counsel for
criminal defendants."663 The local bar advanced this argument in
Aronson v. Ambrose,e64 an equal protection case involving the Vir-
gin Islands bar admission requirement that an applicant state and
prove his intention to reside in and practice law in the Virgin Is-
lands. In holding the requirement valid under the equal protection
clause, the Third Circuit noted the compelling state interest in the
f'speedy and efficient administration of justice"'66  and termed "in-
tolerable" the possible dependence of the Virgin Islands courts
upon sub-standard airline service absent the residency require-
ments.6 While the Virgin Islands' interest may be substantial and
the justification for discriminatory treatment legitimate under con-
ditions of geographic isolation, the argument loses some persua-
siveness when applied to the continental United States. Modem
modes of transportation easily allow one day travel between New
York and Los Angeles, and almost instantaneous contact between
a foreign attorney and his in-state client or the local judiciary is
possible via telephone service. Furthermore, as one commentator
has noted, "residence is itself no guarantee of availability in emer-
gencies."7 Thus, although the state admittedly possesses a sub-
stantial interest in maintaining an efficient judicial system, contin-
uing residency requirements have little direct effect upon such
efficiency. Indeed, many states authorize continuing practice by
admission without regard to residency, attesting to the fact that
such requirements have few local benefits. On the other hand, al-
ternatives less restrictive than continuing residency requirements
may contribute to the efficient administration of the local legal sys-
tem. For example, a state might require the nonresident practi-
tioner to associate himself with a local attorney in order to assure
the local judiciary and the client of effective representation when
ment as counsel for an indigent person."); In re Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 360, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964,
966-67 (1972) (nonresident practitioner is neither "susceptible to discipline nor available for
service").
663. 479 F.2d at 78.
664. 479 F.2d 75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973).
665. Id. at 77.
666. Id. at 78.
667. Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1711, 1714-15
(1967). See also Brown v. Supreme Court, 359 F. Supp. 549, 561 (E.D. Va.), aff'd mem., 414
U.S. 1034 (1973). The Brown court felt that residency requirements cannot be justified
solely by the state interest in client protection.
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the need arises.6 8 Likewise, a state bar admission requirement that
a nonresident attorney designate a local agent for service of pro-
cess guarantees adequate receipt and service in the forum state." 9
Another justification that states offer for requiring the contin-
uing physical presence of attorneys is that it maintains the amena-
bility of attorneys to disciplinary proceedings for any unethical
conduct arising from in-state practice. °7 0 The existence of less re-
strictive and nondiscriminatory alternatives, however, casts doubt
on the continued validity of this justification. The Supreme Court
has recognized that "once admitted to the bar, lawyers are subject
to continuing scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In ad-
dition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-
admission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to crim-
inal prosecutions and disbarment. '8 7 1 On the other hand, states
could revise their court rules or their admission requirements to
provide explicitly that the mere practice of law is sufficient to es-
tablish long-arm jurisdiction over the nonresident attorney, or that
admission to the bar is conditioned upon submission to such juris-
diction. 7 ' Therefore, because of minimal local benefits and the
668. See, e.g., Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960), dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question sub. nom. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961). Of course,
association with a local practitioner may increase the cost of using a nonresident attorney.
In addition to compensating the nonresident lawyer, the client must pay for these essential
services rendered by the local attorney. The additional costs, however, should not contra-
vene discriminatory commerce clause principles. For example, in Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), the Supreme Court invalidated a local health and safety regu-
latory statute and suggested that the city could legitimately ensure high milk standards by
relying upon its own inspection of the distant milk processing plants. The Court concluded
that "such inspection is readily open to [the city] without hardship for it could charge the
actual and reasonable cost of such inspection to the importing producers and processors."
Id. at 355.
669. See, e.g., In re Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 360, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966-67 (1972) (con-
cern that nonresident counsel meant nonavailability for service of process). See also MnmN-
SOTA RULES FOR ADMIssION TO Tni BAR, R. 11(B) (1980) (in lieu of residence, applicant may
designate Clerk of Supreme Court as agent for service of process for all purposes).
670. See, e.g., In re Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 360, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964, 966-67 (1972).
671. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 726-27 (1972) (state's denial of admission to the bar,
based on alien citizenship, violated equal protection clause because citizenship/noncitizen-
ship classification was not necessary to serve state's interest in maintaining high profes-
sional standards of its bar).
672. Such state revisions may also appear facially discrminatory, but probably do not
violate the commerce clause since the measures are intended to achieve equality between
resident and nonresident attorneys. Although the state directs the long-arm jurisdiction at
nonresident attorneys, it merely balances the judicial control over nonresident attorneys
with a similar control over resident attorneys. For a similar judicial analysis of state use
taxes, see General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) (use tax imposed
upon resident purchasers in interstate sales valid because of effect of equally distributing
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availability of numerous nondiscriminatory alternatives to the ac-
tual physical presence of attorneys, it is probable that continuing
residency requirements would violate the commerce clause.
Other justifications for discriminatory state residency require-
ments appear more compelling than the facilitation of efficient ad-
ministration of the judicial system by the mere physical presence
of the attorney. 73 In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners67 4 the
Supreme Court emphasized strongly that "[a] State can require
high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or
proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but
any qualification must have a rational connection with the appli-
cant's fitness or capacity to practice law."' 7 5 Residency require-
ments arguably protect the citizenry from the improper practice of
law by facilitating the state's evaluation of an applicant's moral
character and legal proficiency. 7" Proponents of residency require-
ments argue that because residency permits the applicant to ac-
quire a working knowledge of and familiarity with local customs,
governmental structure, and judicial procedure, it assures the pro-
vision of quality legal services and the orderly and efficient admin-
istration of the state judicial system.6 "7 Furthermore, prior resi-
dence in a community affords that community the opportunity to
cost of local government).
673. The Supreme Court suggested strongly that mere administrative convenience is
insufficient justification for durational residency requirements in a divorce context. See
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975) (state one-year durational residency requirement for
obtaining divorce valid under equal protection and due process clauses).
674. 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (any qualification to practice law must have a due process
rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law).
675. Id. at 239.
676. See, e.g., Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 452 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md.
1978), vacated, 614 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980) (applicant's failure of bar examination made
residence issue moot); Suffling v. Bondurant, 359 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.H.), aff'd mem. sub.
nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972) (six month durational residency requirement
valid as reasonable period in which to investigate applicant's moral character); Lipman v.
Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 403 (N.D. Miss. 1971) ("IT]he reasonable connection of resi-
dence with one's professional fitness and capacity is that it allows the [state], charged with
the duty of investigating the applicant's background, moral character and education, a fair
opportunity for personal interviews with the applicant and on-the-ground investigation.").
But cf. Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (one year
durational residency requirements have no rational relationship to fitness or capacity to
practice law).
677. See Nahstoll, Freedom to Practice Law in Another State, 55 A.B.A.J. 57, 58
(1969); Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar: A Compromise Pro-
posal for Change, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 831, 837-39 (1971); Note, supra note 609, at 1480. See
also Brown v. Supreme Court, 359 F. Supp. 549, 561-62 (E.D. Va. 1973) ("Familiarity with




observe more accurately the applicant's moral character. " 8
Despite the presence of apparent justifications for discrimina-
tory state residency requirements, equally plausible arguments
may be advanced that residence bears little or no correlation to
legitimate state objectives, and that in instances in which discrimi-
nation does serve to protect the citizenry, nondiscriminatory alter-
natives cast additional doubt on residency requirements as permis-
sible exercises of state regulatory power over commerce.
For example, simple residency requirements offer the state lit-
tle opportunity to make an informed observation prior to admis-
sion, and durational periods of residence are, at best, inefficient
aids in assessing "moral character." In Keenan v. Board of Law
Examiners 6 7 a federal district court found that North Carolina's
twelve month prior residency requirement furthered no compelling
state interest and that it denied the bar applicant equal protection
under the laws.680 Unable to conclude that mere prior durational
residence was "in any way relevant to a determination that 'desira-
ble moral' qualities" are present in a bar admission applicant, the
court quoted Dean Horack, a leading critic of residency require-
ments: "A mere year of residence does not go far to establish a
man's character and only careful investigation at the applicant's
former place of residence is apt to disclose those habits or qualities
which would make him an undesirable member of the local bar." '
Dean Horack argued that observation of an applicant at a time of
"attendant idleness or separation from practice"682 results in dis-
tortions that may work against the better quality of the local bar.
For example, if an unethical attorney from state A relocates his
practice in state B, then he must comply with state B's durational
residency requirement prior to admission to the new bar. Without
the opportunity to practice, the attorney, on good behavior, never
demonstrates professional misconduct. If state B neglects to inves-
tigate the applicant's background, which has no connection with
residency in state B, then the applicant probably will pass the
community's "good moral character" examination, and state B will
678. See Suffling v. Bondurant, 359 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.H.), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Rose
v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972); Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss.
1971); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (twelve month durational
residency requirement invalid because it serves no legitimate state interest).
679. 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
680. Id. at 1362.
681. Id. at 1359 (quoting Horack, "Trade Barriers" to Bar Admissions, 28 J. AM. JuD.
Soc'Y 102, 103 (1944)).
682. Horack, supra note 681, at 103.
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fail to achieve its otherwise valid objective. The effect of modern
urban society upon a community's ability to observe one of its new
members further weakens the justification for durational residency
requirements. Effective observation becomes impractical, if not im-
possible, because, as the Keenan court stated, "[e]xcept in very
small communities our society has pretty well succeeded in substi-
tuting numbers for names-as most anyone knows who has tried to
cash a check in his own bank without having his imprinted, mag-
netic check book." 88 In any event, a less restrictive, nondiscrimi-
natory means to promote the licensing of honest, trustworthy law-
yers is investigation of the applicant's prior out-of-state
background6s The Keenan court suggests that the National Con-
ference of Bar Examiners provides an "efficient, thorough, and
widely used nationwide investigatory service."' 885 Thus, the state
may obtain information regarding the applicant's character not
only from the applicant himself, but also from third parties who
would be otherwise unavailable to local admission committees for
comment. Furthermore, this additional information flows from
methods that do not discriminate on the basis of interstate borders
and that represent a less restrictive alternative-an alternative
that would probably contribute to invalidation of residency re-
quirements under a commerce clause challenge.
Some courts have held that residency requirements have a ra-
tional connection with an "applicant's fitness or capacity to prac-
tice law." 8 6 For example, in Brown v. Supreme Court867 a district
court agreed that Virginia's residency requirements prevented the
defrauding of its citizenry by assuring the applicant's "[flamiliarity
with local legal nuances."888 Exposure to the peculiar aspects of a
state's law and its government structure clearly serves as a means
by which an attorney can acquire familiarity with local idiosyncra-
sies. Critics, however, argue convincingly that mere residence has
no relevance to this valuable exposure.689 Only the actual practice
or study of law provides a practical and meaningful opportunity to
683. 317 F. Supp. at 1360. See also Note, supra note 677, at 838-39.
684. See note 681 supra and accompanying text.
685. 317 F. Supp. at 1360. See also Horack, supra note 681, at 103 (comments on the
completeness of a nationwide investigatory service); Note, supra note 609, at 1481-82.
686. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
687. 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Va. 1973).
688. Id. at 561.
689. See, e.g., Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D.N.C.
1970) ("too often, even lifelong residents of a community have no knowledge of even the
basic rudiments of the governmental units closest at hand").
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learn the refined aspects of the legal system, and residence alone,
particularly prior to admission, assures the state of neither. 90
Mere residence bears no correlation to the quality of a law school
or of an applicant's pre-admission legal education. Prior durational
and simple residency requirements, by failing to afford the appli-
cant an opportunity to practice,691 serve minimally, at best, the
state's interest in licensing only those attorneys knowledgeable
about local laws and procedure.
Even a requirement of continuing residence after admission,
which at least assures the state of the attorney's residence while
practicing the law with which he is to become familiar, should not
withstand a commerce clause challenge in light of less restrictive
alternatives. Such alternatives include a requirement that the non-
resident attorney associate with local counsel before providing le-
gal services. 2 The local counsel whose experience touches a vari-
ety of problems could provide the nonresident attorney with
special knowledge of local practice. A state could also require that
a nonresident's admission to the local bar be conditioned upon the
taking of a special course on local practice and procedure. Either
alternative, although discriminatory to some extent, is far less re-
strictive in that knowledgeable, qualified nonresident specialists
would then have the opportunity to join and practice before the
local bar. Furthermore, another nondiscriminatory alternative is
the traditional written bar examination that tests all applicants,
residents and nonresidents alike, on their substantive knowledge of
local law.693
(d) Conclusion
According to proponents of bar admission residency require-
690. See Note, supra note 677, at 837-38; Note, supra note 609, at 482-83. But see
Note, The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 71
Mmic. L. REv. 838, 848-49 (1973) (conclusion that under an equal protection test, both sim-
ple and durational requirements have rational relationship with attorney's knowledge of lo-
cal customs and procedures).
691. Simple residency requirements that do not require the potential practitioner to
remain a resident after admission provide, in effect, for only one day of exposure to the local
laws and customs. An applicant's prior residence is likewise ineffective if the applicant's
exposure through practice may not begin until after admission to the bar.
692. See, e.g., Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960), dismissed for want
of substantial federal question sub nom. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961) (rule requir-
ing resident lawyer who practiced regularly in another state to associate local counsel before
making appearances in-state held valid).
693. See Note, supra note 677, at 838 (residency requirements only supplement a writ-
ten bar examination).
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ments, such requirements protect state interests by facilitating the
efficient administration of a state's legal system, by guaranteeing
the amenability of attorneys to disciplinary proceedings, by assur-
ing the local bar of a period during which to investigate the appli-
cant's moral background, and by providing for an attorney's famili-
arity with local practice and procedure. Residency requirements,
however, do very little to serve a state's legitimate interest in pro-
tecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. Indeed, dis-
criminatory admission based upon the applicant's state residence
impermissibly serves state interests by acting as an effective form
of illegitimate economic protectionism.9 Although the articulated
purposes for residency requirements are legitimate in that they re-
late to the goal of stimulating higher professional standards, resi-
dency requirements are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, 695
and their practical effect is not insurance against professional
incompetence, but the exclusion of out-of-state competition with
the local lawyer. 66 Given the practical prohibition of competition,
the minimal protection of legitimate state interests, and less re-
strictive alternatives to bar admission residency requirements, it is
probable that a commerce clause challenge to a state's authority to
regulate bar admissions through residency requirements would be
successful.
694. See, e.g., Horack, supra note 681. One commentator has urged boldly that attor-
neys "must not be ashamed of speaking out in favor of the concept of the economic protec-
tion of the local bar." Young, A National Bar? Not, 54 FLA. B.J. 109, 112 (1980).
695. Residency requirements that bear no relation to professional standards do not by
themselves prevent the admission of unethical or unqualified applicants. The propensity of
an attorney to engage in immoral, unethical, or unprofessional conduct is as great for resi-
dent applicants as it is for nonresident applicants. Likewise, a resident attorney may engage
in full-time office practice and thus maintain no competence in court procedure or rules.
Whether the applicant is a state resident or a nonresident, investigation of his background
or examination of his skills more successfully avoids the danger of licensing incompetent
attorneys. On the other hand, residency requirements prevent many competent attorneys
from providing legal services in-state. This exclusion will become more prevalent as the
practice of law, characterized by increased attorney mobility and legal specialization, evolves
toward a true interstate business.
696. The prohibition of out-of-state competition is an illegitimate state purpose under
commerce clause analysis. See note 638 supra and accompanying text. In Buck v. Kuyken-
dall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925), the Supreme Court held that the practical "effect upon commerce"
of a state licensing statute was the obstruction of competition because it determined who
could use the state highways. The Court examined the licensing statute and concluded that
it "determine[d] not the manner of use, but the persons by whom the highways may be
used. It prohibit[ed] such use to some persons while permitting it to others for the same
purpose and in the same manner." Id. at 315-16. Bar admission residency requirements,
which bear no strong correlation to professional standards, also tend to determine not the
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3. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
(a) Introduction
The privileges and immunities clause of article IV provides
that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunites of Citizens in the several States. ' 9 7 The framers
designed the clause to facilitate the creation of a national economic
unit by preventing states from discriminating against nonresi-
dents. 9 The Supreme Court recently revived interest in the long
dormant clause by rendering two decisions that provide an avenue
of attack on all types of state residency requirements, including
bar admission rules.699 Resurrecting a doctrine that limits article
IV protection to "fundamental rights, 70 0 the Court in Baldwin v.
Fish & Game Commission °1 held that elk hunting is not a funda-
mental right and that a state therefore may charge nonresidents
seven times more than residents for elk hunting licenses. In the
manner or the quality of in-state legal services, but solely those who may engage in such
legal practice. This effect is illegitimate and thus violates the commerce clause.
697. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The article IV clause should not be confused with
the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, which provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. . . ." The former provision deals
with discrimination as to rights recognized by state law, while the latter was limited in The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), to a small number of rights that derive
from national citizenship.
698. The privileges and immunities clause was based upon the fourth article of the
Articles of Confederation, which provided
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the peo-
ple of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States
• . .shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several
States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject
to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (emphasis added).
Charles Pinckney, who drafted the fourth article of the Constitution, commented that
"the 4th article, respecting the extending the rights of the Citizens of each State, through-
out the United States. . .is formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the
present Confederation." 3 M. FARRAND, Rzconns OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
112 (1911).
699. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436
U.S. 371 (1978). In Baldwin Justice Blackmun noted that the clause "is not one the con-
tours of which have been precisely shaped by the process and wear of constant litigation and
judicial interpretation over the years since 1789." Id. at 379.
700. In constitutional law, the meaning of the phrase "fundamental rights" varies with
the provision involved. For example, voting is not a fundamental right under the privileges
and immunities clause, 436 U.S. at 383 (dictum), but is a fundamental right under the equal
protection clause, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-27 (1969).
701. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
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same term, the Court in Hicklin v. Orbeck70 2 held that an Alaska
statute that gave residents absolute preference for employment in
the state's oil and gas industry deprived nonresidents of a funda-
mental right to practice their occupations.
The boundaries of the privileges and immunities clause are
poorly defined, "perhaps because of the imposition of the Four-
teenth Amendment upon our consciousness, ' 7 0 3 but the Supreme
Court has established a three-step analytical framework. A state
violates the privileges and immunities clause when it imposes une-
qual treatment on residents and nonresidents,7 0 when that une-
qual treatment affects a "fundamental right, 70 5 and when the dis-
crimination lacks a substantial relationship to the peculiar evil at
issue.7 06 Because the Supreme Court has concluded that the terms
"citizens" and "residents" are interchangeable for purposes of arti-
cle IV analysis, the privileges and immunities clause applies to
state residency requirements, including those for admission to the
bar.70 7 In fact, state and federal courts recently have considered
several challenges 08 to such bar requirements under the privileges
and immunities clause.
This section of the Special Project first argues that the prac-
tice of law is a protected "fundamental right" and therefore is enti-
tled to a Toomer-Hicklin standard of review under article IV.
Next, the section reviews and analyzes recent applications of the
privileges and immunities clause and considers the impact of these
cases on future challenges to state statutory schemes. Finally, the
702. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
703. 436 U.S. at 380.
704. Generally, the clause was designed "to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures
into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy." Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (footnote omitted). The Court in Toomer declared that the clause "does
bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for
the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States." Id. at 396.
705. Only "fundamental rights" are protected under the clause. Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978).
706. The third part of the Supreme Court's analytical framework, first discussed in
Toomer and later reconfirmed in Hicklin, consists of two tests. A state statute that discrimi-
nates against nonresidents will fail unless the state shows that nonresidents are a peculiar
source of the evil at which the statute is aimed, and the degree of discrimination is closely
related to the problem caused by such nonresident activity.
707. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978) (quoting Austin v. New Hamp-
shire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975)).
708. Canfield v. Wisconsin Bd. of Attorneys Professional Competence, 490 F. Supp.
1286 (W.D. Wis. 1980); Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980); Gordon v.




section draws conclusions as to the trend in this area and the pref-
erability of an article IV avenue of attack.
(b) The Privilege and Immunities Clause
(1) Fundamental Rights
Because a fundamental rights0 9 limitation exists for article IV
protections, the privileges and immunities clause encompasses only
those "basic and essential activities, interference with which would
frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union. ' 1 0 The Su-
preme Court has held that the clause protects the right to fish,'7 1
to market produce,1 2 to be employed in the oil and gas industry,71
to engage in "common callings, ' '7 1' and to pursue "ordinary liveli-
hoods. 7 1 5 While the Court has not specifically determined whether
the practice of law is such a fundamental right, the language of its
recent decisions7 16 strongly suggests that conclusion. 71 7 In Baldwin
v. Fish & Game Commission71 8 plaintiffs raised a privileges and
immunities challenge to Montana's elk-hunting licensing scheme,
which, among other things, imposed substantially higher fees on
nonresidents than on residents.7 19 The Supreme Court affirmed a
709. See note 705 supra. In Baldwin the Court reconfirmed the "fundamental rights
doctrine" first enunciated in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825). 436 U.S.
at 387.
710. 436 U.S. at 387.
711. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
712. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
713. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
714. 334 U.S. at 403.
715. Id. at 408 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
716. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
717. Some commentators and scholars argue that certain "political rights" do not fall
within the ambit of the article IV clause because such rights impinge directly on a state's
sovereignty. See, e.g., Note, The Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal
Constitution, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 347 (1928). The majority in Baldwin noted that various
equal protection cases applying a strict scrutiny analysis but upholding residency require-
ments for voting and for holding public office support the argument for a "political rights"
exception. 436 U.S. at 383. See, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (per curiam)
(upholding fifty day durational residency requirement for voting); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.
Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 802 (1973) (upholding durational residency re-
quirement for holding public offices). One commentator argues persuasively that the prac-
tice of law is not sufficiently related to the residual sovereign powers of the states to fall
within the "political rights" exception. See Note, supra note 609 (arguing, inter alia, that
the attorney's role as an "officer of the court" does not create a sufficient nexus with state
sovereignty to bring the practice of law within the exception).
718. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
719. Id. at 373-74.
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divided three judge district court decision 720 and held that since
the clause extends only to fundamental rights of citizenship, equal
access to Montana elk by nonresident hunters is not protected by
the clause.721 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun quoted
the list of fundamental rights enumerated by Justice Washington
in Corfield v. Coryell,7 22 the first federal case construing the clause.
Justice Washington's illustrative list of rights included
[t]he right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other
state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise;
to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain
actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal.
7 1'
The court's reliance upon language that explicitly refers to "profes-
sional pursuits" suggests that the practice of law is a fundamental
right triggering scrutiny under the privileges and immunities
clause.72
The relationship between the privileges and immunities clause
and the commerce clause7 25 provides further support for the argu-
ment that the practice of law falls within the scope of article IV
protections. 26 In Baldwin Justice Blackmun noted the common or-
igin of the two clauses in the fourth article of confederation,2 and
Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, asserted that "all
the privileges of trade and commerce" protected by the Articles of
Confederation language are also protected by the privileges and
immunities clause .7 2  Recent Supreme Court decisions involving
720. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (D.
Mont. 1976).
721. 436 U.S. at 388. For a critical discussion of Baldwin and the "fundamental rights
doctrine," see 55 WASH. L. REV. 461 (1980).
722. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (upholding a New Jersey statute that prohib-
ited nonresidents from taking oysters from the state's tidal flats on the theory that a state
property interest in oyster beds gave New Jersey the power to limit the privilege of taking
oysters to its own citizens).
723. Id. (emphasis added).
724. See Note, supra note 609, at 1469.
725. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
726. See Note, supra note 609, at 1471-75.
727. 436 U.S. at 379. The manifest distinction between the two clauses is that the
privileges and immunities clause grants affirmative rights to individuals, whereas the com-
merce clause limits the power of the states to restrict the free flow of goods and services
across state lines. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621-22 (1978). For a discus-
sion of bar admission residency requirements in the context of the commerce clause, see
Part II, Section C, subsection 3.
728. 436 U.S. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring). In Hicklin Justice Brennan noted the




state regulation of the legal profession characterize the practice of
law as a form of trade or commerce. In Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona729 the Court invalidated a ban on advertising by two attor-
neys who operated a "clinic" offering routine legal services. 80 The
Court referred to the proposition that lawyers are "somehow
'above' trade" as an "anachronism. '7' 1 Similarly, in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar"82 the Supreme Court banned certain minimum
fee schedules as a "restraint of trade" in violation of the Sherman
Act.73 The Court recognized that "in the modern world it cannot
be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in
commercial intercourse, and that anticompetitive activities by law-
yers may exert a restraint on commerce."73 ' These pronounce-
ments thus support the view that the practice of law may be classi-
fied as a fundamental right for purposes of article IV analysis.73 5
(2) The Standard of Review
In Toomer v. Witsel73 6 the Supreme Court first discussed the
applicable standard of review in cases brought under the privileges
and immunities clause. While acknowledging that the clause does
not provide absolute protection against discrimination737 the
Court nonetheless held that South Carolina's statute unconstitu-
tionally discriminated against nonresident shrimp fishermen733 be-
cause the state failed to show either that "non-citizens constitute a
peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed, 7 3 9 or that
the discrimination bore a "close relation" to a "substantial" state
interest.740 Mullaney v. Anderson74 1 confirmed the Toomer analy-
sis and used it to invalidate an Alaskan licensing scheme that im-
729. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
730. For a discussion of the facts of Bates, see note 729 and accompanying text.
731. 433 U.S. at 371-72.
732. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
733. For a discussion of the facts of Goldfarb, see notes 603-06 and accompanying
text.
734. 421 U.S. at 788.
735. The Supreme Court, however, recognizes that the practice of law is not always a
purely commercial activity. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
736. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
737. The Court recognized "the principle that the States should have considerable lee-
way in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures." Id. at 396.
738. Georgia commercial fishermen challenged highly discriminatory nonresident H-
cense fees imposed by South Carolina for shrimp fishing in its marginal sea. Id. at 387.
739. Id. at 398.
740. Id. at 396.
741. 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
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posed a substantially higher fee on nonresident than on resident
commercial fisherman. The Court further refined the standard of
review in Hicklin v. Orbeck,742 which invalidated an Alaskan stat-
ute giving residents absolute preference for employment in the
state's oil and gas industry.7 43 The Court relied upon prior cases
"holding violative of the [privileges and immunities] [c]lause state
discrimination against nonresidents seeking to ply their trade,
practice their occupation, or pursue a common calling within the
state.17 44 The Court found neither an indication that nonresidents
were a "peculiar source of the evil ' 745 that the statute purported to
remedy nor a demonstration that a "substantial relationship" ex-
isted between the means chosen by the statute and the end sought
to be achieved.7 46 As further support for its decision, the Court
noted the existence of less restrictive alternatives that could
achieve the stated goal of lowering the high rate of unemployment
in the state.
7 7
The Toomer standard of review, as amplified by the Court in
Hicklin, consists of two tests. First, the state must show that non-
residents are a "peculiar source of the evil" at which the statute is
aimed. Second, the discrimination against nonresidents must bear
a substantial relationship to the particular "evil" that these non-
742. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
743. The key provision of "Alaska Hire," as the Act came to be known, was the re-
quirement that "all oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipe-
line purposes, unitization agreements, or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to which
the state is a party" contain a provision "requiring the employment of qualified Alaska re-
sidents" in preference to nonresidents. ALAsKA STAT. § 38.40.030(a) (1977).
744. 437 U.S. at 524. The Court cited Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871)
(invalidating a Maryland statute that required nonresident merchants to obtain licenses in
order to practice their trade without requiring the same of similarly situated Maryland
merchants, charged nonresidents a higher license fee than those Maryland residents who
were required to secure licenses, and prohibited both resident and nonresident merchants
from using nonresident salesmen, other than their regular employees, to sell their goods in
the city of Baltimore); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (invalidating a South Carolina
statute that required nonresident shrimp fishermen to pay a fee one hundred times greater
than that paid by residents); and Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) (invalidating
an Alaskan licensing scheme that discriminated against nonresident commercial fishermen).
745. 437 U.S. at 526-27.
746. Id. at 527-28. Contrary to previous practice in article IV cases, see, e.g., Mullaney
v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1952), the Court appeared to place the burden of proof
on the state to show that nonresidents are "a peculiar source of the evil." 437 U.S. at 526.
Even if a state carries this burden, a discriminatory statute still may be unconstitutional
because of the existence of less restrictive alternatives. Id. at 528.
747. Justice Brennan suggested that a statute granting an employment preference to
unemployed residents or to residents enrolled in job training programs might be permissi-
ble. 437 U.S. at 528.
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residents purportedly present. With respect to the latter test, the
Hicklin Court's reference to less restrictive alternatives suggests an
additional analytical step in future article IV cases.
(c) Bar Admission Cases
In Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness48 the highest
court of New York considered a constitutional challenge to a dura-
tional7 49 residency rule providing that a person may not be admit-
ted to the bar unless he furnishes proof "that he has been an ac-
tual resident of ... New York for six months immediately
preceding the submission of his application for admission to prac-
tice. 7 50 Gordon had qualified for, taken and passed the New York
State Bar Examination 51 but before he received notification of
the results his employer transferred him to North Carolina.8 In
view of his North Carolina residence and the New York rule, the
bar committee deferred action on his Application.7 53 Gordon then
filed suit, alleging that the rule denied nonresidents equal protec-
tion, due process of law, and the same privileges and immunities
accorded residents.7 " The Gordon court held that the rule violated
the privileges and immunities clause and therefore found it unnec-
essary to pass on the first two claims. 55 The court found manifest
discrimination between residents and nonresidents because "given
two equally qualified candidates who have passed the bar examina-
tion . . . and possess the requisite character and fitness, the rule
would deny one admission based solely upon residence."" Relying
upon Hicklin, Bates, and Goldfarb, the court adopted a two-step
approach and reasoned that the clause protected an attorney's
right to pursue his chosen profession.7 57 The court first applied
Toomer's substantiality test 58 and found no justification for the
748. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
749. "Durational" rules require residency for a fixed period prior to application, exam-
ination, or admission. See note 496 supra and accompanying text.
750. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 9406(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981).
751. 48 N.Y.2d at 269, 397 N.E.2d at 1310, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
752. Id. at 269-70, 397 N.E.2d at 1310-11, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
753. Id. at 270, 397 N.E.2d at 1311, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
754. With respect to the first two claims, the court noted the prior rejection of similar
challenges to six month durational residency requirements. Id. at 270 n.6, 397 N.E.2d at
1311 n.6, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 643 n.6.
755. Id. at 270, 397 N.E.2d at 1311, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
756. Id. at 273, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
757. Id. at 272, 397 N.E.2d at 1312, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45.
758. The court stated that under Toomer, "the governmental interest claimed to jus-
tify the discrimination must be carefully examined to detemine whether that interest is
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state's discrimination against nonresident practitioners." Then, as
in Hicklin, the court stressed the availability of less restrictive al-
ternatives to protect the interest of the state in supervising those
who practice in its courts.710 The Gordon court's rationale provides
a model for plaintiffs seeking to challenge durational residency re-
quirements for initial admission to the bar.
Canfield v. Wisconsin Board of Attorneys Professional Com-
petence7 6 1 involved the constitutionality of Wisconsin's simple
7 3
residency requirements, which required bar applicants to reside in
the state at the time of their application.7 " and at the time of their
admission to the bar.76 Canfield stated in his bar application that
he did not reside in Wisconsin and that he did not intend to be-
come a resident of that state.70 5 The Board denied Canfield's appli-
cation because of his failure to comply with the residency require-
ment.766 Following the Wisconsin Supreme Court's denial of his
petition for a waiver of the residency requirement, Canfield sought
declaratory and injunctive relief in the district court 767 and alleged,
inter alia, that the residency requirements violated article IV.768
The court rejected this constitutional challenge, stating that the
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Wilson v. Wilson dictated
the result.7 6  In Wilson plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of
various Oregon state statutes, supreme court rules, and bar regula-
substantial. . . ." Id. at 273, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
759. The court, however, recognized the legitimate interest of the state in controlling
the attorneys who appear in its courts. Id. at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
760. The less restrictive alternatives suggested by the court included permitting non-
residents to furnish affidavits attesting to the applicant's character and fitness to practice
law, enacting legislation requiring nonresident attorneys to appoint an agent for service of
process within the state, and utilizing the remedies of contempt, disciplinary proceedings,
and malpractice actions to protect against abuses by resident attorneys. Id. at 274, 397
N.E.2d at 1313-14, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
761. 490 F. Supp. 1286 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
762. "Simple" residency rules require residency merely at the time of application, ex-
amination, or admission. See note 497 supra.
763. Wisconsin Bar Rule 1.03(3).
764. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.28(2) (West 1980) (repealed by Wisconsin Supreme Court
order dated Dec. 11, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980).
765. 490 F. Supp. at 1288.
766. Id.
767. Id.
768. Id. at 1289. Plaintiff also alleged that the residency requirements violated the
equal protection, due process, and privileges or immunities clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id.
769. Id. at 1290 (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 416 F. Supp. 984 (D. Or. 1976), affd mem.,
430 U.S. 925 (1977)).
772 [Vol. 34:655
BAR ADMISSIONS
tions, ° including a requirement that applicants manifest an inten-
tion to reside in the state at the time of admission.7 7 1 Plaintiff con-
tended that the residency requirements violated his rights under
the equal protection and due process clauses.7 7 2 The three judge
district court rejected plaintiff's claim without mentioning article
IV, although the provision had been cited in a pretrial order.7 78 In
his appeal to the Supreme Court, Wilson's jurisdictional statement
included, inter alia, arguments based on the article IV clause.77 4
Consequently, the Canfield court concluded that the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance in Wilson controlled the outcome of
Canfield because the Wisconsin requirement was "substantially
equivalent to the Oregon requirement upheld in Wilson: residency
at the time of admission. 7 75 In reaching its decision, the court crit-
icized Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, arguing that
the Gordon court mistakenly addressed the article IV issue in light
of the summary affirmance in Wilson. 7 The Canfield court, how-
ever, noted that the Gordon court's apparent disregard of Wilson
might have stemmed from a perceived distinction between the six
month durational residency requirement in New York and the sim-
ple residency requirements upheld in Wilson.7
In Sheley v. Alaska Bar Association7 7 8 the Alaska Supreme
Court cited Gordon as precedent for invalidating the requirement
that bar applicants establish domicile in the state at least thirty
days before taking the examination.7 When she applied to take
the Alaska bar examination, Sheley already held law licenses in
Washington and Texas and planned to complete a judicial clerk-
770. 416 F. Supp. 984, 985 (D. Or. 1976), aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 925 (1977).
771. Id. at 986.
772. Id. at 985.
773. The Canfield court noted the presence of the article IV issue in the Wilson pre-
trial order. 490 F. Supp. at 1290.
774. Id. at 1291.
775. Id.
776. Id. at 1290.
777. Id.
778. 620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980).
779. Alaska Bar Rule 2 provided in pertinent part,
Section 1. Every applicant for examination shall
(e) Establish domicile in the State of Alaska for at least 30 days prior to the first day
upon which the bar examination is to be given. Domicile may be shown for purposes of
taking the bar examination by physical presence in Alaska for the 30-day period prior
to the first day of the examination.
620 P.2d at 641 n.1. Obviously, the rule discriminated against nonresidents of Alaska.
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ship in Texas before moving to Alaska.7 80 Based upon her repre-
sentation that she could not move to Alaska until the end of her
clerkship, the Board of Governors denied her application.781 Invok-
ing the state equal protection clause and the federal privileges and
immunities clause, 2 Sheley appealed to the Alaska Supreme
Court. The court held that the thirty day residency requirement
violated the privileges and immunities clause because the state de-
nied nonresidents the opportunity to take the bar examination on
an equal basis with residents.7 88 Recognizing that the practice of
law is a fundamental right triggering scrutiny under article IV/'7"
the court applied the Toomer-Hicklin standard of review and
asked whether there was a "substantial reason" for the residency
requirement.7 85 The Board contended that the rule afforded a rea-
sonable opportunity to investigate an applicant's academic fitness
and moral character-concededly a legitimate state interest.786 The
court, however, disagreed that there was a "substantial relation-
ship" between the means chosen and the legitimate objectives
sought to be achieved by the bar. 87 Since less restrictive means
were available to achieve those goals, 88 the court concluded that
the discrimination violated the privileges and immunities clause.7
780. Id. at 641.
781. Id.
782. Id. After filing her appeal, Sheley asked the court for permission to take the ex-
amination pending the outcome of her appeal. The court granted the motion and Sheley
took and passed the examination. Id. at 641.
783. Id. at 643.
784. The court agreed with the New York Court of Appeals in Gordon and the com-
mentators, see, e.g., Note, supra note 609, that the practice of law is a fundamental right
triggering scrutiny under the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 642-43.
785. Id. at 645.
786. Id.
787. Id.
788. The court stated that information concerning fitness and character could be
found outside of Alaska and cited the language of Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317
F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) (holding a twelve-month residency requirement for bar ex-
aminees unconstitutional on right to travel and equal protection grounds), for the proposi-
tion that a short period of residence does not aid in establishing an attorney's character. 620
P.2d at 645. The court also noted the availability of the National Conference of Bar Exam-
iners' nationwide investigatory service and suggested that the Alaska Bar Association or a
master outside of Alaska could interview the applicant following the examination, since
there was a three to four month delay in reporting test results. Id. at 645-46.





Both Gordon and Sheley indicate that state bar admission stat-
utes that discriminate on the basis of durational residency cannot
withstand a challenge under the privileges and immunities clause.
The Gordon court based its holding upon the absence of a substan-
tial reason for the discrimination and the availability of less re-
strictive alternatives, while the Sheley court emphasized only the
latter factor. Nevertheless, both courts correctly applied the
Toomer-Hicklin standard in striking down discriminatory stat-
utes.79 0 The incorporation of the "less restrictive alternatives"
component in privileges and immunities clause analysis by the Su-
preme Court in Hicklin"I increases the likelihood that state bar
requirements based upon durational residency will not survive ju-
dicial scrutiny. In general, there are several means available other
than durational residency requirements to protect a state's legiti-
mate interest in controlling the attorneys who practice in its
courts. 2
(2) Simple Residency
Canfield casts some doubt on the viability of an article IV
challenge to simple residency requirements. The Supreme Court's
summary affirmance in Wilson was a disposition on the merits that
binds the lower courts.7 93 A summary affirmance, however, affirms
the judgment only, and is not necessarily based upon the rationale
of the opinion below.79 ' The district court in Wilson did not specif-
ically rely upon article IV in its opinion, and it cannot be pre-
sumed, as the Canfield court did, that the Wilson court referred to
article IV when it used the phrase "right to travel."95 If the Su-
preme Court relied upon the lower court opinion then it in effect
agreed that the statute could withstand an equal protection or due
790. See note 746 supra.
791. See note 747 supra.
792. For a discussion of less restrictive alternatives, see notes 805-12 infra and accom-
panying text.
793. Canfield v. Wisconsin Bd. of Attorneys Professional Competence, 490 F. Supp.
1286, 1289 (W.D. Wis. 1980) (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1975)).
794. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977). The term is ordinarily used in the equal
protection context.




process challenge. 9 6 Additionally, it is important to note that the
Wilson affirmance preceded the revival of the privileges and im-
munities clause in Baldwin and Hicklin. Hicklin's emphasis on the
importance of least restrictive alternatives arguably suggests that
the Court's technical rejection of an article IV argument with re-
spect to simple residency requirements is no longer valid. Simple
residency requires not only physical presence, but also a subjective
intent to remain indefinitely.797 Satisfying a simple residency re-
quirement places a heavy burden on an applicant because the state
demands demonstration of intent by some objective evidence, such
as ownership of a home. While the state has a legitimate interest in
ensuring the ethical character of a bar candidate, simple residency
may not afford the state an opportunity to evaluate the appli-
cant.796 Consequently, a simple residency requirement is even less
rational than a durational rule and should be even more vulnerable
to attack under article IV.
(3) Legitimate State Interests
Although Gordon and Sheley invalidated the particular dis-
criminatory state statute under consideration, the court in each
case recognized the states' legitimate interest in controlling the at-
torneys who practice in its courts. The Supreme Court also has
recognized the state's long established authority to regulate the
practice of law. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar4'9 the Court
noted
We recognize that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of
professions within their boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect
the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to
establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of
professions .... The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially
great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of ad-
ministering justice, and have historically been "officers of the courts."'' 0
Various courts and commentators have identified several interests
that a state may have in residency requirements. First, the state
has an interest in "minimizing its administrative and investigative
796. The Wilson court specifically addressed equal protection and due process argu-
ments. Wilson v. Wilson, 416 F. Supp. 984, 987 (D. Or. 1976), af['d mem., 430 U.S. 925
(1977).
797. See Note, supra note 609, at 1481.
798. Id.
799. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
800. Id. at 792.
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workload."' 80 1 Second, the state may properly exclude morally unfit
lawyers. 0 2 Third, the state may ensure that those who practice
within its borders are familiar with its substantive law, court pro-
cedures, and local customs. 03 Finally, the state may justify a re-
quirement of physical presence on the grounds that it facilitates
malpractice investigation, bar discipline, response to motion calls,
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants, service of process,
and communication with in-state clients.80 '
(4) Less Restrictive Alternatives
While a state has a legitimate interest in regulating the admis-
sion of attorneys to its bar, recent cases demonstrate that resi-
dency requirements are particularly susceptible to constitutional
challenge, especially under the privileges and immunities clause.
To avoid such challenges and to comply with constitutional man-
dates, states must rely upon less restrictive alternatives to accom-
plish their objectives. As suggested by the courts, these alterna-
tives include the following: first, utilizing the National Conference
of Bar Examiners' nationwide investigatory service for information
concerning fitness and character;805 second, requiring nonresident
attorneys to appoint an agent for service of process within the
state;808 third, conducting personal interviews within the state or
before a master outside the state;807 fourth, permitting applicants
to submit affidavits attesting to their character and fitness to prac-
tice law; °0 and last, applying remedies currently available to safe-
guard against abuses by resident attorneys, including contempt,
disciplinary proceedings, and malpractice actions.809 Commenta-
801. Wilson v. Wilson, 416 F. Supp. 984, 988 (D. Or. 1976), affd mem., 430 U.S. 925
(1977).
802. See Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640, 645 (Alaska 1980); Gordon v. Com-
mittee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 274, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d
641, 646 (1979); Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WAsH. L. Rav.
699, 709 (1975); Simson, Discrmination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 379, 390-91 (1979); Note, 71 MICH. L.
REv., surpa note 690, at 838.
803. See Simson, supra note 802, at 390-91.
804. See Aronson v. Ambrose, 479 F.2d 75, 77-78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854
(1973); Brown v. Supreme Ct., 359 F. Supp. 549, 561 (E.D. Va.), afi'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034
(1973); Note, supra note 609, at 1480.
805. See Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640, 645 (Alaska 1980).
806. See Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 274, 397
N.E.2d 1309, 1314, 422 N.Y.8.2d 641, 646 (1979).
807. See 620 P.2d at 646; 48 N.Y.2d at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
808. See 48 N.Y.2d at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1313, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
809. Id. at 274, 397 N.E.2d at 1314, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
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tors have suggested additional alternatives. States could improve
methods of testing bar applicants' familiarity with the state's
law, °10 require lawyers to pass periodic examinations on issues of
state law as a condition of continued practice,811 and enact long-
arm statutes and statutes providing for service by mail.
8 12
(5) Comparisons with Other Methods of Challenge
Recent cases demonstrate that article IV provides the most vi-
able method to challenge bar admission statutes and rules that dis-
criminate between nonresidents and residents. Bar residency
requirements repeatedly have survived equal protection chal-
lenges,81 primarily because courts usually apply the rational basis
test in such cases. Governmental classifications almost always
withstand equal protection challenge when courts apply this stan-
dard of review.8 1 4 In contrast, assuming that the practice of law is a
fundamental right for purposes of article IV, bar residency require-
ments trigger a level of scrutiny under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause that requires a state to show a substantial relationship
between nonresidents and the peculiar "evil" at which the statute
is aimed. Few bar residency requirements can survive such review,
especially because less restrictive alternatives almost always exist.
The article IV approach also is preferable to equal protection
because it is inherently limited to residency requirements involving
fundamental rights such as the practice of law. Courts are hesitant
to employ an analysis that may be broadly applied to all types of
residency requirements. Under the equal protection clause, if all
residency rules, regardless of subject matter, were subjected to a
strict level of judicial review, then they would surely fall.815 In con-
810. See Simson, supra note 802, at 390-92.
811. Id.
812. Id.
813. For a discussion of equal protection challenges to bar residency requirements, see
Part II, Section C, subsection 1.
814. The degree of review afforded under the equal protection clause varies depending
upon the affected individual interest and the basis of the challenged classification. If a sus-
pect class or fundamental interest is involved, the state must demonstrate a compelling in-
terest achieved through the least restrictive means available. If, however, mere economics
are involved, the state must only show a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest. See notes 502-05 supra and accompanying text.
815. Although the Supreme Court has found a fundamental right to travel in some
equal protection cases, see, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), it has refused to
apply strict scrutiny in all equal protection cases involving residency requirements. Such a
course would invalidate a broad range of state legislation, a result specifically rejected by
the Supreme Court. See notes 535-43 supra and accompanying text.
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trast, invalidating state bar residency requirements under article
IV does not provide a basis for proscribing residency requirements
involving different subject matter.8 16
Although state bar residency requirements arguably violate
the commerce clause,8 17 article IV remains the more viable ap-
proach for litigation. The privileges and immunities clause affirma-
tively grants rights to individuals, while the commerce clause lim-
its state power in transactions crossing state lines. Because of this
distinction the burden on the applicant under the commerce clause
is greater. Furthermore, the commerce clause case law in this area
is not well developed, and unlike an article IV case the applicant
would be litigating a case of first impression.
(e) Conclusion
Recent decisions proscribing discriminatory state bar admis-
sion requirements under the privileges and immunities clause sug-
gest a developing trend toward invalidation of various residency
requirements. This judicial trend reflects the greater mobility of
lawyers, their clients, and the society in general. Movements to-
ward legislative uniformity and specialized legal practice accelerate
the development of an interstate law practice, and the increasingly
multistate character of legal problems and lawyers' practices fo-
cuses attention on restrictive bar admission requirements. Conse-
quently, state legislatures and judiciaries must respond with non-
restrictive means to accomplish the states' legitimate objective of
ensuring the ethical character of bar candidates. If, however, the
states are slow to respond to pressures for reform, plaintiffs may
rely on article IV to attack discriminatory statutes. The reasoning
of the Gordon and Sheley courts represents a logical extension of
the Supreme Court's privileges and immunities analysis and pro-
vides a sound basis for challenging durational residency require-
ments. Whether the same analysis applies to simple residency re-
quirements remains an open question because of the apparent
conflict between the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Wil-
son and its incorporation of a "less restrictive alternative" test in
Hicklin.
816. See Note, supra note 609, at 1465.
817. For a discussion of commerce clause challenges to bar residency requirements, see
Part II, Section C, subsection 2.
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III. ADMISSION Pro Hac Vice
A. Introduction
Parties to civil or criminal litigation frequently prefer repre-
sentation by a specialized, out-of-state attorney rather than by a
local generalist.81 8 Numerous factors, 19 including the increased
mobility of lawyers and the multistate character of today's legal
problems, have contributed to the sharp increase in the ranks of
corporate in-house counsel, civil rights attorneys, and federal law
specialists.8 20 Because the interstate practice of law in this country
is an expanding phenomenon, a re-evaluation of the restrictive out-
of-state practice rules is essential for the multistate practitioner.
The nonresident attorney granted permission to try a single
lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction is said to have been admitted pro
hac vice.'21 The requirements for admission pro hac vice are pro-
vided for statutorily in all but one jurisdiction.822 The various state
818. See Brakel & Loh, supra note 802. A local party may gain an advantage by en-
gaging counsel admitted to practice in a foreign jurisdiction whose law will be controlling in
the local action. Another consideration is the need to secure competent nonresident counsel
when the litigant is unpopular locally, as was often true in the civil rights cases of the 1960s.
See Sherman, The Right to Representation by Out-of-State Attorneys in Civil Rights
Cases, 4 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 65, 65 (1968). See also Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392
(E.D. La. 1968).
819. For a discussion of the factors responsible for this trend, see H. TwEED, THE
CHANGING PRACTICE OF LAW (1955); Note, The Practice of Law by Out-of-State Attorneys,
20 VAND. L. REV. 1276 (1967).
820. See Brakel & Loh, supra note 802, at 729-34.
821. Pro hac vice literally means "for this turn" or "for this one particular occasion."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (5th ed. 1979). This legal fiction allows an attorney not per-
manently admitted to the bar of the trial jurisdiction to become a member thereof while he
participates in litigation. Admission pro hac vice, however, does not bestow the rights and
privileges of full membership. For example, the procedure does not enable an attorney to
have an office practice, write a will, draft documents, or advise clients in a nonlitigious set-
ting. See Sherman, supra note 818, at 73.
822. R. GOVERN. ADMISS. TO THE ALA. STATE BAR R. VIII (1979); ALASKA CIv. R.
81(A)(2) (1973); ARIz. R.S. CT. 28(C)I (1979); R. GOVERN. ADMss. TO BAR XIV (Ark. 1975);
CAL. R. OF CT. 983 (West 1980); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 12-15-113 (1973); R. SUPERIOR CT. AND
REG. OF THE STATE BAR ExAM. Com. REG. ADmiss. TO THE BAR § 24 (Conn. 1980); DEL. Sup.
CT. R. 53(b) (1978); D.C. CT. App. R. 46 1I[b][4] (1978); FLA. R. JuD. ADmiN. 2.060(b) (1980);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4502 (1976); HAWAII Sup. CT. R. 15 & 16 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 13,
§ 12 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IND. BAR ADmass. R. 3 & 6 (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 610.13 (West
1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7.104 (Weeks 1975); Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3030(2) (1978); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37:214 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 802 (1979); R. GOVERN. ADwnSS. TO
BAR 19 (Md. 1977) and S. CT. R. 20; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 46A (Michie/Law. Co-op
1974); MICH. Comp. LAws § 600-946 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.02 (West 1971); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 481.02 (1972); Mo.- ANN. STAT. § 484.100 (Vernon 1965); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 37-61-208 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 7-103 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 7-103 (1943);
and Sup. CT. R. 42 (Nev. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311:3 (1966); Sup. CT. R. 1.21-2
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statutes are distinguishable on the basis of several prerequisites for
admission pro hac vice.
One typical requirement 23 for admission pro hac vice is asso-
ciation by the nonresident attorney with a local attorney.8 24 States
have advanced a number of policy considerations to justify the ex-
istence of this and other restrictions on foreign practice. A tradi-
tional rationale is that a state has a duty to ensure competency
among practicing attorneys. 25 A second policy justification is that
the limitation in appearances of out-of-state attorneys facilitates
the administration of justice because local attorneys are more read-
ily available for service of process and disciplinary proceedings.82 6
Finally, it is argued that the real consideration behind admission
pro hac vice is the protection of the economic interests of the local
bar.
8 27
Despite the confusion created by the considerable interstate
diversity among statutes and policy justifications, the procedure
for admission pro hac vice is relatively simple. The usual proce-
dure requires introduction of the nonresident counsel, either by a
local lawyer or by letter, to the judge of the court as a member in
good standing of the bar of another state; the nonresident counsel
must also request that he be granted admission for all matters re-
(N.J. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 36-2-27 (1978); N.Y. Jun. LAW § 478 (McKinney 1968); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 84-4.1 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-27 (1974); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. §
4705.01 (Banks-Baldwin 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 5 (West 1979); OR. REv. STAT. §
240 (1979); PA. B.A.R. SUB. CH. C.R. 301 (1979) and PA. R. OF CT. BAR ADMIss. R. 301 (West
1979); R.I. Sup. CT. R. 40 (Bobbs-Merrill 1976); R. OF CT. ADMISs. P. 13 (S.C. Law. Co-op
1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 2 (1979); Sup. CT. R. 37 (8.06) (Tenn. 1980); Tsx. REv.
STAT. ANN. art. 308 (Vernon 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10 (1953); VT. R. Civ. P. 79.1(e)
(1974); Sup. CT. R. 14:4 (Va. 1979); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 2.48.170, .190 (1979); W. VA. CODE §
2 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256 (West 1979); and App. STATE BAR R. 19 (West 1979); BAR
AsS'N. ORGAN. & GOV'T R. 19 (Wyo. Michie 1957). Case law grants the right to appear pro
hac vice in Idaho state courts. See Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087 (1936).
823. For a discussion of several requirements, see Brakel & Loh, supra note 802, at
703.
824. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:214 (West 1974) (nonresident attorney "tem-
porarily present" in the state forbidden to practice "unless he acts in association with some
attorney duly licensed to practice law by the supreme court of this state.").
825. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). Admission limited
to one occasion, however, bears little relation to protecting the public from an incompetent
or unethical foreign lawyer.
826. See Brown v. Wood, 257 Ark. 252, 516 S.W.2d 98 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
963 (1975); Note, supra note 819, at 1284-85.
827. See Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 246 (5th Cir. 1968); McKenzie v. Burris, 255
Ark. 330, 344, 500 S.W.2d 357, 366 (1973) (economic protection of the local bar is a legiti-
mate state interest). Restraining the number of attorneys admitted to practice permits the
state to maintain a viable bar committed to the local community and to reduce financial
pressures that may lead to misconduct.
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lating to the case at bar.s28 Hence, judges usually grant admission
pro hac vice as a routine courtesy.
This section of the Special Project focuses on two constitu-
tional issues in the pro hac vice area. First, the section analyzes
due process requirements in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Leis v. Flynt.2 9 Next, the section focuses on equal protection
considerations. The section concludes that, while due process ave-
nues of challenge are closed to attorneys seeking admission pro hac
vice, equal protection remains a viable method for challenging de-
nial of admission pro hac vice.
B. Procedural Due Process
1. Leis v. Flynt
In the recent case of Leis v. Flynts e the Supreme Court sur-
prisingly restricted the interstate practice of law by holding that
the due process clause does not protect an attorney's interest in
obtaining admission pro hac vice. In Leis Larry Flynt and Hustler
Magazine, Inc. were charged with violations of the Ohio obscenity
statute. Flynt retained two nonresident attorneys who specialized
in the defense of obscenity cases.831 The judge of the court of com-
mon pleas informed the local attorneys in the case that he would
not allow either of the out-of-state attorneys to represent the de-
fendants. The judge held no hearing on the issue and gave no justi-
fication for his decision to deny admission of the attorneys.3 The
state supreme court later dismissed a mandamus action without
explanation, but on plaintiff's motion the judge who had denied
the admission was removed from the case.833
Flynt and his attorneys then instituted an action pursuant to
828. Sherman, supra note 818, at 73-75.
829. 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
830. Id.
831. The attorneys were Herald Fahringer and Paul Cambria. In 1975 Fahringer re-
ceived the Outstanding Practitioner of the Year award from the New York State Bar Associ-
ation. Cambria received his legal education in Ohio at the University of Toledo Law School
and graduated first in his class. Both attorneys had previously appeared pro hac vice in
Ohio courts.
832. A newspaper reportedly quoted the judge of the court of common pleas as refer-
ring to Fahringer as a "fellow traveler" of pornographers. 439 U.S. at 446 n.3 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
833. The action was apparently dismissed on a procedural point, rather than on the
merits of the case. Id. at 453 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The court found no evidence of
bias or prejudice, but ruled that a trial before a different judge would avoid even the ap-
pearance of impropriety. Id. at 440.
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42 U.S.C. section 1983834 in federal district court to enjoin prosecu-
tion of the case until they were granted a hearing on the denial of
the attorneys' admission. The complaint alleged a violation of the
equal protection clause as well as a corresponding violation of the
attorneys' procedural due process rights.83 5 The district court
granted the injunction, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.838 These
courts held that the attorneys' procedural due process rights were
violated because of the lack of a hearing, adequate advance notice,
and a specification of the alleged misconduct. Neither the district
court nor the Sixth Circuit, however, specified the source of the
attorney's protected property interest.
On certiorari the Supreme Court summarily reversed.8 3 7 The
Court held that attorneys not admitted to the practice of law in
Ohio did not possess the requisite interest to trigger due process
protections, and that therefore they were not entitled to a hearing
upon denial of their application to appear pro hac vice. According
to the Court, the only way such an interest could arise would be
through a grant of right under state or federal law or through an
entitlement under any state "statute or legal rule or. . . mutually
explicit understanding.8 3 8 After noting the failure of the courts
below to cite authority that would support a finding of such an
interest, 3 9 the Court concluded that there "simply was no depriva-
tion here of some right previously held under state law."" The
Court reasoned that, regardless of any reliance by the attorneys
834. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides that
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
835. Because the district court ruled in favor of the procedural due process argument,
it never reached the question of an equal protection violation. Thus, the validity of an equal
protection challenge is still unresolved since the question was not before the Sixth Circuit or
the Supreme Court. Flynt v. Leis, 434 F. Supp. 481 (S.D. Ohio 1977), afl'd, 574 F.2d 874
(6th Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 439 U.S. 438 (1979). See notes 909-20 infra and accom-
panying text.
836. Flynt v. Leis, 574 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 439 U.S. 438
(1979).
837. 439 U.S. 438 (1979). Because of the summary disposition of Leis, the case was
decided before the parties were given an opportunity to address the merits. Justice White
voted to grant certiorari and set the case for oral argument. Id. at 445. The dissent argued
that since this was a matter of "great importance to the administration of justice," it was an
egregious error to summarily reverse. Id. at 457-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
838. Id. at 442 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972)).
839. 439 U.S. at 441.
840. Id. at 443.
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upon Ohio customs, admission pro hac vice was a privilege rather
than a right because the state had never relinquished the power of
its judges to deny admission without explanation."'
The dissent" 2 criticized the majority for relying upon out-
dated labels such as the right-privilege distinction.' s~ The dissent
identified two possible sources of a protected interest and main-
tained that either one was sufficient to require a court to provide
due process protection before denying admission pro hac vice.
First, the dissent contended that attorneys have a liberty interest
not only in pursuing their calling but also in carrying out their "re-
sponsibility for the fair administration of justice in our adversary
system, 's44 and that admission pro hac vice falls within that inter-
est. Second, the dissent argued that the "implicit promise" inher-
ent in Ohio custom and policy with respect to those admissions
was sufficient to create a property interest in admission pro hac
vice. 45 The dissent concluded by noting that this was "the classic
situation in which the interests of justice would be served by al-




The Court in Leis resolved that an attorney who is denied ad-
mission pro hac vice is not entitled to a hearing, either to protest
841. Id. at 442-43.
842. Justice Stevens dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
Id. at 445. Justice White did not join an opinion in the case, voting instead to grant certio-
rari and set the case for oral argument. Id.
843. Under the right-privilege distinction, interests viewed as rights cannot be taken
away without the required procedural safeguards, while those viewed as privileges can be
withheld arbitrarily. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nester, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (state's refusal
to pay old-age benefits is a "mere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit"); Ameri-
can Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 389-90 (1950) (Supreme Court not "free
to treat § 9(h) [of the Taft-Hartley Act] as if it merely [withdrew] a privilege gratuitously
granted by the government."). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, 486-
87 (1978).
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has rejected this distinction. See, e.g., Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (social security disability benefits); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) (public employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (welfare benefits). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
For further discussion of the right-privilege distinction-and the suggestion that the
Court has once again adopted it sub silentio in recent decisions-see Note, The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 56, 95-102 (1976).
844. 439 U.S. at 453 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
845. Id. at 456.
846. Id. at 452.
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or to request reasons for the denial. According to recent case
law, 8 7 procedural due process safeguards would have attached only
if the Court found that the attorney had a protected fourteenth
amendment interest in appearing in an out-of-state case. This sec-
tion comments on the nature of these interests and on the Court's
determination that they did not exist in Leis.
Traditionally, the fourteenth amendment has protected per-
sons from state action that arbitrarily impairs protected interests
in life, liberty, and property. 48 In recent years, courts have broad-
ened the scope of protected interests to include state-created inter-
ests called "entitlements."8' 9 This expansion of protected interests
is the result of the government's increasing role as the source of
necessary and important goods and the concomitant growth of citi-
zen dependency on this governmental largesse. Consequently, the
entitlement doctrine has become an important new source of lib-
erty and property interests. Under this current analysis, if a party
claims an interest in admission pro hac vice, then the Court should
focus upon state law, policies, and practice to ascertain whether an
entitlement has been created.8 5 0
The Supreme Court has held that attorneys possess a consti-
tutionally derived liberty interest in their initial admission to the
bar.851 In his dissent in Leis, Justice Stevens argued that attorneys
also have a protected liberty interest in admission pro hac vice de-
rived from a substantive due process right to practice law.5 2 The
majority in Leis, however, rejected this argument and ruled that a
foreign attorney has no liberty interest in appearing pro hac vice.
One commentator has attempted to explain the majority's holding
through the use of a three-step syllogism.85 First, it is recognized
847. See notes 862-66 infra and accompanying text.
848. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1, provides in part,
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing,"
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
849. The Supreme Court first discussed the theory of entitlements in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Professor Reich of Yale initially articulated this theory in an
article entitled The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See note 843 supra and accom-
panying text.
850. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972); accord, Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See also 439 U.S. at 442-43.
851. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
852. See 439 U.S. at 452 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
853. See 79 COLUM. L. Rv. 572, 577 (1979).
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that a state may exclude from the practice of law any applicant
who has not complied with reasonable state requirements.85 Thus,
permanent admission to the bar of the state in which the applicant
chooses to practice is a reasonable requirement.8 55 Therefore, if a
state may require all those who practice within its borders to be-
come permanent members of its bar, then the state may also grant
admission pro hac vice in any manner it wishes, however arbitrary,
without violating any due process right. The problem with this ar-
gument is that the conclusion is based upon the right-privilege dis-
tinction consistently rejected by the Court.8 56 Although a state has
the power to terminate a benefit altogether, it does not necessarily
follow that a state can administer that benefit in any fashion it
chooses. A state may require permanent admission only because it
is a reasonable requirement; if the state chooses not to require per-
manent admission then any substitute scheme must also be
reasonable.
Assuming the inadequacy of the above syllogism, there are two
possible explanations for the Court's decision in Leis. First, the
Supreme Court failed to find a protected liberty interest in Leis
because Ohio's refusal to admit the nonresident attorneys for a sin-
gle occasion did not constitute a deprivation of a sufficient degree
to be protected by the fourteenth amendment.8 57 In Board of Re-
gents v. Roth8 58 the Court indicated that some foreclosures of op-
portunities might rise to the level of deprivations of liberty. '59 In-
stead of further specifying the precise requirements of such a
deprivation, the Court cited Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, a
case in which the Court held that an applicant has a significant
due process interest in admission to the bar.8 A denial of perma-
nent admission to the bar in one's home state amounts to a fore-
closure of opportunities sufficient to constitute a deprivation of lib-
854. See, e.g., Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154 (1971); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
855. See, e.g., Brown v. Supreme Court, 414 U.S. 1034 (1973), af'g mem. 359 F. Supp.
549 (E.D. Va.); Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 928 (1975).
856. See note 843 supra and accompanying text. The syllogism is also invalid because
it ignores the existence of any equal protection challenge. See notes 909-20 infra and accom-
panying text. A convincing argument can be advanced, however, suggesting that the Court
has re-adopted the "wooden" right-privilege distinction. If so, then the logic of the syllogism
is arguably sound.
857. See notes 71-77 supra and accompanying text.
858. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
859. Id. at 574 n.13.
860. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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erty.86 1 On the other hand, a refusal to admit an attorney pro hac
vice hardly constitutes a serious foreclosure of opportunities since
the attorney can still pursue the practice of law in his home state.
Second, the narrow definition given to protected liberty inter-
ests in Leis may also be attributed to the current Court's philoso-
phy on the scope of protected interests. In the past, the Court has
recognized liberty interests that arise independently of state or
customary law.86 2 In recent decisions, however, the Court has taken
a conservative stance when analyzing liberty interests. For exam-
ple, in Paul v. Davis6 3 the Court suggested that liberty interests
not found in the Bill of Rights must be "initially recognized and
protected by state law" in order to receive constitutional protec-
tion.8s' In Paul the police placed a picture of Davis on an active
shoplifters list when he had been arrested but not convicted of
that crime. Later, the charges were dismissed and Davis sued,
claiming a deprivation under the fourteenth amendment due to the
damage to his reputation. But because Kentucky did not "extend
to respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputa-
tion which has been altered as a result of petitioner's action," Da-
vis was not entitled to constitutional relief.8 65 The Court could
have taken a more liberal approach in Paul and found reputation
to be an interest stemming directly from the Constitution, but it
chose not to do so. Similarly, the Leis Court did not look outside
state law in determining whether admission pro hac vice is a pro-
tected interest. Such a conservative approach virtually ensures
that interests such as admission pro hac vice will be defined
outside the scope of protected interests.6 6
861. For the most part, if an applicant is denied admission in his home state for lack
of good moral character, then he will also be denied admission in other states. See notes 71-
77 supra and accompanying text.
862. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
863. 424 U.S. 603 (1976). See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
864. 424 U.S. at 710. The Court stated in a footnote,
There are other interests, of course, protected not by virtue of their recognition by the
law of a particular State but because they are guaranteed in one of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights which has been "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 710-11 n.5.
865. Id. at 711-12.
866. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293,
322-28 (1976); Note, supra note 843, at 91.
Whether or not this approach will continue to receive the support of a majority of the
Court in all cases is an open question. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73
(1977) (holding that a liberty interest is involved when schoolchildren receive corporal pun-
ishment despite the fact that such an interest is not created by state law). See also Blum-
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The majority in Leis also rejected the claim that Ohio had in
fact created a property entitlement in admission pro hac vice.
867
The Court stated that "the Constitution does not create property
interests. Rather it extends various procedural safeguards to cer-
tain interests "that stem from an independent source such as state
law.' "868 Deciding that there was no property interest in admission
pro hac vice in Ohio, the Court based its determination upon a
rule of the Ohio Supreme Court allowing "participation by a non-
resident of Ohio in a cause being litigated in this state when such
participation is with leave of the judge hearing such cause." 86' 9 A
claim of entitlement is defeated when such a statute creates abso-
lute discretion in the trial judge to allow or deny admission.87 0 A
review of available evidence by the dissent, 7 1 however, revealed
that Ohio had not granted unfettered discretion to the trial judge
but had arguably created a property entitlement in the nonresi-
dent attorney. 72 In State v. Ross 87 - the Ohio Court of Appeals
heard an appeal from a trial judge's order denying an out-of-state
attorney's pro hac vice application. The appellate court made an
extensive inquiry into the trial court's reasons for the denial.8 7' Al-
though the appellate court found the denial to be justified, it can
be inferred from the opinion that an arbitrary ruling by the trial
stein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting Human Life and
Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 243-46 (1977).
867. 439 U.S. at 442-43, 444 n.5.
868. Id. at 441.
869. Id. at 439 n.2 (quoting Sup. CT. R. Gov'T B. OHIo I. § 8(C)).
870. See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 636-37 (1971). When the rule establishes only a limited discretion, a
court can still find the mutuality of expectation required for finding an entitlement.
871. Judicial inquiry necessarily focuses upon state laws, policies, and practices, be-
cause the claimant seeking to establish an entitlement must prove the existence of "rules
and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials." Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
872. See 439 U.S. at 453-54, 454 n.24 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Canon 3 of Ohio's ethi-
cal code expresses an official state policy favoring admission pro hac vice. It recognizes the
indispensability to many modern attorneys of the ability to pursue their clients' interests
across state lines:
IT]he legal profession should discourage regulation that unreasonably imposes territo-
rial limitations upon the right of a lawyer to handle the legal affairs of his client or
upon the opportunity of a client to obtain the services of a lawyer of his choice in all
matters including the presentation of a contested matter in a tribunal before which the
lawyer is not permanently admitted to practice.
Id. at 454 n.21 (quoting OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmimrry EC 3-9).
873. 36 Ohio App. 2d 185, 304 N.E.2d 396 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 904 (1974).
874. Id. at 190-201, 304 N.E.2d at 401-06.
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judge would have been reversible error.87 5 Thus, the above rule of
the Ohio Supreme Court conferring discretion upon the trial court
did not necessarily defeat the attorney's claim of property
entitlement.
Although the claimants in Leis arguably had a valid property
entitlement, the Court's summary disposition of the case may be
attributable to the majority's conservative view of entitlements.
Ohio law did not clearly establish the entitlement, and so the
Court opted for the view that no protected interest existed.876 This
approach did not prevent Ohio from making a contrary finding if it
so chose. Such a conservative position rests upon basic principles
of federalism 877 whereby states have autonomous power, subject
only to constitutional limitations, to govern their internal affairs.878
The concept of federalism is consistent with the entitlement doc-
trine itself. Thus, the Court will not require the state to provide
procedural safeguards unless it is clear that the state has recog-
nized the interest sought to be protected.
3. The Impact of Leis v. Flynt
Because the court relied upon Ohio state law to define the
property interest allegedly protected by the due process clause in
Leis, a restrictive interpretation may arguably be given to the
Court's holding. Under such an interpretation, a similar challenge
in another state in which the policy governing admission pro hac
vice is more clearly established may result in the attachment of
due process safeguards. An examination of the law governing ad-
mission pro hac vice in other states, however, reveals that this area
of the law is generally no more well defined than in Ohio. Thus,
Leis may effectively foreclose due process challenges to denials of
admission pro hac vice.
Bundy v. Rudd 879 indicates that an attorney has no constitu-
tionally protected right to appear pro hac vice in Florida." O Apply-
ing Florida law, the Fifth Circuit held that the nonresident attor-
ney's prior appearances in Florida courts were not sufficient to
875. 439 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
876. The Ohio Supreme Court had dismissed a mandamus action brought by Flynt's
attorneys. Id. at 440. Further, the court found the record "devoid of any indication that an
out-of-state lawyer may claim such an entitlement in Ohio." Id. at 442.
877. See 79 COLuM. L. Rzv., supra note 853, at 580.
878. See generally National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
879. 581 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1978).
880. Id. at 1130-31.
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create a liberty entitlement.88 1 There are, however, implications
from the opinion that a denial without some justification would
have been reversible error.
8 82
New York case law suggests that the trial court has some dis-
cretion in allowing pro hac vice appearances. 8 3 In In re Rap-
paports8 the Second Circuit held that permission to appear pro
hac vice for the initial trial did not guarantee the automatic right
to appear for the retrial of the case. Another New York case,
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp.,8a 5 fell short of creating a right
to appear pro hac vice because it only determined that the practice
is permissive. Like New York, the California courts appear to lack
a well-established policy on the right of foreign attorneys to appear
pro hac vice.888 In Munoz v. United States District Courte 7 how-
ever, the court ruled that an appearance pro hac vice must be per-
mitted in California unless adequate justification for denial is
established.
None of the above mentioned states has any statute or court
881. Id. at 1131.
882. Id. at 1132. Bundy v. Rudd was decided after the Sixth Circuit's decision in Leis
but before the Supreme Court's decision. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Bundy from Leis
by noting that there was a report of misconduct by the attorney in Bundy in another state.
The court's view of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Leis therefore implies that an unjustified
denial may constitute reversible error.
883. See People v. Epton, 248 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Whether that discretion
is limited or unfettered is unclear. In Epton, the district court ruled that the state trial
court had not abused its discretion by excluding defendant's nonresident attorney, despite
the failure to give any reason for the exclusion. Id. at 277.
884. 558 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1977).
885. 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966). In Spanos a California
attorney was awarded legal fees even though he was not formally admitted to appear pro
hac vice in New York. Justice Stevens relied upon Spanos in his dissent in Leis. 439 U.S. at
449-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority in Leis, however, observed that Spanos was
limited, if not rejected entirely, by Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Beatty, 423 U.S. 1009 (1975). 439
U.S. at 442 n.4.
886. The California decisions seem to turn on the presence or absence of unique cir-
cumstances. In Ex Parte McCue, 211 Cal. 57, 293 P. 47 (1930), an out-of-state attorney
sought admission for the sole purpose of transferring his case to another court. Ruling that
the attorney should have been admitted, the court stressed that the qualifications and the
moral character of the attorney were insignificant when dealing with such a slight appear-
ance. More recently in Magee v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 949, 506 P.2d 1023, 106 Cal. Rptr.
647 (1973), the California Supreme Court again relied upon the presence of unique circum-
stances in holding that appearance by foreign counsel should have been allowed. The Supe-
rior Court of California had denied admission pro hac vice because of its desire to avoid any
error on the trial court record in a criminal case that had already consumed a large amount
of court time and vast expenditures for security.
887. 446 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1971). Both the original case and the rehearing contained




rule that specifically grants a nonresident attorney the right to ap-
pear pro hac vice. Furthermore, because few, if any, other state
rules clearly create an entitlement to admission pro hac vices
-most statutes make the practice permissible but then fail to enu-
merate the grounds upon which the admission may be withheld-it
is unlikely that any procedural due process challenge to state pro
hac vice rules will succeed. In addition, even if a specific statute or
court rule granted admission pro hac vice, there is no indication
that the Court will alter its current practice of narrowly construing
these rules. Thus, although it is still possible in some states for a
court to find that an attorney has a property entitlement to appear
pro hac vice, the chances of such a finding are remote.
Since Leis state courts addressing the question of whether a
nonresident attorney has a protected interest in appearing pro hac
vice have all adopted the Supreme Court's position. In Whitaker v.
Statees" the Georgia Supreme Court cited Leis and opined that an
out-of-state lawyer has no cognizable fourteenth amendment prop-
erty interest that requires automatic recognition of a right to ap-
pear pro hac vice. The court, however, also declared that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the attorney.8'0
This dictum implies that an abuse of discretion might have been
grounds for reversal. Although the New Jersey case of Burlington
County Internal Medicine Associates, P.A. v. American Medicorp,
Inc 91 is factually distinguishable from Leis,89 2 the Superior Court
nevertheless discussed the Leis holding and concluded that an at-
torney has no constitutional right to admission pro hac vice. These
two recent decisions indicate a general adoption of the Leis hold-
ing among the state courts and perhaps will generate a uniform
state practice in a once poorly-defined field of law.
Leis is of less consequence in the federal courts because local
court rules govern admission pro hac vice.8 5 Although these rules
888. But see A. KATZ, ADMISSION oF NoNREmEsir ATrORNEYS Pao HAc VicE 1 n.1
(1968).
889. 246 Ga. 163, 269 S.E.2d 436 (1980).
890. Id. at 167-68, 269 S.E.2d at 440-41. The exclusion occurred because the trial
judge denied a continuance of several hours in order to allow time for the out-of-state attor-
ney to arrive. The judge decided to proceed with the hearing on schedule in order to accom-
modate a state's witness, who would have been inconvenienced by a delay of several hours.
891. 168 N.J. Super. 382, 403 A.2d 43 (1979).
892. Burlington County concerned the client's right to choose an out-of-state counsel,
while Leis related to the attorney's interest in admission in a foreign state.
893. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1976). Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
promulgated under the rulemaking power granted by 28 U.S.C. § 2071. Rule 83 provides,
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time to
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vary substantially,894 the federal courts routinely permit pro hac
vice appearances and apply procedural safeguards.895 The recent
case of Johnson v. Trueblood898 exemplifies the relatively minor
impact of Leis in the federal courts. In Johnson the district court
revoked sua sponte the pro hac vice status of a nonresident attor-
ney.897 Citing Leis v. Flynt, the trial judge reasoned that, since the
nonresident attorney had no property interest in admission pro
hac vice, the procedure was merely a privilege granted by the cour-
tesy and grace of the court.89 Accordingly, the trial judge ruled
that the attorney had no due process right to a hearing.89 On ap-
peal the Third Circuit vacated.900 Unlike the court below, the ap-
pellate court did not find it necessary to first identify authority in
the district that recognized the attorney's property interest in ad-
mission pro hac vice. Instead, the court emphasized the desirabil-
ity of due process safeguards in this area of interstate law prac-
tice.901 It also held that a procedural requirement serves a number
of salutary purposes. 2  While a full scale hearing is not necessary
in every case, the court concluded that an attorney is entitled to a
meaningful opportunity to respond to identified charges before his
pro hac vice status is terminated.908
As Johnson illustrates, the attorney seeking admission pro hac
time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules.
Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall upon their promul-
gation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. In all cases not pro-
vided for by rule, the district court may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules.
See also Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
894. See Brakel & Loh, supra note 802, at 718.
895. See, e.g., In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bergamo,
154 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1946).
896. 629 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1980).
897. Johnson v. Trueblood, 476 F. Supp. 90, 91 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
898. Id. at 92 n.5. The trial judge did not inquire whether the attorney might have had
a liberty interest in his admission pro hac vice. Cf. 439 U.S. at 448-52 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (finding a liberty interest in admission pro hac vice). The district court relied upon the
right-privilege distinction. 476 F. Supp. at 92. See note 843 supra and accompanying text.
899. The trial judge also concluded that a hearing was not merited because all of the
matters before the court concerned conduct committed in the actual presence of the court.
476 F. Supp. at 92 n.5. Plaintiffs, however, contended that fairness dictated the holding of
revocation proceedings before a different judge rather than the potentially biased trial
judge. 629 F.2d at 304.
900. 629 F.2d at 302.
901. Id. at 303.
902. Id. The court found that procedural due process protection ensures that the at-
torney's reputation and livelihood are not unnecessarily damaged; it protects the client's
interests; and it promotes more of an appearance of regularity in the court's process. Id.
903. Id. at 304.
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vice will encounter little resistance in the federal courts.'" The im-
plication of Leis, however, is that an attorney who is denied admis-
sion pro hac vice in state court will not have a valid due process
argument.90 5 Consequently, the nonresident attorney must rely on
other constitutional claims to vindicate his own or his client's
rights. Possible challenges include a violation of the privileges and
immunities clause, 0 6 a denial of the client's right to counsel under
the sixth amendment,0 7 and, perhaps the most persuasive of all, a
challenge on equal protection grounds. 0 8
C. Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment mandates that "[n]o state shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the law."'' An equal protection problem thus arises when states
utilize classifications that treat similarly situated persons un-
equally. Under current analysis, if the classification disadvantages
persons within a suspect class 10 or affects a fundamental inter-
est,91 the classification falls unless the state can demonstrate a
compelling interest served through the least restrictive means
available.' 12 If the classification affects an economic interest, how-
ever, then the classification must only bear a rational relationship
to a legitimate state interest.'
13
904. See generally Annot., 33 A.L.R. Fed. 799 (1977).
905. See notes 879-92 supra and accompanying text.
906. Under the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
states may not restrict any measure necessary for the assertion of a federal claim or defense.
In Spanos v. Skouros Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987
(1966), Judge Friendly held that under the privileges and immunities clause no state can
prohibit a citizen with a federal claim or defense from engaging an out-of-state attorney.
907. See 79 COLUM. L. Rav, supra note 853, at 581.
908. See notes 909-20 infra and accompanying text.
909. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
910. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Levy v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegitimacy); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(race).
911. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1963) (voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (procreation).
912. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
913. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Courts utilize a third
level of review if a significant individual interest other than economics is involved. In that
case, the classification must bear a substantial relationship to a legitimate state interest.
See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolv-




In Leis v. Flynt914 petitioners argued before the district court
that the state judge's denial of pro hac vice to Flynt's attorneys
violated both the equal protection and due process clauses. The
district court, however, relied solely on due process grounds in ren-
dering its decision; thus, the equal protection challenge was not
before either the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court.' 15 Unlike the
due process clause, which requires an individual to demonstrate
that the state's action has infringed upon a "protected" interest,'96
the equal protection clause applies whenever similarly situated in-
dividuals are treated unequally by the state. Thus, equal protec-
tion principles apply when a court routinely grants admission pro
hac vice to applicants but has denied such admission to a particu-
lar individual.
In any equal protection challenge, a court's determination of
the appropriate standard of review to be utilized is critical to the
outcome of the case. Considering the nature of the interest in-
volved in admission pro hac vice, it is apparent that the rational
basis test is the appropriate standard of review. Clearly, the attor-
ney has an economic interest in such appearance. Although an ar-
gument can be made that career and reputation interests are also
involved, the Supreme Court's treatment of admission pro hac vice
in the due process context teaches that it is not likely that the
current Court will sanction any standard of review but the most
minimal.917
Despite the application of minimal scrutiny, however, it ap-
pears that the court's action in denying admission to Flynt's attor-
neys would not stand under equal protection scrutiny. In denying
admission to the attorneys, the Ohio court stated only that "Mr.
Fahringer and Mr. Cambria are not attorneys of record in this case
and will not be permitted to try this case."' 1' s Justice Stevens, in
his dissent, stated that conceivably the reason for the denial
hinged on the nature of the suit-an obscenity trial.'1' In any
event, such an arbitrary classification would not appear to pass
constitutional muster even under a minimal scrutiny standard of
equal protection review."90 Thus, although the Court's decision in
914. 439 U.S. 438 (1979).
915. 574 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1979).
916. See notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
917. See notes 830-46 supra and accompanying text.
918. 439 U.S. at 446 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
919. 439 U.S. at 447 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
920. See note 913 supra.
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Leis casts considerable doubt on the viability of any due process
challenge to denial of admission pro hac vice, the same cannot be
said of equal protection challenges. The equal protection clause
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